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

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

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

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Daniel Yankelovich

FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE ELECTION

Much has been written about how the end of the Cold War is reshaping American foreign policy. Less well understood is how this change interacts with an equally momentous change in domestic affairs—the buildup of a powerful anti-status quo sentiment among the electorate. The mood of the American electorate radiates anxiety, mistrust, pessimism and an implacable determination to change the way things are done in Washington. The energy generated by the convergence of these two powerful changes is likely to effect a major transformation of American foreign policy.

The mood of today's electorate differs from that of previous presidential campaigns in the postwar period. Though unmistakably potent, it is easily misunderstood. The public mood is linked to the economic recession, but in an indirect way. Most observers oversimplify this cause-effect relationship.

Economists are thus bewildered by the public sentiment in light of the fact that, in objective economic terms, the present recession is less severe than that of 1981–82; fewer Americans have lost their jobs or have suffered as badly as in the recession of a decade ago. Yet the public is far more agitated now than it was then.

In his own analysis President Bush also ties this public mood too directly to the recession. He attributes his steep decline in the opinion polls to it, and he apparently assumes that once voters realize the recession is over their confidence in him will spring back to previous higher levels. But a careful reading of the public mood suggests this inference may be wrong. The more likely scenario is that, even if the economy picks up before the election, confidence levels in the president will rise only moderately and probably remain below 50 percent (in

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Daniel Yankelovich is Chairman of DYG, Inc. and President of the Public Agenda Foundation. His most recent book is *Coming to Public Judgment*.

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sharp contrast to the almost 90 percent approval ratings of last year).

The public mood interacts with the end of the Cold War to influence foreign policy. A better understanding of the characteristics of that mood and how it relates to the economy will throw light on its implications for America's foreign relations after the presidential election.

II

Journalists invoke words like "anger" and "outrage" to describe voter sentiment. These words do apply to roughly one out of five Americans. But for the vast majority anger and outrage are not the dominant feelings. Most Americans are less angry than they are anxious.

Over the past year the public's level of anxiety has been rising steadily. What worries Americans is that the economy is growing stagnant or declining (75 percent), that Japan is ahead of the United States in terms of its ability to compete (77 percent) and that as a consequence the American standard of living is in grave danger.[1] The main source of voters' anxiety is not the recession as such, but their interpretation of its meaning. There is a big difference between the public's reaction to this recession and its reaction to the last one. The public experienced the recession of 1981–82 as if it were a giant traffic jam: once it was over the nation could resume normal speed. People are not reacting to the present recession in the same way, as if it were part of the normal business cycle. Even though they cannot quite put their finger on it, they fear that something is fundamentally wrong with the U.S. economy. They look to their leaders to pinpoint what is wrong and what to do about it. When their leaders fail to respond well, the anxiety deepens and spreads.

Most voters are coping reasonably well with the present; it is the future they fear. What frightens them is the prospect of fewer good jobs, college tuition climbing out of reach, skyrocketing health-care costs, pensions and retirement benefits at risk and a humiliating rise in homelessness, poverty and urban decay—a shameful America unable to take care of its own.

For years Americans ignored warnings that all was not well with the economy and that the Japanese were forging ahead.

[1]Peter Hart, Council of Competitiveness, September 1991.

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Until the recession people were able to brush aside these warnings ("If things are so bad, how come they are so good?"). When the recession finally came, it gave credibility to the dire predictions and confirmed people's worst fears.

Surveys show that pessimism among the affluent has grown more sharply than pessimism among lower income groups. Unlike previous recessions this one hit white collar as well as blue collar people. No group in the population was taken by surprise quite as much as the giant baby-boom cohort. The majority of affluent well-educated baby boomers had taken for granted, as if it were a law of nature, that the equity in their homes would increase every year, that jobs were secure, that incomes would rise steadily and inexorably and that the smart sophisticated way to manage money was to leverage debt. Now this group, like almost every other group in the population except older affluent suburbanites, has been thrown badly off balance. Its assumptions for living are in disarray.

Americans have grown virtually obsessed with the economy. But this obsession is not self-evident; in opinion polls people express concern about other issues such as health care, education, crime and drugs. A little probing, however, shows that what makes people so anxious about those issues is their economic dimension. At bottom the concern about health care is primarily economic. People ask themselves what will happen if they lose their jobs and, consequently, their health insurance. Most Americans today (88 percent) assume that to get ahead one needs a college education. But they see college tuition costs rising well above the inflation rate (as are health-care costs), and they despair about the future education of their children.[2] Crime and drugs, too, are seen as symptoms of poverty and a deteriorating economy.

Americans realize that many noneconomic factors contribute to the nation's problems as well. But even these are swept up with economic concerns. Americans suspect that the nation's economic difficulties are rooted not in technical economic forces (for example, exchange rates or capital formation) but in fundamental moral causes. There exists a deeply intuitive sense that the success of a market-based economy depends on a highly developed social morality—trustworthiness, honesty, concern for future generations, an ethic of

[2]The Associated Press, May 1991.

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service to others, a humane society that takes care of those in need, frugality instead of greed, high standards of quality and concern for community. These economically desirable social values, in turn, are seen as rooted in family values.

Thus the link in public thinking between a healthy family and a robust economy, though indirect, is clear and firm. The nation should anticipate a growing wave of social conservatism as Americans grapple with the complexities of how to recover their economic dynamism through renewing their commitment to America's traditional core values.

Anxiety alone, even an obsessive anxiety, cannot by itself fully account for the mood of the electorate. One other factor must be added: frustration with America's leadership. Americans are losing confidence in their leaders not because of the recession (they did not lose confidence in Ronald Reagan in 1981–82) but because they perceive a lack of leader responsiveness. People feel that their leaders are not getting the message.

Congress is seen as responsive to the wrong people—special interests with money to help win elections. The president is seen as unresponsive. Voters turn to George Bush with concerns about their economic future and, instead of allaying their anxieties, he fans them. He has appeared oblivious to people's fears about the future and passive in relation to the present. The president seems to think in terms of the inexorable logic of the business cycle; the American people are thinking about other aspects of economic life—inroads by Japanese products and investment, corporate "restructuring" that means jobs lost forever, the flight of manufacturing jobs to other countries, the erosion of wages in this country, annual "givebacks" to employers in the form of paying more for less health-care coverage, the Los Angeles riots. The public is convinced that a great deal can be done to avert the economic threat to the future, if only government and business would stop bickering, push aside special interests and quit "fooling around."

This lack of responsiveness by leadership engenders massive voter frustration that, in turn, creates a crisis of legitimacy. Such crises arise when people come to believe that the institutions that are supposed to serve them are instead serving themselves and, as a consequence, the government has stopped working. The conviction that the government no longer works has been growing for a long time and is not likely

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to dissipate soon. Out of these bone-deep frustrations immense pressures for change are building.

III

The American public began to grow weary of the Cold War in the mid-1980s, years before the fall of the Berlin Wall, let alone the rise of Boris Yeltsin. The turning point in public sentiment can be identified as Ronald Reagan's shift early in his second term from stern judge of "evil empire" to warm friend of Mikhail Gorbachev. As usual Reagan reflected the nation's zeitgeist with uncanny precision. He did not personally cause the change in public attitude (though, with his anticommunist credentials, he accelerated it). By the mid-1980s the American people were ready to abandon the Cold War at the first realistic opportunity. The reasons were these: domestic problems were piling up and the ascendancy of Mikhail Gorbachev offered hope of improved relations with the Soviet Union. People sensed the difficulty of trying to do two things at once—concentrating on both external and internal threats.

It was time, the public sensed, to turn the nation's attention inward. Opinion polls clearly showed that from the mid-1980s to the present the nation became increasingly worried about economic vulnerability as a threat to national security. The time had come to turn away from the imperatives of fighting communism and toward domestic priorities.

It is important to realize how ready the public was to turn inward long before the national mood began to grow sour. The recession may have precipitated the sharp decline in citizen confidence, but it did so mainly in the sense that it "proved" to the public that America's downward spiral was accelerating. The unresponsiveness of the political system then fueled voter frustration and the public's determination to take action.

In the early weeks of the Republican primaries the positive response to Patrick Buchanan's "America First" slogan gave many observers the impression that the public was moving away from internationalism toward isolationism. A superficial glance at public opinion polls also reinforced the impression that America, in its eagerness to address domestic concerns, was ready to turn its back on the rest of the world. By margins of almost five to one Americans agreed that "we shouldn't think so much in international terms, but concentrate more on

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our own national problems."[3] Most rank orderings of issues in polls placed foreign policy and defense at or near the bottom of public priorities.

It is certainly true that Americans feel an urgent need to focus on domestic issues, but this does not mean they are ready to abandon the nation's international commitments. Support for Buchanan and other protectionist candidates like Jerry Brown was part of an unstable protest vote that flowed to Ross Perot when it had the chance. It had little to do with isolationism, except for about 15 percent of the electorate.

A more careful reading of public opinion polls better demonstrates the likely consequences of the political mood for foreign policy. In focus-group discussions average citizens invariably start by loudly and insistently emphasizing the need to pay more attention to America's internal problems. But probing shows that the desire to focus on urgent economic concerns is predicated on a firm commitment to internationalism. Alongside the desire to concentrate on domestic problems is a strong assertion (71 percent) that America "must take an active part in world affairs."[4] Majorities feel America has the right number of troops stationed in Europe and regard a continuing military alliance with western Europe as indispensable to America's national security.

If one looks at the full panoply of issues facing the nation, American opinion varies widely, ranging from "raw opinion" on one extreme to responsible "public judgment" on the other.[5] Raw opinion refers to views that are flabby, contradictory and unstable. These are views yet to be subjected to any careful deliberative process: the public has not wrestled with the tradeoffs, hard choices and conflicts of values that all truly important issues pose. Raw opinion is the knee-jerk view that people carelessly express without real consideration of the consequences. Unfortunately public opinion on many issues today (for example, what to do about the nation's health-care crisis) falls into this category.

In sharp contrast are those select issues on which the public has made the long voyage from casual opinion to thoughtful consideration. Fortunately for the nation the issue of isolation-

[3]Gallup/CNN/*USA Today*, January 1992.
[4]Gallup, September 1991.
[5]Daniel Yankelovich, *Coming To Public Judgment*, Syracuse (NY): Syracuse University Press, 1991.

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ism versus internationalism is one of those. The experience of two world wars followed by the forty-year Cold War with its crises in Berlin, Korea, Cuba, the long divisive war in southeast Asia, as well as the conflict in Afghanistan and more recently the post-Cold War campaign against Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait—these and other searing experiences have given the American people ample time and opportunity to ponder the pros and cons of America's relations with the outside world.

From this extended deliberation voters have drawn a number of lessons, and these have stuck. Americans have learned the hard way that:

—the United States cannot withdraw with impunity from involvement in world affairs;
—it cannot go it alone in this dangerous world without friends and allies;
—great power carries with it great responsibility;
—it is unrealistic to break off relations with nations simply because we happen to dislike or disapprove of their policies;
—it suits America's practical interests as well as its ideals to promote democracy and market-based economies among other nations;
—it is important to remain strong militarily in an unstable and unpredictable world.

The American people have made a thoughtful and stable commitment to these and other tenets of internationalism that will endure through many a domestic crisis. A commitment to internationalism is one of a handful of issues about which citizens have carefully considered the consequences of their views and have come to accept responsibility for them—the defining characteristic of mature public judgment.

IV

Public influence is likely to bring about some decisive changes in American foreign policy. There is a shift in emphasis away from national security defined in military terms, away from ideology described by either anticommunist or prodemocracy commitments and away from geopolitical thinking defined by a balance of power. Instead the public wants greater priority given to America's economic interests.

It is not that Americans are opposed to noneconomic policy goals. Most people, for example, strongly support efforts to

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encourage the spread of democracy to other nations. When asked in the abstract about supporting democracy abroad they embrace this national goal with enthusiasm.[6] But when it comes to setting actual priorities, support for democracy and other worthy foreign policy goals is subordinated to economic concerns. Asked which is the more important goal for the United States to pursue in the world—promoting democracy or promoting American economic interests—by two to one (62 percent to 31 percent) the public chooses economic interests.[7] Similarly when national security and economic interests collide people give priority to the economic side of policy, partly on the grounds noted earlier, that America's present economic weakness is seen as the larger threat to national security.

What does this view of priorities mean in practice? It has large-scale consequences. Consider, for example, America's relations with Japan. Throughout the Cold War America's economic interests vis-à-vis Japan often conflicted with national security considerations and, almost invariably, economic interests were brushed aside. Even today geopolitical aspects of the Japanese relationship consume a great deal of policymakers' attentions. Public pressure is mounting, however, to redefine America's relationship with Japan primarily along economic lines.

Political leaders may argue that the present relationship does benefit the United States economically as well as Japan. But the public is persuaded otherwise. It sees the relationship as zero-sum, with Japan the winner and the United States the loser. Significantly Americans do not place majority blame on the Japanese. Much of the fault, they believe, lies with America itself, notably the shortsightedness of American business and the inadequacy of American government policies.

It is this belief that has kept protectionist sentiment at bay throughout the 1980s. But it will not do so in the 1990s. With economic anxiety so all-pervasive the question of blame is less important than how to improve matters in a practical way. The administration's vision of a new "global partnership"—the United States and Japan cooperating to mount a joint attack on world problems—is, from the average American's point of view, a nonsensical fantasy. It will remain so as long as the relationship is seen as one-sidedly beneficial to Japan. The

[6]ABC News/*Washington Post*, February 1989.
[7]*Ibid.*

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only vision of future American-Japanese relations acceptable to the public is one that creates a new pattern of competition and cooperation that also benefits America—and is perceived as doing so. If both sides win, then a new era of good relations will not only boost the American and Japanese economies but the global economy as well. If present patterns continue, protectionism and worse is the probable scenario, and both sides will lose.

Unfortunately a policy that creates new patterns of economic competition and cooperation is far more difficult to implement than a national security policy: the two governments cannot force the necessary economic relations by themselves. Other players—business, labor, science, technology and the academy—are needed to move from vision to practical strategy. Farsighted government policies on both sides can provide leadership, inspiration and practical help, but implementing such policies will not be accomplished quickly or easily.

V

If Americans are preoccupied with revitalizing the economy yet mindful of international commitments, where will those concerns lead the country? They will probably lead to stringent selectivity in America's future military involvements abroad. President Bush correctly assessed the national mood in his reluctance to intervene militarily in Yugoslavia, despite that nation's agony. The end of the Cold War and other global trends have unleashed the passions of ethnic tribalism all over the world. American intervention in such disputes could make Vietnam's quagmire look like a small puddle. Americans have even less appetite for assuming the role of world policeman than in the Cold War years. Yet they recognize the need for a policeman of some sort. One of the public's best learned lessons is that America must not intervene in world trouble spots unilaterally. Leadership may come from the United States but, without allies who see a similar threat and who are willing to share the sacrifice, it is folly to act alone.

The logic of the situation calls for strengthening those multilateral institutions such as NATO and the United Nations that are organized to counter threats to regional and world security. To be sure, many obstacles stand in the way. NATO is a creature of the Cold War. Germany and France flirt with other security concepts that would exclude U.S. leadership.

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The United Nations often remains toothless without aggressive American-driven initiatives. And by temperament, American policymakers are loath to share leadership with other nations.

Where does the public stand? The public remains ambivalent toward the United Nations—far more positive than in the era when it was dominated by anti-American Third World rhetoric—but still ambivalent. There is no active demand by the American public that the United Nations take more initiative as the world's policeman. But there is a latent willingness to support such policy. If Americans do not want the United States to do the job unilaterally—yet feel some responsibility for indeed getting it done—the United Nations is the most credible candidate for the task. Americans are willing to be sold on this proposition, to have their questions and resistances addressed, and their enthusiasm sparked. This will not happen spontaneously. It will require active leadership. The potential nonetheless exists, if America's leaders wish to take advantage of it.

VI

Preoccupation with the economy will almost surely lead to developing an aggressive industrial policy, and this will happen whoever wins the presidency.

In all likelihood the term "industrial policy" will be avoided because of the negative ideological baggage it carries. A majority of economists and business leaders passionately rejects the idea. For economists the term conjures up the distortions of command economies that have failed so spectacularly in communist regimes. Business leaders shudder at the idea of government telling them how to run their shops and at the gruesome image of Washington-based bureaucracies picking economic "winners and losers."

In the past few decades these concerns have prevented serious consideration of an industrial policy. Instead the United States conducts its economic business with other nations through a mishmash of ad hoc regulations and laws that are frequently contradictory and self-defeating. Critics have identified more than 300 pieces of legislation and regulation that would ordinarily be labeled as part of an industrial policy, if the government were to admit that it harbored one.

There are, of course, countless ways of formulating and conducting industrial policy. Eastern Europe's former com-

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

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mand economies may be a horrible example of one type. But the kind of business-government nexus undergirding Japan's and Germany's economic performance can hardly be cited as examples of failure. The argument is compelling that what may work well in Japan or Germany will not necessarily work in the United States. But there is nothing to stop the United States from developing an industrial policy that fits its own special needs and circumstances. Such a policy would be different in critical respects from Japan's or Germany's.

For decades the debate over industrial policy has been confined to economic opinion leaders in universities, think tanks and Washington. Up to now it has gotten nowhere. Now, however, public sentiment is starting to exert irresistible pressure. The public's position could hardly be clearer. The public believes that in countries like Germany and Japan business and government get together to strengthen the nation's economic competitiveness; in the United States business, Congress and the president are too busy bickering with each other and too bogged down in partisanship to do what is needed to create American jobs and economic growth. Fewer than one out of five Americans attribute the nation's economic problems to "forces beyond anyone's control."[8] Majorities do not believe that Congress alone or the president alone can improve America's competitive strength in the world but that this goal can be achieved only if the two work together (85 percent).[9] Americans want to see more and better training for workers, tougher trade policies, greater efforts to keep jobs in the United States and more attention to improving the quality of American products. They hold government responsible for seeing that these things get done.

Even among experts, attitudes are changing in subtle but important ways. The shift away from factory jobs to a service and information economy has proven a disappointment. It has caused wage levels of the average worker to erode severely. Sentiment is building for a revitalization of America's manufacturing base and a strengthening of its technological leadership. The combination of a changed climate of public opinion and the brutal lessons of competing more effectively in a global economy has broken the ideological gridlock. Whatever new label may be attached to it, an aggressive industrial policy lies

[8]ABC News/*Washington Post*, October 1991.
[9]Hart, *op. cit.*

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in America's future. It is likely to reside at the very heart of the nation's future foreign policy.

VII

The end of the Cold War finds an America anxious to respond to the imperatives of the new global economy. There is a widespread conviction in the country that America's economic leadership has been far too complacent and short-sighted in recent years. Americans fault the country's moral climate for breeding an atmosphere of "everyone out for themselves," with the result that the nation is falling behind on many fronts, especially the economic.

Proponents of the "end of history" are too narrowly focused on geopolitics. The next chapter in American history will feature different players and themes than in the past. The drama will focus on restoring America's competitive vitality, not its military strength. The dominant note will be pragmatism, not ideology. The competition will be with Germany and Japan, not the Soviet Union. The question of "domestic or international" will be brushed aside as irrelevant, since the domestic economy will stand or fall in the international arena. America's moral fervor, always close to the surface, will be rechanneled from anticommunism to a new era of American patriotism centered on improving the quality of America's goods and services—an uninspiring vision, perhaps, for old Cold Warriors but not for the hard-pressed American public.

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Theodore C. Sorensen

AMERICA'S FIRST POST-COLD WAR PRESIDENT

On the morning of November 4, 1992, the first person to be elected president of the United States since the end of the Cold War will awaken to a world remarkably unlike that following any presidential election in the last half century or more.

He will be the first president to start a four-year term without any need to worry seriously about this nation facing nuclear or even armed attack, the existence of another military superpower or a challenge from a hostile global ideology. He will be the first who can rely on a virtually veto-free Security Council in a more effective, respected United Nations. For the first time a worldwide community of nations under law will appear to be within our reach. He will be truly free, in short, to use his inaugural address to outline a new course in world affairs for America.

It will be a historic opportunity.

But along with that opportunity he will face challenges that his predecessors did not face—from the integration of western Europe and the disintegration of eastern Europe; from the spread of ethnic, tribal, religious and other micronationalist clashes that are undeterred by nuclear might and unresolved by free-market and free-election doctrines; and from the difficulties of converting to a less military-oriented economy without unacceptable dislocation.

With the Cold War out of the way the next president will be obliged to face long-deferred global problems, including population growth, food and water shortages and environmental hazards that in combination could create for the next generation of Americans a very ugly and perilous way of life. To an extent not shared by his modern predecessors he will face an anxious and inward-looking American public that generally feels neither generosity nor responsibility toward the plight of other peoples. He will find it more difficult to distinguish

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Theodore C. Sorensen is a Senior Partner at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton and Garrison in New York.

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between friend and foe, now that the clear ideological colors of the Cold War are gone; to distinguish between real dangers and mere problems, now that all kinds of nonmilitary concerns have replaced one clear overriding threat to the nation's survival; and to distinguish between foreign and domestic issues, now that international influence depends less on military supremacy and more on market competitiveness.

In short America's first post-Cold War president will face a world of both unmatched opportunity and unprecedented opacity. Under pressure to choose a new course for the country, with the gravest consequences attendant upon that choice, he will be standing at a crossroads, looking at conflicting signposts and holding outdated maps.

II

He will not be the first president this century to stand at such a crossroads. Presidents Warren G. Harding, after the election of 1920, and Harry Truman, after the election of 1948, stood at comparable intersections. In each case the United States and its military allies, during the period following the previous presidential election, had won a stirring global victory and commenced demobilization. In each case the American people were weary of crisis and eager to resume a course of domestic tranquility and prosperity. In each case the newly elected president had unusual freedom to forge a new national consensus in foreign affairs. Each of them chose very differently.

Harding, elected by a record margin, regarded his victory as a "referendum" rejecting "internationality," as a mandate for "the resumption of our onward, normal way." Europe and Asia were racked by debt, famine and regional disputes, by communism in Russia and by uprisings in scattered colonies. But this country, said Harding, needs "not nostrums but normalcy, . . . not submergence in internationality but sustainment in triumphant nationality."

He appointed a brilliant secretary of state, Charles Evans Hughes, whose focus on international law led to a series of arms and naval limitation conferences and treaties. In the absence of political will and enforcement measures in Washington and other world capitals, all proved ultimately worthless.

In his inaugural address Harding recognized "the new order in the world" (a familiar refrain) and the need for

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international law and understanding. But his primary emphasis was on "the wisdom . . . of non-involvement in Old World affairs."

> Confident of our ability to work out our own destiny . . . we do not mean to be entangled. We will accept no responsibility, except as our own conscience and judgment in each instance may determine . . . no permanent military alliance . . . no political commitments which will subject our decisions to any other than our own authority.

America's return to isolationism in the 1920s was soon symbolized and aggravated by higher tariff and immigration barriers and by the virulent anti-foreigner sentiment that raged in some regions.[1]

Truman, barely returned by the voters in 1948 to the Oval Office that he had inherited three years earlier upon the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt, took a distinctly different course. Even before the 1948 election he had launched the Marshall Plan, embraced the United Nations and commenced the Berlin airlift, making clear America's commitment to Western Europe's security and to a continuing global role. Despite a large contraction of the military budget, he guided the nation's relatively smooth conversion to a civilian base. Immediately after his election he instructed the Department of State to open negotiations for a new North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The NATO agreement, establishing this nation's first "peacetime" military alliance, was signed in Washington only four months later.

Unlike Harding, Truman devoted all of his only inaugural address to foreign affairs. "Today," he declared, "marks the beginning not only of a new administration, but of a period that will be eventful, perhaps decisive, for us and for the world." He stressed, in addition to the need to negate the rising menace in Moscow, four themes of international cooperation: support for the United Nations, continuation of the Marshall Plan, the establishment of NATO and "Point Four," a bold new program to make the benefits of American know-how available to underdeveloped countries.

Between his election and inauguration Truman had accepted the resignation of the ailing George C. Marshall as

[1]A handful of concerned statesmen, recognizing the folly of this path, founded the Council on Foreign Relations and its publication, *Foreign Affairs*.

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secretary of state and named a strong successor, Dean Acheson. In the four years that followed, Truman and Acheson successfully met the multiple challenges of Western postwar reconstruction, Cold War confrontation, Old World decolonization and international economic harmonization, setting the country on a course that lasted almost four decades and that would ultimately "win" the Cold War. To be sure, support from Congress and the public was enormously facilitated by the fear of a visible, powerful enemy; but the nation's basic long-term approach of vigilance, restraint and cooperation with friends and allies had been set by the president in the first few months after his election.

III

Truman, like most presidents, perceived a mandate in his narrow electoral victory. But it may be difficult to discern any foreign policy mandate in this year's election returns, regardless of who wins.

Unfortunately presidential election campaigns often have an unhealthy effect on American foreign policy. Political promises are commonly designed to appeal to local and short-term interests and to ethnic voter blocs. Foreign countries and foreign imports make handy targets for campaign oratory. The leaders of allied nations, however important in the long run, cannot carry a single U.S. district. Overseas problems, particularly if they are controversial, are often neglected or postponed until election pressures are over. In 1976, for example, Republican challenger Ronald Reagan's campaign against President Gerald Ford helped delay both the second Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Panama Canal treaties.

This election year has been worse than most. Logically this November's voting should constitute another great "referendum" on new directions in American foreign policy. Instead, as of this writing, the campaign has dwelt almost entirely on domestic politics, the economy and personalities. The two presidential candidates have largely downplayed major international issues. With public opinion polls consistently showing strong support for President Bush's handling of foreign affairs, particularly his leadership in Operation Desert Storm—a strength on which he had hoped to capitalize in the election—voters complained in the same polls that the president had spent too much time on foreign affairs and too little time on

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U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE '90s



A Search for Enemies
America's Alliances after the Cold War
by Ted Galen Carpenter

"The most important book on U.S. foreign policy since Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. A Search for Enemies* will shape our national debate over America's post-Cold War world role for years to come."

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The passing of the Cold War is the most important development of the late 20th century. Yet Washington clings tenaciously to old policies. Carpenter writes that in a futile attempt to rid the world of "unpredictability," the Bush administration insists on perpetuating a host of obsolete, expensive military alliances, including NATO.

Although those outdated alliances have no real adversary, they hold the potential to embroil the United States in obscure conflicts that have little relevance to America's legitimate security concerns, and they cost U.S. taxpayers $130 billion a year.

Ted Galen Carpenter is director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute.
1992/212 pp./$22.95 cloth/$12.95 paper.

Quagmire
America in the Middle East
by Leon T. Hadar



The Washington foreign policy consensus demands that the United States remain the dominant power in the Middle East. Neoconservatives and others want unstinting support for Israel. Arabists want America to broker a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Hadar concludes that it is time for the United States to disengage from the region and adopt a policy of benign neglect. *Quagmire* points the way to a stable and prosperous future for all peoples of the Middle East.

Leon T. Hadar is a former UN bureau chief for the *Jerusalem Post.* He teaches at American University's School of International Service. **1992/240 pp./$24.95 cloth/$14.95 paper.**

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the domestic issues that were of primary importance to the country. Foreign economic, environmental and other hazards continue to threaten the nation's well-being (less visibly than did Soviet nuclear weapons, to be sure), but only one percent of poll respondents declared foreign policy issues to be the most important matters facing the nation.

As a result President Bush curtailed some of his foreign travels and activities, for months averted his gaze from the slaughter in Sarajevo, delayed and diluted the U.S. contribution to a Russian aid package and—like his Democratic Party challenger—devoted his campaign speeches principally to domestic issues.

With the U.S. economy sluggish, the budget deficit still increasing and America's physical survival no longer at stake, this focus on the domestic front in the country's first post-Cold War election is not particularly surprising or troublesome. But at times only a fine line separated the Democratic Party campaign appeal to "take care of our own first" from the isolationist "America First" philosophy favoring wholesale withdrawal of U.S. forces and commitments. The presidential primaries of both parties appeared to reject outright protectionism and isolationism, making at least that much of a mandate clear. But the meaning of the November election will be harder to read.

IV

If President Bush is reelected, one factor will in theory alter his position the day after that reelection. Under the twenty-second amendment to the Constitution, he will be a "lame duck," ineligible to succeed himself in office after another four years.

Will this make a difference? No doubt, starting early in his term, there will be increased scrambling and angling among both Republicans and Democrats hoping to succeed him. That will make his relations with Congress, including some members of his own party, even more difficult than they already are. The reported interest of members of his own cabinet in gaining the next Republican nomination, unusual in modern politics, though once a common occurrence, could add a still sharper partisan cast to national security debates. Even without any added and early emphasis on presidential ambition Mr. Bush's reelection is unlikely to return bipartisanship in

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foreign affairs to the level that generally but not inevitably prevailed in the first two decades of the Cold War.

Whether a president in his final term actually loses some of his influence with Congress and other countries, and even some of his own determination to please the electorate, is difficult to prove. He still holds the presidency with all its powers. He still occupies the "bully pulpit." He still dispenses patronage, party funds and endorsements. He may not need to win popular or party votes ever again but he will want to win his place in history and to influence the choice of his successor.

Foreign governments occasionally try to play games with the end of a U.S. president's term. The South Vietnamese were apparently induced by Richard Nixon's team in 1968 to stall any peace negotiations until he took charge. Inquiries are now under way to determine whether the Iranians were induced by Ronald Reagan's advisers in 1980 to postpone the return of U.S. embassy hostages until he took charge. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev claimed that he had deliberately deferred the release of downed U-2 pilot Gary Powers in 1960 until President Dwight D. Eisenhower, with whom he was feuding, was gone.

In general the last years in the presidencies of Eisenhower and Reagan, the only two presidents to have served two full terms since adoption of the twenty-second amendment, do not prove either side in this debate. President Eisenhower had his share of disappointments in 1960. His trip to Japan was canceled by an angry mob in Tokyo, and his trip to the Soviet Union was canceled by an angry Khrushchev, whose outrage over the U-2 incursion, real or feigned, also sank a much-awaited summit meeting in Paris. Nevertheless Eisenhower was able to proceed with a number of lesser trips and agreements and remained personally popular at term's end.

President Reagan was also popular after two terms, although his last 18 months in office were marred by the Iran-contra scandal. Inasmuch as the final White House years of both Eisenhower and Reagan shattered the age record for that office, a decline in vigor rather than influence may explain their respective lack of foreign policy initiatives during those years. If President Bush is reelected, the fact that he will be commencing his last term foretells little or nothing about his effectiveness in foreign affairs during the next four years.

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V

If Democrat Bill Clinton is elected on November 3 to replace Mr. Bush the nation will commence on November 4 that unique 11-week phenomenon known as the "presidential transition period." To the leaders of other nations, who will have impatiently waited at least a year for the United States to complete its unduly long presidential selection process and get back to foreign policy decision-making, a further delay of 77 days before they know with whom and what they will be dealing may well seem intolerable. Many policymakers in an outgoing administration return to private life even before the new president is sworn in, and the momentum and interest of those who remain begin to sag. Secretary Acheson complained of the "virtual interregnum" of more than a year that accompanied the 1952–53 change of government. The world does not stand still during our election campaign and transition, and a widespread sense that no one is minding the store in the United States during this prolonged period can be dangerous. The growing crises in Laos during the winter of 1960 and in El Salvador during the winter of 1980 did not wait for new U.S. policymakers to be briefed and take charge.

For a new president-elect, however, the transition period seems all too brief. Unlike a newly chosen prime minister of Britain he has no previously selected, already functioning shadow cabinet, ready at a moment's notice to assume responsibility with total confidence in the permanent career services, with automatic support from the legislative branch and with relatively few important positions to be filled. On the contrary, while still exhausted from a far longer political campaign than Britain has ever endured, a new president must select hundreds of new appointees—most of them strangers to him and to each other—and fight to secure their confirmation by the Senate. He must reexamine America's position in the world from the vantage point of the presidency, very different from that of the candidate, and review in a new and cooler context his campaign promises for early legislative and executive action. He must prepare for the decisions and deadlines that the calendar unavoidably forces upon him soon after he takes office. Next year's list includes new protocols to the international Global Warming and Ozone Layer agreements, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the North Ameri-

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can Free Trade Agreement and renewal of most-favored-nation status for China.

A new president's team needs time, even after inauguration, to move in, learn the ropes and find out more about each other, the responsibilities, personnel and other resources at its command. The working relationship between the new president, secretary of state and national security adviser also needs time to evolve.

Outgoing presidents have occasionally sought to involve their successors in some controversial international move during the transition, and incoming presidents-elect have occasionally acted to discourage one last summit or send-off for their predecessors. A 1992 transition, should President Bush be defeated, will see no such impropriety. Mr. Bush and Mr. Clinton can both be presumed to be men of goodwill, devoted to the national interest. Neither will be unclear as to who has full responsibility until January 20, 1993. The Foreign Service and other career services will accept and assist the members of the new leadership team, and in turn be accepted by them. No career ambassador is likely to be penalized (as some were in 1980–81) for having served in a policy position under the outgoing administration. Briefings for the new team will be comprehensive and objective. To be sure, the departing president may well include in his final budget submission to Congress, as so many have before him, a few hidden land mines, unachievable goals or parting jabs at his successor; but that kind of charade is neither unprecedented nor unforgivable.

Nevertheless transition periods have their dangers, particularly for a president-elect who (like Clinton, and Reagan and Carter before) is a relative newcomer to Washington. Self-appointed spokesmen for the new administration will inevitably sow confusion and concern in foreign embassies and capitals. A few self-important nominees will disdain help from more knowledgeable career officers. (The 1952–53 transition emissary from the newly appointed secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, demanded from the appropriate desk officer "all the telegrams" covering a particular country then in crisis; when asked if the secretary also wanted any background material, he stiffly replied: "No, we will provide our own background.") Occasionally a confidential commitment is unintentionally omitted from the briefing, or a covert operation is inadequately explained (for example, the Bay of Pigs in

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

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
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1960–61), thereby creating serious problems for the new administration at a later date.

A particularly dangerous practice in recent transitions has been the president-elect's selection of his own large, aggressive transition team for each department and agency. These teams, often filled with ideologues, disappointed job-seekers and eager congressional staffers, all jockeying for power, setting their own agenda and determined to score political points, set out not to smooth the transfer of power but to conduct investigations or collect confidential documents that will confirm their worst suspicions about the departing administration. Both the president-elect and the nation would be better served if he named for each department a small, low-profile, issue-oriented, fact-finding task force whose members recognize that the election is over and wish simply to pave the way for the new secretary and then disband.

The president-elect will also need to shift gears, to remember that the political campaign is over and that he no longer needs to respond to every news media demand, criticize his predecessor or take pains to distinguish his position on every issue. Nor in world affairs would it be wise to do so.

VI

Both Bush and Clinton have promised "change" to a frustrated electorate, without exempting world affairs from that prescription. Both have termed themselves "agents of change." But they have been understandably vague about any specifics of change in U.S. foreign policy. Even with all the altered conditions and new opportunities noted above, the new president will not be writing on a clean slate. Continuity avoids confusion and builds consensus. Change solely for the sake of change, or solely for the sake of political appearance, is unworthy. Sudden change can be destabilizing, unsettling to allies, inconsistent with commitments and deemed further evidence of unreliability. Overly ambitious change can lead to embarrassing rejection abroad and to disillusionment at home.

Nevertheless, taking all that into account, the president elected this November, whether incumbent or challenger, will find that his unprecedented freedom to move the country in new directions is not only an opportunity but an obligation. He cannot, even if he wishes, adhere to the old foreign policy agenda, for it is now largely obsolete. Change, more fundamental than either party or any branch of government has

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discussed to date, will be required in virtually every aspect of national security policy. Without attempting to spell out specific details and numbers that will depend upon the next president's personal and political predilections, it seems clear that, regardless of party, he must reexamine our nation's course in the world in at least six overlapping areas: the approach to military matters, multilateral agencies, economic development assistance, international trade, human rights and democracy, and nonmilitary threats to security.

What is needed in each of these areas is not so much the invention of new ideas as the adoption of old ideas whose time has come—measures that do not merely prolong the status quo but ultimately transform it.

No doubt many will regard what follows as presumptuous, partisan and partial; they are right. But any foreign policy agenda offered to a future president whose identity is still unknown would be subject to the same three criticisms. The following agenda is a potential first draft, both to prod the November 3 winner and to provide him with a base upon which to build his own long-term vision of the world as it should be.

VII

In military matters the next president will need to decide whether America should remain a global hegemonic power ready to "pay any price, bear any burden, fight any foe" or evolve into a pivotal, residual power. He will need to decide whether America should transfer to independent regional security groups the primary and initial responsibility for containing those threats to security that arise in their respective regions. This includes those organizations in which the United States has legitimate membership (NATO, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Organization of American States).

Under the latter scenario those regional groups, backstopped by U.N. forces, would be supplemented by American troops only when necessary to their success and to America's own vital interests. Consistent with this approach other leading nations would be encouraged to join and help strengthen those regional groupings in which they have a legitimate interest; our traditional concern for the stability and safety of western Europe would be extended to all of Europe, east and west; the historic turnabout represented by French-German

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military cooperation would be encouraged, not discouraged; and the worldwide elimination of all short-range nuclear weapons would become a priority.

Shooting last instead of first would mean transforming America's Cold War posture of ready global intervention into one of intervening militarily abroad only in concert with other nations, only when the military personnel burden as well as the financial burden (and genuine decision-making) is shared with others, and only when the likely enduring effectiveness of such intervention makes that action worthwhile. America needs to become as skilled in the organization and enforcement of international economic and political sanctions against transgressors as it is in the deployment of military force, thereby increasing its willingness to prefer the former and defer the latter. America needs to devote as much energy to halting, through economic and political pressures and strengthened international machinery, the present "horizontal" proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological, high-tech conventional and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, along with the technology, equipment, personnel and matériel needed to obtain them, as this country previously devoted to halting the "vertical" proliferation of such weapons in the Soviet Union. Accepting a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing would be a good start.

The next president, regardless of party, will be called on to submit a defense budget that is substantially below present levels. This is likely to involve sharply cutting back those overseas forces and major strategic weapons systems that were established primarily to prevent or resist a massive Soviet attack. America would emphasize instead a smaller, mobile conventional force, trained, equipped and ready for rapid and relatively brief Desert Storm-like deployment to meet the kind of regional aggressors, separatists or terrorists that now constitute the most likely threats the nation will face.

Such a reorientation could help win battles on the home front as well. The next president could divert the bulk of federal high-tech research and development funds from the task of increasing our military superiority to the task of enhancing our economic competitiveness; facilitate the conversion to a civilian economy of those communities and work forces now heavily dependent upon anachronistic military industries and installations; and make use of redundant Defense Department personnel and facilities in tackling the

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nation's need for teachers, crime fighters, schools, housing, job training and places of detention.

VIII

The next president should take considerable comfort from the fact that the post-Cold War United Nations, in providing an essential legal umbrella for the Persian Gulf War, helping to free the hostages in Lebanon and to end the fighting in El Salvador, and moving forcefully to underpin the perilous transitions of Namibia and Cambodia, demonstrated that it can bring to the solution of global problems not only machinery and talent but also legitimacy and credibility.

During his term the United States has the opportunity to lead the way in strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of the United Nations, particularly the Security Council (ultimately with the European Community and Japan each holding permanent seats) and the Secretariat, but also such specialized agencies as the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N. Development Program and UNICEF. He should be able to make more consistent use of those bodies, referring more issues to them and to the International Court of Justice, whose compulsory jurisdiction we should once again accept. The new global problems—transborder environmental, economic, health, population, refugee, drugs and human rights—can all best be tackled through these international agencies, where future costs and past experience can be shared.

America can also lead in strengthening and making better use of international financial institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and regional development banks. The world having breathed a sigh of relief over the disappearance of Soviet vetoes blocking U.N. Security Council actions, the next president should go slow in using for political reasons his own effective veto in these international financial bodies.

IX

The new conventional wisdom invariably emphasizes the importance of economics. The next president will recognize that, whatever other goals may have motivated Truman's original Marshall Plan and Point Four, economic development assistance was largely a creature of the Cold War. Public and congressional support for such an economic assistance program in the shifting power patterns of the post-Cold War era

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

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

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

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

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is not likely to be sustained. But neither is the peace of a world community (like that of a local community) harshly divided between rich and poor likely to be sustained. Today African and other nations no longer considered useful as anti-Soviet pawns find themselves largely ignored by Washington. But over the years the multilayered U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) bureaucracy, eager to show its flag in every corner of the developing world, has scattered its remaining funds among a variety of economic development, free enterprise development and democratization development projects with largely disappointing results.

The next president must decide whether to scale back costly country-by-country aid operations and the agency that administers them, instead leaving small emergency and discretionary funds in the hands of each American ambassador. The monies now used to support humanitarian, disaster relief and other grass-roots programs could be channeled through the World Bank and other multilateral agencies and through nongovernmental foundations and similar organizations, thus sharply reducing both tax-supported overhead and associated political payola, but still attaching basic conditions of human rights, arms reduction and accountability. (Those recipient governments instituting genuine administrative, political and economic reforms should also be forgiven all debts to the U.S. government.)

If USAID is scaled back, the bulk of the money it now handles—the "strategic" funds—could be distributed in much larger amounts in multiyear commitments as direct balance-of-payments or budgetary support to a much shorter list of recipients. Under this approach, the president and secretary of state would carefully select the most dynamic developing nations, regardless of size, that are clearly ready and willing to undertake the rapid but long-term political, economic and social development to make them strong, stable and peaceful leaders, regional models and enduring trading and political partners. These funds, along with Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and Export-Import Bank guarantees and credits, should also be used to leverage an increased flow of private investment to the same targeted countries.

To create a viable free economy out of chaos in Russia and the other former Soviet republics, the emerging demilitarized democracies of the Commonwealth of Independent States

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(and not all of them will meet that standard) clearly must receive from the West more economic assistance (in addition to humanitarian aid and agricultural surpluses) than the amounts belatedly offered thus far. In return those states clearly must provide more adequate assurances than they have thus far that necessary long-term political, fiscal, monetary, military and structural reforms will be made. Both America's security and economic interests make stability in this region a high priority.

Finally the next president must take dramatic and decisive steps—such as paying for the destruction of Russian and Ukrainian nuclear stockpiles or establishing with each nation a joint investment guarantee fund—to make sure that prolonged studies and negotiations do not in the meantime cost the Russians their newfound freedom from authoritarianism and cost the world this historic opportunity for peace. Taking care not to pay attention solely to Russia—or even solely to Moscow—providing technical assistance in building free institutions as well as factories, opening U.S. markets to their goods and sending Peace Corps volunteers to their villages, he must initiate a post-Cold War effort in the former Soviet Union that will match the post-World War II vision demonstrated by Harry Truman 44 years ago.

X

With regard to international trade the next president will have no choice but to formulate a coherent national strategy to make American industry competitive again in all key sectors of the world marketplace, basing that strategy on results and consequences, not on some doctrine or dogma of free or fair or managed trade.

No strategy will succeed unless the president, like his Japanese and European counterparts, can build behind it a consensus among American workers, business leaders and consumers sufficiently strong to support a new social compact—a legislated understanding under which each group shares in the costs and sacrifices of that national strategy as well as its benefits. Accepting the self-discipline necessary to improve the nation's rate of savings, investment, productivity, quality control and functional literacy sufficiently to match those of America's principal competitors will be far more effective than trying to discipline those competitors.

To obtain the necessary consensus the next president must

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ask Congress to emulate our major competitors also in providing an adequate level of job retraining, special unemployment benefits, community compensation and other forms of trade adjustment assistance for those displaced by a national trade policy.

Increasing the export of American goods instead of jobs will require new measures not only to pry open particular foreign markets aggressively but also to build demand in new potential markets, including Russia, the developing nations and newly robust economies like India, Korea and Brazil. It will require as well the restoration of the manufacturing base through the reorientation of national research laboratories to civilian purposes, the modernization of infrastructure, the encouragement of emerging technologies and the investment, educational and other measures of self-discipline noted above.

Just as Truman initiated the grand military alliance of NATO immediately after his election, to meet the overriding challenge of his time, so must the next president initiate a grand economic alliance with Japan and the European Community to meet an equally urgent challenge. Its task will be the preservation and coordination of an open, integrated global trading system facilitating the increased worldwide flow of goods, services, capital and intellectual property, free from both protectionist and predatory practices and enhancing the stability of major currencies and exchange rates. Regional trading blocs would be required to keep open markets and membership rolls; weaker economies, including the ex-Soviet states, would be assured access to the system; most important, all nations would be held to the same rules of trade, proscribing not only open and hidden barriers and distortions (including antitrust violations as well as subsidies) but also the practice of shortchanging labor, environmental, health, safety or consumer protection standards as a means of lowering costs and attracting investment.

It is in that context that the next president must complete the GATT and North American Free Trade Area negotiations, ultimately extending the latter to the entire western hemisphere. But time is short.

XI

With respect to human rights and democracy, the next president will need to increase the transparency, integrity and consistency of U.S. policy, avoiding the double standards and

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hypocrisy that characterized America's approach when the Cold War inhibited criticism of anticommunist dictators.

America no longer needs to subsidize the activities and stroke the egos of military usurpers and other despots. It can now encourage consumer boycotts of products from wayward countries; support increased U.N. fact-finding and monitoring of human rights; encourage regional organizations to isolate any member-nation failing to meet basic standards; expand programs of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) and National Endowment for Democracy (NED) that build and promote the institutions of democracy and concern for human rights; undertake every effort to make America's own race relations, political procedures and economic opportunity a model for the rest of the world.

Once the campaign rhetoric on human rights and democracy has faded, the next president should not be under the illusion that more far-reaching measures will be easy or automatic.

He must decide how far the nation can go in invoking human rights considerations in determining relations with both friend and foe. Clearly they can only be one factor, not the sole determinant. Nor can there be any single, simple litmus test in deciding who meets our standards, if we are to avoid the kind of cynical manipulation and denial that such a test invites.

He will wish to encourage democratization and discourage military and other dictators through trade, aid and other preferences, through the maintenance or severance of diplomatic relations and through the educational and promotional efforts of the NED and USIA. But this country cannot afford to deal only with democracies or attempt to remake the world in its own image.

He will no doubt support international economic sanctions and suspend OPIC, Export-Import and economic assistance programs when necessary to penalize those governments that engage in the worst human rights abuses. But as the cases of Haiti and Iraq remind us, he must also beware of starving people or otherwise increasing the suffering of innocent captives as punishment for the sins of their rulers.

He will be under pressure to criticize openly, and to join in U.N. Security Council resolutions condemning, any government, whether allied or adverse, that consistently mistreats legitimate protesters and ethnic minorities. But quiet diplo-

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matic warnings may prove more effective with some governments.

He will wish to support forceful regional and U.N. actions to halt and correct wholesale deprivations of human rights. But legitimate calls for military intervention on humanitarian or democracy-saving grounds can, if caution is not used, easily evolve into another Vietnam-type conflict.

XII

Finally, with regard to other nonmilitary threats, the next president, whoever he is, will need to recognize four basic facts:

—that nonmilitary developments can pose genuine threats to the long-term security and quality of life of American citizens as surely as armed aggression—but cannot be repelled militarily;

—that traditional concepts of national sovereignty are unable to cope with torrential transborder flows of not only money and information but also environmental scourges, AIDS and other diseases, illegal drugs, arms and immigrants;

—that no one of these threats can be ended by the United States acting alone; and

—that new international rules and institutions will be required to combat these nonmilitary threats.

The threat of environmental degradation, for example, by destroying this planet's life support systems—air, ozone, water and natural resources—can blight entire regions and ultimately make the whole earth inhospitable for human as well as other species. America can try to make certain that new U.S.-financed technology and industrial development proceed only with adequate environmental safeguards; but America alone cannot halt the danger to its health and ecology from those noxious and toxic emissions, rain forest depredations and biodiverse species reductions that occur outside its borders.

The threat of energy dependence and depletion requires not only increased international efforts but also a firm national policy emphasizing conservation and greater attention to cheaper alternative and renewable fuels. Operation Desert Storm was only the latest chapter in the age-old story of shedding blood to control energy and other natural resources (including fresh water, which America also wastes and consumes beyond all rational proportions). Yet this country re-

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mains lax in the imposition of fuel efficiency standards and in deterring the excessive use of hydrocarbons and other nonrenewable resources.

Overpopulation with all its many offspring—large-scale unemployment, poverty, hunger, desperation, crime, environmental destruction and great waves of economic migration—is already the province of an international agency, the U.N. Population Fund; but its family planning and information programs have not been fully backed by the United States. Unless more women in the poor nations are fully educated and emancipated with regard to their reproductive systems and rights, our children will live in a world in which the industrialized countries, with most of the planet's wealth, will have less than one-fifth of its population—a recipe for disaster.

All of these sobering global trends are illustrated in Haiti. A desperately poor, oppressed but rapidly growing population exhausted the wood fuel, topsoil and drinking water needed for survival and sought in large numbers to enter the United States illegally by means of sea voyages that proved fatal to a large proportion of those who chanced them.

Is this the future of the world?

This presentation of a presidential agenda does not imply that these measures can be promulgated by the president alone. On the contrary they require the cooperation and participation of other nations, the United Nations and, most important, the Congress. They require the support of the next president's State Department, Defense Department and National Security Council team. Above all they require the support of the American people. Electing a president who promises change is only the first step. Americans must then display the political will to break with the old, to institute the new and to accept the risks and burdens inherent in each of these changes.

The next president, needless to say, cannot lead unless he has a vision of where to go. But neither can he lead, nor should he try to lead, unless the American people are willing to shoulder the responsibilities of leadership in the new post-Cold War world.

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Zbigniew Brzezinski

THE COLD WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH

Karl von Clausewitz defined war as the continuation of policy by other means. By extension the Cold War can be defined as warfare by other (non-lethal) means. Nonetheless, warfare it was. And the stakes were monumental. Geopolitically the struggle, in the first instance, was for control over the Eurasian landmass and, eventually, even for global preponderance. Each side understood that either the successful ejection of the one from the western and eastern fringes of Eurasia or the effective containment of the other would ultimately determine the geostrategic outcome of the contest.

Also fueling the conflict were sharply conflicting, ideologically motivated conceptions of social organization and even of the human being itself. Not only geopolitics but philosophy—in the deepest sense of the self-definition of mankind—were very much at issue.

After some forty-five years of political combat, including some secondary military skirmishes, the Cold War did indeed come to a final end. And, given its designation as a form of war, it is appropriate to begin with an assessment deliberately expressed in terminology derived from the usual outcomes of wars, that is, in terms of victory and defeat, capitulation and postwar settlement. The Cold War did end in the victory of one side and in the defeat of the other. This reality cannot be denied, despite the understandable sensitivities that such a conclusion provokes among the tenderhearted in the West and some of the former leaders of the defeated side.

A simple test reinforces the above assertion. Suppose at some stage of the Cold War—say, ten years ago or even earlier—one were to have asked: What might be a reasonable but also substantive definition of a Western or American victory? Or, alternatively, what might a communist or Soviet

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victory look like? The answers are revealing, for they indicate that the final outcome was even more one-sided than most dared to expect.

Until 1956 some in the West might have defined victory as the liberation of central Europe from Soviet domination. Western passivity during the Hungarian uprising, however, indicated that the Western, and especially the American, commitment to a policy of liberation was largely rhetorical. Thereafter most serious Westerners probably would have defined victory as involving primarily a combination of the following arrangements: German reunification by mutual agreement, with at least the former East Germany neutralized and with many in the West (and especially in Germany itself) even willing to accept German neutrality in exchange for unity; a mutual NATO-Warsaw Pact treaty, providing for significant troop reductions on both sides but also for the retention of some political-military links between Moscow and the central European states; genuine liberalization of the Soviet-imposed regimes, but with many liberal Westerners quite happy to settle for Kadar-type versions; a comprehensive strategic and conventional arms reduction agreement; and the termination of ideological hostility.

In brief, victory would have been defined largely as an accommodation in some respects consistent with the Western understanding of the Yalta agreement: de facto acceptance of a somewhat benign Soviet sphere of influence in central Europe, in return for Soviet acceptance of America's ties to Western Europe (and also to Japan and South Korea). To be sure, a more militant Western minority would have viewed the above as inadequate, while liberal progressives were in general inclined to accept the status quo as the basis for terminating the Cold War.

A Soviet definition of victory is somewhat more difficult to delineate, given the universalist aspirations of communist ideology and the more limited scope of actual Soviet power. Moreover one can also differentiate in the Soviet case between the radicals and the conservatives. The former favored the energetic pursuit of world revolution, exploiting what they perceived to be the general postwar crisis of capitalism. Others warned that caution dictated first consolidating the postwar Soviet gains. One can also deduce to some extent the basic geostrategic assumptions of the Soviet leadership from the top-level and confidential Soviet-Nazi exchanges in late 1940

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

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

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regarding the postwar division of spoils in the event of the then anticipated Nazi victory. Both Hitler and Stalin agreed that America should be excluded from any role whatsoever in Eurasia, and that appears to have been the continuing Soviet goal during the Cold War.

Thus it seems reasonable to conclude that a working definition of a Soviet strategic victory in the Cold War would have entailed the submissive neutralization of both Western Europe (through the dismantling of NATO) and Japan, and the withdrawal of U.S. political and military presence across the oceans. Moreover, following adoption of the 1962 program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), victory was also defined as attaining the worldwide economic supremacy of communism over capitalism, said to be inevitable by 1980. In the meantime anti-Western "national liberation" struggles would isolate "the imperialist camp," with the rest being only a global mop-up operation.

It is a useful exercise to ponder these two alternative notions of victory. Not only did the Soviet victory not come to pass (whether it could have ever been attained is discussed later), but the most likely conventional Western scenario of victory has been exceeded to a degree that is truly staggering. Germany is reunited and already wholly in NATO, with Soviet forces to be withdrawn altogether by 1994; the Warsaw Pact has been abolished, and Soviet forces have been evicted from Hungary and Czechoslovakia and are in process of their final departure from Poland; the Soviet-imposed regimes in central Europe have not only been overthrown but Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia are moving toward joining the European Community (EC) and even knocking at the doors of NATO.

Most important of all, the Soviet Union itself has crumbled and central Eurasia is now a geopolitical vacuum. The former Soviet army is being demobilized and is already demoralized. The Baltic states are free, Ukraine is consolidating its independent statehood and so are the Central Asian republics. Russia's own unity may soon also be at stake, with perhaps the Far Eastern provinces tempted before too long to set up a separate Siberian-Far Eastern republic of their own. Indeed the economic and even the political destiny of what was not long ago a threatening superpower is now increasingly passing into de facto Western receivership. Instead of the once ac-

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claimed theory of "convergence" of the two competing systems, the reality is that of one-sided conversion.

This is an outcome historically no less decisive and no less one-sided than the defeat of Napoleonic France in 1815, or of Imperial Germany in 1918, or of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in 1945. Unlike the Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years War in a grand religious compromise, *cuius regio, cuius religio* does not apply here. Rather, from a doctrinal point of view, the outcome is more similar to 1815 or 1945: the ideology of the losing side has itself been repudiated. Geopolitically the outcome is also suggestive of 1918: the defeated empire is in the process of dismantlement.

As in previous terminations of war there was a discernible moment of capitulation, followed by postwar political upheavals in the losing state. That moment came most probably in Paris on November 19, 1990. At a conclave marked by ostentatious displays of amity designed to mask the underlying reality, the erstwhile Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, who had led the Soviet Union during the final stages of the Cold War, accepted the conditions of the victors by describing in veiled and elegant language the unification of Germany that had taken place entirely on Western terms as "a major event." This was the functional equivalent of the act of capitulation in the railroad car in Compiègne in 1918 or on the U.S.S. *Missouri* in August 1945, even though the key message was subtly couched in "friendship."

Defeats tend to be politically unsettling. Not only do war-losing regimes tend to be overthrown, but the leaders who accept the necessity of capitulation also tend to pay the political price. The kaiser's regime collapsed within days after November 11, 1918—Armistice Day. Within a year the Soviet leader who had accepted the thinly disguised defeat of the Soviet Union was himself overthrown. More than that: the doctrinal past was also formally condemned, the red flag was officially lowered, the ideology and systemic features of the victorious side were henceforth to be formally imitated. The Cold War was, indeed, over.

The critical question on history's agenda now is this: What kind of peace? To what end? On what models of previous postwar settlements? But before those issues are addressed, a second set of major, as well as some subordinate, questions still need to be examined:

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—How was the Cold War actually played? More specifically, were there discernible phases to it? Which side was on the offensive and which on the defensive, and when?
—Was the outcome foreordained? Was an earlier Western victory possible? Could there have been a compromise outcome? And, finally, could the Soviet Union have won and, if so, when?

Both sets of questions are not only of historical interest. There are lessons to be learned for the kind of relations that should now be fostered in the new postwar settlement era, both from the mistakes as well as the accomplishments of the past, and from the very nature of the grand contest itself.

II

It now seems clear that in the Cold War's initial phase, which lasted until after Stalin's death in March 1953, both sides were motivated more by fear than by aggressive designs, but each also perceived the other as, indeed, intent on aggression. In fact *both* significantly demobilized their forces, though the traditional Stalinist secrecy that masked the Soviet demobilization fed Western fears of a possible Soviet conventional sweep westward by a huge Soviet land army that actually no longer existed.

It is now evident that for Stalin the central concern then was to keep and to digest his principal war gain—control over central Europe—while avoiding a premature collision with the ascending Western power, America. He was no doubt motivated also by the hope that America would eventually disengage from Europe. He thus counseled caution and restraint to his more radical and impatient revolutionary allies, notably Yugoslavia's Marshal Tito and China's Mao Zedong.

Stalin was also convinced that the West would seek to contest his primacy in central Europe. He interpreted the Western demands for democratic elections as an effort to inject Trojan horses into his domain. He saw in the introduction of the new West German currency a deliberate effort to undermine his own occupation of East Germany. As the Cold War heated up, he became increasingly paranoid, prompting massive purges of his own satellite communist elites and witch-hunts against any and all manifestations of independent political thinking.

This does not mean that Stalin's intentions were altogether defensive. Rather one can argue that Stalin had a realistic appreciation of the correlation of forces, that he knew how to

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bide his time and that he wanted first to consolidate his gains before moving forward. Eventually he did expect that with the hoped-for American disengagement from Europe continental domination (and thus ideological victory) would be his. In a revealing exchange at Potsdam Stalin responded to Churchill's congratulations on the Russian capture of Berlin by noting wistfully that in 1815 Alexander I had triumphantly marched into Paris.

During this first phase the West also maintained a defensive posture. The West condemned the Soviet subjugation of central Europe but did not contest it. Then the Berlin blockade in 1947 was perceived as the beginning of a Soviet westward push, meant to force the West not only out of Berlin itself but also out of Germany. The Korean War was viewed at a minimum as a diversionary offensive tactic, preliminary to the central showdown in Europe, but also as a part of the effort to complete the expulsion of America from the mainland of Asia and an effort to intimidate Japan.

The Western, and especially the American, response remained cautious throughout. Preventive war against the Soviet Union was not seriously contemplated, despite the U.S. nuclear monopoly. "Massive retaliation," based on U.S. strategic superiority, was in effect a defensive doctrine. The Berlin blockade was contested only indirectly. China was not attacked, despite its massive intervention in the Korean War. The West, instead, placed increased emphasis on the political integration of its slowly recovering former enemies, Germany and Japan, and America undertook explicit commitments to remain militarily present both in the western and eastern extremities of Eurasia. The Korean War demonstrated the American resolve to remain in shattered Korea and Japan, while the creation of NATO in 1949 represented a binding security marriage between America and the still weak Western Europe. The lines were thus clearly drawn. They endured for some forty years.

Stalin's death brought this first phase of the Cold War to an end. Not only were both sides ready for a respite, but the West seemed poised for an offensive. American self-restraint in the Korean War was becoming increasingly strained, and the new Republican administration was broadly hinting that nuclear weapons might be employed. More important, the new U.S. secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, had publicly committed the United States to a policy of "liberation" of central Europe

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from Soviet domination. With NATO in existence, with German rearmament under active consideration and with the United States assertively proclaiming a forward strategy of its own, the proclamation of the policy of liberation appeared to foreshadow a comprehensive Western offensive on the central front, boldly directed at the enemy's weakest sector.

The offensive never materialized. The reasons were basically twofold. The first is that the American side never fully meant it. The policy of liberation was a strategic sham, designed to a significant degree for domestic political reasons. To the extent that it was taken seriously by U.S. policymakers, it prompted more intensified Radio Free Europe broadcasts to the satellite nations, more financial support for émigré political activities and larger-scale efforts to support anti-Soviet undergrounds behind the Iron Curtain. The policy was basically rhetorical, at most tactical.

America's European allies, in any case, not only had never embraced the concept but in fact had been basically against it. The strategic hollowness of the liberation policy was fully exposed during the dramatic months of October and November 1956, when the communist regimes in Hungary and Poland were teetering and when the post-Stalin regime in Moscow was torn by fear and uncertainty. America did nothing to deter the eventual Soviet intervention in Hungary, while the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt signaled that America's principal allies had other priorities.

The other reason the offensive never emerged was that the post-Stalin Soviet leadership was so fearful that the West might actually attempt to exploit the consequences of the tyrant's death that it promptly moved in the direction of diffusing the more dangerous facets of the ongoing Cold War. One of the principal contenders for Stalin's mantle, the secret police boss Lavrenti Beria, even explored the notion of German reunification (in exchange for neutrality). If implemented it would have meant an unprecedented pullback of Soviet power. The other Soviet leaders were not prepared to go quite that far, but they did strive to facilitate the end of the Korean War and, lead by the comical duo of Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin, they eagerly embraced "the spirit of Geneva" that the British and French (fearful of the new American rhetoric) were promoting.

The interlude did not last long. The American-led Western offensive that the post-Stalin leadership so feared never ma-

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terialized, while before long the spirit of Geneva fizzled out as well. In the meantime the new Soviet leadership, increasingly consolidated under Khrushchev, gradually regained self-confidence and began to craft a new and comprehensive strategy, designed to break out of the Eurasian containment that the West had fashioned. That strategy was to be based on three elements: growing Soviet strategic power, which was beginning to neutralize the U.S. deterrent; Soviet economic vitality, which Moscow hoped would before long match the industrial might of the United States and become an ideological magnet for the developing countries; and the promotion of "national liberation" struggles around the world, thereby forging a de facto alliance between the newly emancipated Third World and the Soviet-led bloc.

III

The Soviet Union now moved to the offensive. Eurasia was still the central stake but no longer the central front. Containment was to be defeated by encirclement. Since it could not be pierced without a central war, it would be enveloped. Victory would come somewhere around 1980. This target date was postulated with extraordinary optimism—and supported by massive statistics—in the new CPSU platform proclaimed by Khrushchev in 1962. By that date not only was the Soviet Union to surpass the United States economically but the communist world as a whole was to become economically stronger than the capitalist world. At that point the scales of history would tip.

This second major phase, with its various ups and downs, including some temporary Soviet setbacks, lasted almost twenty years, from the late 1950s to the late 1970s. Although there were brief periods of Western tactical assertiveness as well as occasional "ceasefires," the Cold War on the geostrategic level during this phase was characterized by an offensive Soviet posture. It was marked by boastful assertions of Soviet rocket superiority, by the expansion of Soviet political-military influence into the Middle East and by the successful acquisition of the highly symbolic but potentially geostrategically important base in Cuba. It even involved two brief but dangerous U.S.-Soviet confrontations, one in Berlin and the other in Cuba, both precipitated by Soviet assertiveness.

Despite the prevailing view of the time that these two dangerous clashes ended as American victories, the U.S.

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successes were largely tactical while the Soviet gains were more strategic. The uncontested Soviet construction of the Berlin Wall consolidated Soviet control over East Germany—thereby terminating Soviet fears of Western subversion of its domination over central Europe—while the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba was purchased by the Kennedy administration through a blanket guarantee of the continued existence of a pro-Soviet regime. In effect, immunity was successfully extorted for a geopolitically important Soviet forward base in defiance of the line drawn by the once inviolable Monroe Doctrine.

Despite the fall of Khrushchev in 1964 the basic thrust of the Soviet strategy was sustained under the less colorful and more bureaucratic Brezhnev regime. The strategic buildup continued for the next two decades, imposing such enormous strains on the Soviet economy that, in the end, they vitiated the (in any case, unrealistic) goal of surpassing the United States in the economic domain. The efforts to expand the Soviet role in the Third World, thereby piercing Western containment within Eurasia, were likewise sustained, despite tactical accommodations with the Johnson and Nixon administrations, both of them burdened by the Vietnam War and eager for some respite in the Cold War.

The resulting U.S.-Soviet accommodations were, however, confined to only two areas: some modest progress in arms control negotiations and some relaxation of tensions in Europe. But though the Soviet expansion into the Third World and the Soviet strategic buildup continued, even that limited progress on several occasions led the West to proclaim the premature end of the Cold War. In the late 1960s and early 1970s "détente" became a fashionable concept, "beyond the Cold War" a frequent title for op-ed pieces, and a U.S. president even announced in the early 1970s that "a generation of peace" had been attained.

During this phase of the contest America's European allies, fully recovered and protected by containment based on American power, tended to act as if they were increasingly neutral in the global Cold War and ready to negotiate separate ceasefires in Europe itself. While this posture was not formally opposed by the United States, it did tend to create tensions in the alliance as well as openings for Soviet diplomacy. To many people the slogan "Europe to the Urals" or the term "Ostpolitik" were code words for a separate European posture on the

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critical East-West issues. The unpopularity of the Vietnam War tended to contribute to a sense of American isolation, and that in turn fed into U.S. slogans advocating "Come home, America."

The Soviet offensive thrust reached its apogee in the 1970s. Soviet momentum interacted with America's post-Vietnam fatigue and with the widespread Western eagerness for détente to a degree that America seemed ready to settle the Cold War even on the basis of accepting strategic inferiority. President Nixon's brilliant coup in opening the U.S.-Chinese relationship altered the geostrategic context, but it could not compensate for internal American dissension and demoralization. That condition prompted Secretary of State Henry Kissinger—himself inclined toward historical pessimism—to diligently seek an accommodation modeled on the Peace of Westphalia: each side was to retain its geopolitical and ideological realms. It would be stabilized by a new emphasis on arms control, thereby slowing down the massive Soviet buildup but at the price even of accepting (in SALT I) Soviet strategic superiority.

The Soviet global offensive continued unabated into the second half of the 1970s. No longer politically deterred by American strategic power, Soviet troops were deployed in Vietnam, Ethiopia, Yemen, Cuba, not to mention the geopolitically vital Middle East, while Soviet military surrogates were active in Mozambique, Angola and elsewhere. The Soviet military buildup reached unprecedented and truly threatening proportions. The SS-20 deployments aimed at Western Europe and Japan were specifically designed for intimidation. For the first time during the entire Cold War the Soviet Union seemed to be genuinely preparing to dictate the outcome, both by encirclement and perhaps even on the central front.

Yet self-delusion lingered in the Western capitals and in Washington. French and German leaders competed in courting Brezhnev and in extolling his virtues. President Carter was counseled by some of his own top associates that he and Brezhnev "shared the same aspirations" and they urged the elevation of arms control into a Holy Grail, the solution to the overall ideological and geopolitical struggle. Indeed, in that view, not only was any linkage between arms control negotiations and Soviet misconduct dogmatically excluded, but the Soviets were even seen as entitled to exercise "negative" linkage, that is, they had the right to view as an obstruction to

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arms control those American policies they did not like (such as any strategic enhancement of the U.S.-Chinese relationship). Détente came to be viewed as an end in itself.

The moment seemed ripe for a historical turning point, but it did not occur. Instead the dramatic reversal only gradually took shape, mushroomed and eventually produced an outcome beyond the wildest expectations even of the few historical optimists who persisted in the conviction that the Soviet drive, if confronted, could be stopped; and once stopped, that it could be reversed. As often in history, this happened for a variety of reasons, ranging from human folly to fortune. Most important perhaps were the errors and miscalculations of the Soviets themselves. Misjudging the historical situation, they pushed their forward thrust beyond the limits of toleration of even the most accommodationist elements in the West, while at the same time they strained Soviet internal resources to a point that the inherent weaknesses and corruption of the Soviet system assumed dynamic dimensions. Their conduct, in brief, fitted well Paul Kennedy's concept of "imperial overstretch."

IV

The result was the final phase of the Cold War, roughly from 1979 until 1991. It was marked by the West's gradual recapture of the ideological initiative, by the eruption of a philosophical and political crisis in the adversary's camp and by the final and decisive push by the United States in the arms race. This phase lasted slightly more than a decade. Its outcome was victory.

The historically dramatic turnabout was precipitated by three critical cases of Soviet overstretch. Geopolitically the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979—apparently taken on the assumption that the United States would not react—propelled the United States to adopt, for the first time ever during the entire Cold War, a policy of directly supporting actions aimed at killing Soviet troops. The Carter administration not only undertook immediately to support the Mujahedeen, but it also quietly put together a coalition embracing Pakistan, China, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Britain on behalf of the Afghan resistance. Equally important was the American public guarantee of Pakistan's security against any major Soviet military attack, thereby creating a sanctuary for the guerillas. The scale and quality of U.S. support steadily expanded during the 1980s under the subsequent Reagan

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administration. America—along with Pakistan, which played a courageous and decisive role in the effort—thus succeeded in bogging down the Soviet Union in its own equivalent of Vietnam.

Moreover, with the influence of the accommodationist school of thought undercut by Soviet assertiveness, the United States qualitatively expanded its relationship with China. As early as 1980 U.S.-Chinese cooperation assumed a more direct strategic dimension, with sensitive undertakings not only toward Afghanistan but also on other matters. Thus the Soviet Union faced the growing geopolitical menace of a counter encirclement.

In addition, the Carter administration initiated the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force, and, most important, the decision was made together with key NATO allies to match the Soviet SS-20 deployments with new and highly accurate American intermediate-range missiles positioned on European soil. The latter prompted a vigorous Soviet campaign of intimidation directed at Europe, with Europe explicitly warned (in the words of Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko) that it might suffer the fate of Pompeii unless the Atlantic security link was significantly loosened. However, America's European allies held firm—encouraged by the increasingly assertive tones emanating from Washington and by the acceleration of the U.S. defense buildup adopted by the Reagan administration.

The massive U.S. defense buildup of the early 1980s—including the decision to proceed with the Strategic Defense Initiative—both shocked the Soviets and then strained their resources. Its scale, momentum and technological daring had been totally unexpected in Moscow. By 1983 a genuine war scare began to develop in the Kremlin, with the United States seen as bent perhaps even on a military solution. And then by the middle of the decade it dawned on Soviet leaders that they could neither match nor even keep up with the American efforts.

This realization interacted dynamically with the third reversal, on the ideological and social planes. In the second half of the 1970s President Carter launched his human rights campaign. Within Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe and then within the Soviet Union itself, it first encouraged a few individuals, then larger groups, to pick up the standard of human rights, counting on Western moral and even political support. The struggle for human rights mushroomed, espe-

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cially in Poland, galvanized by the election of the first Polish pope in Rome. By the late 1970s Solidarity's mass movement was beginning to threaten the communist regime of the Soviet Union's most important European satellite.

The Soviets were poised to intervene militarily in Poland, once in December 1980 and then again in March 1981. In both cases two successive U.S. administrations made clear, through direct and indirect signals, that such intervention would produce grave consequences, a message in the meantime made more credible by U.S. support for the Afghan resistance. Under these circumstances the Kremlin leaders chose to rely on an only partially effective imposition of martial law by the Polish communists themselves. As a result the Polish crisis festered throughout the decade, progressively undermining not only the Polish communist regime but gradually infecting other East European states.

The human rights campaign and the arms buildup thus became the mutually reinforcing central prongs of a U.S. response that not only blunted the Soviet offensive but also intensified the crisis of the Soviet political and socioeconomic system itself. Power and principle combined to reverse the Soviet momentum. Neither one alone would have sufficed.

By the mid-1980s a new and younger Soviet leadership had come to power. Imbued with the realization that Soviet policies, both internal and external, were a failure, Moscow was determined to repair the communist system through energetic reforms and to place its satellite regimes on a more domestically acceptable basis. To do that it needed a period of respite. These Soviet leaders thus eagerly seized the olive branch extended by the Reagan administration in 1985—especially in connection with the December 1985 Geneva summit—in the hope of gaining relief from the arms race.

The recent past is still fresh in memory. The domestic reforms, conducted pell-mell, did not revitalize the Soviet system but merely brought to the surface its hypocrisies and weaknesses. The arms race had exhausted the Soviet economy, while refuting its ideological expectations. Failure to crush the Solidarity underground in Poland gradually forced the Polish communist regime into a compromise that rapidly turned into a progressive concession of power, with contagious effects in the neighboring satellites. Gorbachev's willingness to tolerate what he thought would be limited change in east-central Europe—in order to gain a breathing spell for his own

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domestic reforms—precipitated not the emergence of more popularly endorsed and reformist communist leadership but eventually the collapse of the communist systems as a whole.

By 1989 the choice left to Moscow was either a last-gasp effort to reimpose its rule through massive bloodshed—which not only could have precipitated violent domestic or external explosions but in all probability an intensification of the arms race and hostility with America—or to acquiesce. The reformist Gorbachev leadership—flattered, courted, even bribed by the West, and in the final phases skillfully manipulated personally by President Bush and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl—chose the second course. The result was chaos in east-central Europe and then capitulation.

V

Could the outcome have been different? And what of the future, given the past?

The West perhaps might have won sooner, but at a higher cost and with a greater risk of war. The key opportunity for the West came in the period 1953–56. Greater Western elasticity in 1953 might have facilitated a Soviet pullback from Germany. But the Kremlin almost certainly would have used the Soviet army to maintain its grip on Warsaw and Prague, while in the West the neutralization of Germany might have precluded the establishment of binding NATO links between America and Europe. In contrast greater Western toughness in 1956—still a time of decisive U.S. strategic superiority—might have resulted in forcing the Soviet Union out of Hungary and Poland. The communist regimes in these countries were crumbling, and the Soviet leadership itself was in a state of panic.

The Cold War, however, would not have ended. Communism was not ripe for a collapse within Russia itself, and on the global scale the ideological momentum of communism was far from spent. Communist movements were strong even in Western Europe, and the communist wave in the Far East was still cresting. Thus any respite in the Cold War would have been just temporary. Moreover one cannot exclude the possibility that in these circumstances at least a conventional war might have broken out in central Europe.

The only other opportunity for ending the Cold War may have existed in the early 1970s, on the basis of what might be called "the Peace of Westphalia formula." But both sides

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would have had then to accept the status quo in Europe as fixed. The West seemed ready to do so. However, by the mid-1970s, the Soviets saw themselves as being on a historical roll. Hence Moscow wanted the status quo in Europe as well as American acquiescence to continued Soviet global expansion and to a gradual shift in "the correlation of forces." In effect any acceptance of the European status quo would have been for the Soviets merely a temporary expedient.

This is why it is historically important to reiterate here the fact that the Kremlin was in no mood to be propitiated either through arms control or an acceptance by the West of the existing division of Europe. The Cold War eventually ended because the West succeeded in combining firm containment with an active offensive on human rights and a strategic buildup of its own, while aiding the resistance in Afghanistan and Poland.

A more plausible case can be made for the proposition that the West could have spared itself a decade or so by adopting earlier an offensive ideological and strategic posture. But in real life democracies are not able to adopt a forward strategy that requires philosophical and military mobilization without overwhelming and truly threatening provocation from the other side. That provocation was apparent to some in the 1970s; to most Americans and Europeans it became evident only in the early 1980s, in the wake of the blatant Soviet SS-20 threats, the invasion of Afghanistan and the suppression of Poland's Solidarity movement.

Throughout the Cold War it was America that bore most of the burden and displayed the strongest will to persist. America's allies were generally steadfast in critical moments, but otherwise they were more tempted to settle for a compromise. It was America that sustained large scale efforts—especially by means of radio—to pierce the Iron Curtain, and it was America that in the later phases of the Cold War most directly supported the resistance in Afghanistan and the underground in Poland while intimidating Moscow through its crash strategic buildup. And it was America that throughout the Cold War deterred Soviet power with a posture and a leadership that was on the whole remarkably consistent.

In that regard the historical credit for fashioning the winning strategy and for forging the victorious coalition must go to one man above all: Harry Truman. He committed America because he understood the stakes. Eisenhower then built on

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Truman regarding NATO; Carter built on Nixon regarding China; Bush built on Reagan regarding the arms race. American policy may not have been brilliant and, at times, it was overly defensive, but it was steady. It also remained tactically focused on the weakest link in the Soviet "front": east-central Europe. From the 1960s onward the United States consistently sought, overtly and covertly, to soften Soviet control over the region by a policy of peaceful engagement, with the payoff coming finally in the 1980s.

In contrast Soviet policy lacked consistency. With the exception of Stalin himself the Soviet leadership proved to be less steady and operationally inferior to America's. Stalin was the Great Calculator, carefully husbanding his resources, devouring his enemies, while cautiously bluffing in order to obscure his system's weaknesses. But even he made a basic and historically decisive error: his brutal policies in east-central Europe united the West, and that unity precluded America's disengagement from Europe. Once that became clear a conclusive Soviet victory was no longer possible.

Stalin's successors were second rate. Khrushchev was the Master Bumbler, pressing and posturing, creating the illusion of historical momentum at a time of Western indecision. But he could not achieve a breakthrough, even though he brought both sides dangerously close to a military collision at a time of still relative Soviet strategic inferiority. Brezhnev, the Gray Plodder, posed more of a threat, with his steady buildup of Soviet strategic might, but he did not know when to exploit that might for political gain. Had Brezhnev proved more imaginative, he might have taken advantage of Nixon's realism to reach an advantageous peace of Westphalia or the goodwill of the American president in the latter 1970s, and of the naïvete of some of his advisers, to conclude an even more beneficial accommodation. Instead, Brezhnev pursued the policy of global encirclement, with some peripheral successes but no breakthrough on the central front.

The last Soviet leader, Gorbachev, can be considered operationally the Grand Miscalculator and historically a tragic figure. He thought he could revitalize the Soviet economy that Brezhnev, through his military spending, had ruined, but he did not know how. He thought he could reach a broad détente with the West, but he underestimated the corrosive effects of the war in Afghanistan and of the survival of the Solidarity movement in Poland. Attempts at East-West accommodation,

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instead of stabilizing Soviet rule in east-central Europe, exploded in his face, especially once the fear of Soviet intervention had been dissipated by Gorbachev's cultivation of the West and by the Soviet military's failures in Afghanistan.

Could the Soviets have won the Cold War? The final outcome was the product of objective and subjective factors, and on both scores the Soviet side turned out to have been at a disadvantage. The Western socioeconomic system proved much stronger and its underlying ideas ultimately much more appealing. In effect, despite some illusions propagated by Khrushchev and entertained by Brezhnev, the Soviet Union was forced to play "catch-up ball" throughout the Cold War.

The bottom line thus has to be that a full-blown Soviet victory was never in the cards, except very briefly right after World War II. Had America disengaged, the outcome would have been quite different. But that alternative was foreclosed early on. Thereafter the Kremlin could have sought and perhaps obtained favorable settlements that could have served as launchpads for later offensives, but its leaders failed to exploit the occasional opportunities. These knocked on history's doors early in the 1950s and even more so in the 1970s. Finally, the grand scale of the final defeat in the late 1980s could also have been minimized, if the Gorbachev leadership had been more skillful in handling its domestic reforms and had moved more rapidly in the mid-1980s to resolve the Afghan and Polish problems.

VI

What should now be the West's central strategic objective toward its former Cold War rival?

The point of departure for a meaningful answer is to recognize that, from a historical point of view, the collapse of the Soviet Union, which endured for some seventy years, is more than overshadowed by the disintegration of the great Russian empire, which lasted for more than three hundred years. This is an event of truly historic magnitude, pregnant with geopolitical uncertainties. It will be many years before the dust finally settles, but it is already clear that the postcommunist transition in the former empire will be more difficult and much more prolonged than the democratic reconstruction of either Germany or Japan after 1945.

The West must support that transition with the same commitment and magnanimity with which America acted after the

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victory in 1945. That commitment, however, must be guided by a longer-range geopolitical vision that goes beyond the West's currently one-sided concentration on facilitating Russia's socioeconomic recovery. While that recovery is desirable, its attainment should be seen as part of a broader effort designed to accomplish two interrelated objectives: the emergence of a truly post-imperial Russia that can assume its proper place in the concert of the world's leading democratic nations; and the stable consolidation of the newly independent non-Russian states, some of which are only in the early stages of their own nation building, in order to create an enduring geopolitical context that by itself reinforces Russia's transformation into a post-imperial state. Each of the foregoing is dependent on the other, and hence both must be deliberately sought.

Any Western ambiguity on this matter could prove historically shortsighted. Just as it would have been a historic mistake to settle for less than the liberation of east-central Europe from Moscow's domination, so now too a recovery program for the Russian economy that does not at the same time seek to transform Russia into a post-imperial state could prove to be ephemeral. Accordingly any Russian efforts to isolate and eventually again to subordinate Ukraine through the maintenance of a Moscow-controlled outpost in Crimea, for example, or to delay the evacuation of Russian troops from the Baltic republics should be unambiguously viewed as obstacles to effective financial and economic assistance.

However it is also essential to provide the Russians with a meaningful alternative to their longstanding imperial status, and that has to be the offer of partnership with the West. The West is correct in stressing that it sees Russia's eventual destiny as a major player in the European concert of nations and as one of America's partners in dealing with the world's wider problems. But to become such a player the transformation of Russia requires—as earlier in the cases of Germany and Japan—the shedding of its imperial aspirations.

Since as a practical matter any formal association of Russia with Europe is still a long way off, some thought should now be given to the creation of intermediary forms of involvement with Europe. One such step might involve Western support for a Baltic Sea/Black Sea zone of enhanced cooperation. This would engage the central European states that are already becoming associated with the EC in a common effort with

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Russia, the Baltic states, Ukraine and Belarus to enhance their communications, transport and eventually free trade. Kaliningrad, while remaining Russian politically, could also become a European free-trade zone. The recent agreement between Belarus and Poland for Belarussian use of the Polish port of Gdynia is a sign that central European regional cooperation can extend eastward. Russia should not be made to feel that a new *cordon sanitaire* separates it from the West.

The above must be matched by sustained Western efforts to promote nation building in the former Soviet empire. Above all it is geopolitically essential that Ukraine succeed in stabilizing itself as a secure and independent state. That will automatically increase the chances of Russia's evolution as a democratizing and increasingly European post-imperial state. Accordingly a critical component of Western strategy has to be the deliberate effort—not only economic but also political—to consolidate a stable and sovereign Ukraine. Elsewhere in the former empire the process of nation building is likely to be even more complex than in Ukraine, and yet it too will have to be supported simultaneously with the postcommunist socioeconomic transformation itself.

That socioeconomic transformation will be long and painful. The West, in proffering aid and advice, must be careful not to replace old communist dogmas with new dogmas of its own regarding the application of capitalist practices. Any attempt to create simultaneously a free-market economy and a political democracy that does not carefully seek to minimize the social pains of the needed transition could precipitate a destructive collision between these two objectives. This collision could then discredit both goals in the eyes of the affected peoples and enhance the appeal of some new escapist doctrines.

The aftermath of the Cold War thus poses an agenda for the West that is truly daunting. Its essence is to make certain that the disintegration of the Soviet Union becomes the peaceful and enduring end of the Russian empire, and that the collapse of communism truly means the end of the utopian phase in modern political history. But these grand goals will come to pass only if the West again demonstrates strategic staying power, focused on clearheaded geopolitical—and not just on narrow socioeconomic or vaguely idealistic—aims.

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John Lukacs

FINLAND VINDICATED

Finland and Russia signed a friendship treaty in Helsinki on January 20, 1992, consisting of many clauses, including commercial and financial ones. More significant was the exchange of notes that same day. These certified the cancellation of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed in Moscow on April 6, 1948. That treaty, the result of the Soviet victory in the Second World War, established the limitations of an independent Finnish foreign policy and, indeed, certain conditions of Finnish independence itself. That those limitations proved manageable and flexible was principally due to the moderation and wisdom of successive Finnish governments, including their recognition that—especially for a small nation—an untrammeled independence of foreign policy is a chimera.

Thus in 1992 the last outlines of the ominous shadow of Russian domination of Finland disappeared—75 years after the establishment of an independent Finnish state. It must not be thought that the present treaty was but another by-product of the Russian retreat from central and eastern Europe. Finland's independence was achieved and secured, bit by bit, by its successive governments over the last fifty years. Long before 1992 the exercise of that kind of Finnish statesmanship was vindicated. This was not always understood in Washington—not by John Foster Dulles, who in 1954 proclaimed that during the Cold War "neutrality" for a nation was impossible and immoral; and not by John Kennedy, who in 1961 said to a Finnish diplomat: "What puzzles us Americans is why the Soviet Union has allowed Finland to retain her independence." There need not have been such puzzlement in Washington, but that is not the theme of this article. Its theme is that of the historical nature and development of Finnish-Russian relations, which should tell us not only some things about

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John Lukacs is Professor of History at Chestnut Hill College, Philadelphia, and author of several books including, most recently, *The Duel. 10 May–31 July 1940: The Eight-Week Struggle Between Churchill and Hitler.*

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Finland but also some seldom recognized things about Russian foreign policy under Stalin.

II

For nearly two hundred years the relationship between Finland and Russia has been marked by a compound of struggle and compromise—the compromise reluctant and enforced in the worst of circumstances, and realistic and propitious in the relatively best of instances. Its origins go back to the first stage of Finnish independence which, contrary to general belief, occurred not in 1918 but in 1809 and which was made possible by the Russian tsar. Before 1809 Finland was part of the Kingdom of Sweden. Having defeated Sweden, Tsar Alexander I acquired Finland, but made it an autonomous Grand Duchy of the Russian empire.

There were positive elements in that arrangement. The Grand Duchy of Finland kept the old Swedish administrative system, its legal and cultural institutions and customs. When the martinet tsar, Nicholas I, faced the Polish uprising in 1830–31, he was supposed to have said: "Leave the Finns alone. They have not given us any trouble." During another Polish uprising in 1863 Finnish leaders themselves cautioned their countrymen to avoid "foolish gestures" that would "only hurt Finland without any benefit to the poor Poles." Alexander II treated the Finns well; his statue is preeminent in Helsinki, and parts of that city still retain some of the melancholy charm of the neoclassical imperial architecture of early nineteenth-century St. Petersburg.

Finland enjoyed more privileges than had even Hungary within the Hapsburg dual empire after the 1867 Austro-Hungarian *Ausgleich*. There was a Finnish parliament elected by universal suffrage as early as 1906. Finnish women were the first in the world to have the right to vote and the right to be elected. Yet, after all was said, Finland was not an independent country. It was subject to sudden Russian whims. Around 1900 a Russian policy to restrict Finnish autonomy began. Finnish resistance against such measures (most of which were erratic and thoughtless rather than brutally and rigorously enforced) coincided with the rise of Finnish nationalism and the final crisis of the tsarist empire. But in 1917 the collapse of the tsarist regime and the subsequent Bolshevik revolution made the full independence of Finland possible. It was declared by a national assembly on December 6, 1917.

History does not repeat itself, but historical conditions do. The

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relatively moderate treatment of Finland as practiced by the Soviets, including Stalin after World War II, was preceded by the temperate policy of the tsars regarding Finland during the nineteenth century. Thereafter Finnish independence profited as much as it suffered from revolutions in Russia, including the communist one. In 1917 Lenin was the first to recognize the independence of Finland at a time when no Russian nationalist would have. Lenin, of course, had no particular liking for a bourgeois state in Finland. Fortunately for the Finns—and for Europe—Lenin was handicapped by his ideological expectations. He thought that what happened in Petrograd in November 1917 would soon happen everywhere west of Russia. He was proved wrong—in Finland before anywhere else.

A short and cruel civil war between "reds" and "whites" erupted in Finland in January 1918—but in Finland, unlike Russia, the anticommunist whites defeated the reds. The small Finnish army was able to keep incursions by Russian red troops at bay too. Lenin was then forced to recognize, by means of a treaty, the independence of a noncommunist Finland whose frontier, at its closest point, ran but less than thirty miles from Petrograd.

It is here that we must turn, no matter how briefly, to consider the remarkable character and career of Baron Carl Gustaf Mannerheim. He was no less the savior of a nation than was Winston Churchill in the hour of his nation's greatest peril. Mannerheim had risen to a lieutenant-generalship in the tsar's army, with a brilliant record and many unusual accomplishments. But in 1917 his allegiance to the tsar ceased. In December of that year the Finnish senate named Mannerheim commander in chief of the embryonic army of the new state. He defeated the reds in the Finnish civil war.

Yet he disagreed with some leading Finnish political figures. The majority of the Finnish senate was pro-German in 1918; a nephew of the German kaiser was about to become the king of Finland. That summer a German expeditionary force of *Jägers* arrived to assist the Finnish whites in their struggle against the communists. Mannerheim welcomed the latter (at least temporarily), but he warned the senate against the German connection. Britain and France, not Germany, would win the war, he said. Mannerheim broke with the senate, resigned and went abroad. But when Germany indeed lost the war he was called back to Finland to act as regent. He ran for president but lost in the first Finnish presidential election. In 1933 he

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received the title of field marshal. During the Second World War he came to the fore, first as commander in chief and then as president, to defend and protect Finland from Russia and Germany, as he had once before in 1918.

Between the two world wars Finland's situation differed in some ways from that of other east European countries, while it was similar in others. It was different because democracy was more popular and better entrenched in Finland. At the same time Finland, too, was but one of the newly constituted tier of small states geographically situated between a resurgent Germany and the sinister giant state of Soviet Russia. Also most Finns felt less threatened by Germany than by Russia, even during the era of the Third Reich. Nor was Finland entirely immune to the tendencies of radical and ideological nationalism that reached their peak in Finland in the early 1930s—without, however, seriously compromising the functioning of Finnish parliamentary democracy. In any event this palely sunlit period from 1919 to 1939—long in the life of a generation but brief in the history of a nation—came to an end with the beginning of the Second World War, when suddenly the very survival of Finland was at stake.

In August 1939 the Secret Protocol of the Hitler-Stalin pact allotted Finland to the Soviet sphere of interest. The fate of Finland now depended on the designs of the great powers, as in 1807 when the meeting at Tilsit between Napoleon and Alexander led to the Russo-Swedish War and eventually the 1809 transfer of Finland to the domain of the tsar; and as in 1943–45 when the Atlantic democracies chose not to imperil their relationship with Russia by insisting on the conditions of political liberty of east European states after the war.

Despite more than fifty years' distance and extensive documentary evidence, certain questions about the Hitler-Stalin pact remain. The Secret Protocol used the term "sphere of interest"; the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe did not. What both of those arrangements had in common, however, was the absence of a specification of what "sphere of interest" meant. It seems that Hitler was surprised when (except in the case of the division of Poland) Stalin interpreted his "sphere of interest" as actual military occupation and incorporation of territories on the Soviet side of the demarcation line—just as the American and British governments after 1945 found that Stalin was not content with the establishment of Russophile

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governments in eastern Europe, but would proceed to their complete Sovietization.

That the Russians were interested in certain border revisions was already evident in 1938, when they had thus approached the Finns. When in October 1939 Stalin invited the Finns to Moscow he requested, first of all, a revision of the Finnish-Russian border to where Peter the Great's frontier had been laid out in 1721. Several times during the negotiations he referred to those tsarist precedents. Marshal Mannerheim himself understood this; he advised a more positive Finnish response to Stalin's demands than what actually happened. Soon this problem became moot: the Soviet Union attacked Finland, employing such treacherous and fraudulent pretexts that were rare even among the depressing diplomatic brutalities perpetrated by totalitarian states in World War II.

This is not the place to sum up the history and diplomacy of the Winter War, full as that is of complex and interesting details, including the harebrained and hypocritical attempt by the British and French to send a military expedition to Finland, which fortunately came to nothing. The Winter War of 1939–40 lasted three and a half months; the Finns fought well enough to impress Stalin; they lost important portions of their territory but retained their independence.

From the Treaty of Moscow in March 1940 fifteen months passed until the German invasion of the Soviet Union brought a Finnish resumption of the war in its wake. (The Finns, with understandable understatement, refer to that as the Continuation War.) Largely as a response to the tremendous German conquest of western Europe and the extension of German domination over southeastern Europe, Moscow wished to achieve a kind of balance by trying, among other things, to extend its own military and political influence further over Finland. During his visit to Berlin in November 1940 Molotov's repeated harping on this issue only raised Hitler's ire. By that time, however, most of the Finnish military and political leaders found that the only great power on whom Finland could depend against Russia was Germany; indeed, after August 1940 the Germans entered into a partly clandestine military collaboration with the Finns.

There are still some questions about the exact sequence of events in June 1941, when war between Finland and the Soviet Union erupted four days after the German invasion of the

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latter. The resumption of the war against Russia mostly (though not exclusively) to regain lost territories was popular in Finland, as was the alliance with the Third Reich. Yet important Finnish personages, especially Marshal Mannerheim, wanted to make clear that Finland's war was separate from Germany's—an arguable proposition, except that, in part because of Mannerheim's wishes, the Finnish army would not advance beyond certain lines.

Upon Stalin's insistence Churchill, who had tried to avoid a British declaration of war on Finland, felt compelled to do so a few days before Pearl Harbor. The United States did not go to war against Finland and maintained normal diplomatic relations with Helsinki throughout the war. (Among all of Germany's allies and associates, only Finland did not conform to the German pattern—among other things, instituting no discriminatory regulations or legislation against Jews.) After Stalingrad, as also desired by the United States, serious Finnish attempts at negotiating a separate peace with Moscow began. The results were indifferent.

In June 1944 the great Soviet offensive westward actually began on the Karelian front, before the Byelorussian and eastern Polish campaigns. As in summer 1918 a last-minute agreement with Germany and the arrival of some German assistance contributed to halt the Soviet advance. But in August, again as in 1918, it became Mannerheim's task to detach Finland from the German side. President Risto Ryti resigned and Marshal Mannerheim assumed the Finnish presidency. The armistice was signed on September 19, 1944, essentially restoring the 1940 frontier, to which two other important Russian territorial gains were added: Petsamo—Finland's only port on the Arctic—and a naval base at Porkkala-Udd, close to Helsinki.

There were many other painful conditions. Finland had been defeated. But as the excellent Finnish diplomat and historian, Max Jakobson, put it, "she was not conquered. Apart from Great Britain and the Soviet Union, Finland was the only one of all the European nations involved in the Second World War to avert an enemy occupation. Its social fabric remained intact and the continuity of its political institutions unbroken. In this fact lies an achievement that transcends the conventional meaning of such terms as defeat or victory."[1]

[1]Max Jakobson, *Finland: Myth and Reality*, Helsinki, 1987, p. 43.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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That retrospect is both inspiring and correct. All this turned out to be for the good in the end. Yet no one could know that at the end of the war, when the Russian bear was both triumphant and hungry and when the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States—the former leaning on Finland, the latter five thousand miles away—was about to begin.

III

Alone among the western neighbor states of the Soviet Union—indeed, alone in the entire eastern half of Europe (save for Greece, the only state with a British and later American military presence after the war)—Finland avoided both Russian occupation and communization. How was that possible? During the most dangerous period between the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War, the main factor was the cautious realism inherent in Stalin's statesmanship; but that, in turn, was inseparable from his appreciation for certain Finnish qualities, including political prudence.

There was in this instance a subtle but significant difference between Stalin and his otherwise entirely obedient minion, Molotov. The latter said in 1940 and on several occasions thereafter that the time for small nations had passed. Stalin was not convinced of that, certainly not in the case of Finland. He was impressed by the military courage and civic stability of the Finns. A remark Stalin dropped at the 1943 Teheran Conference was an early indication of this appreciation; recently opened documents in the Kremlin archives also contain a few significant remarks in that regard, remarks Stalin made in the presence of abashed Finnish communists in 1945. In sum Stalin seems to have believed that while a military subjugation of Finland might be possible, it would not be worth its cost: to swallow Finland may be one thing, but to digest it quite another.[2]

No one, however, could be certain of Stalin's restraint in 1945, least of all the Finns. Their country was bled white, weakened to a dangerous extent. They were burdened by a

[2]This corresponds to what Churchill said to de Gaulle in November 1944 (recorded by de Gaulle in his war memoirs). In answer to the latter's criticism of American policy Churchill said: yes, the Americans were rather thoughtless in not considering seriously the dangers of Russian expansion in Europe; yes, Russia was now a hungry wolf in the midst of sheep. "But after the meal comes the digestion period."

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very large war indemnity to be paid to the Soviet Union (which they delivered with extreme punctuality). The north of Finland was devastated: according to the armistice agreement, Finnish forces had to participate in driving German troops out of Finnish Lapland toward northern Norway. Nearly half a million Finns fled the Karelian territories annexed to the Soviet Union: their resettlement was another exceptional burden. Nearly one hundred thousand young Finns out of a population of four million died in the war. The communists, together with some leftist allies, had almost one-fourth of the Finnish vote. They had to be part of a coalition government, including the important post of minister of the interior. Still there was President Mannerheim, with his tremendous prestige. He was, however, 79 years old and his health had weakened. In 1946 he was succeeded by another remarkable Finnish statesman, Juho Paasikivi. Throughout his political life Paasikivi had shown a solid understanding of Russia's strategic interests. He had opposed Finland's association with Hitler's Germany. He consequently enjoyed a considerable reputation in Moscow.[3]

But the global political struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union had begun. The Finnish leadership knew this very well. In 1947 they thought that they had better decline the help offered to their impoverished country by the Marshall Plan. Paasikivi's decision impressed Stalin. "The Marshall Plan was designed to save Europe from communism, but Finland may have saved herself from communism by saying no to the Marshall Plan."[4]

But the crunch was soon to come. By early 1948 American strategy was moving forward from the Marshall Plan in the direction of NATO. At the same time—as a matter of fact, on the same day—when the communist takeover occurred in Czechoslovakia (without even the need of a Soviet armed presence to enforce it), Stalin requested that Paasikivi come to Moscow. The Soviet Union had already concluded mutual assistance treaties with Hungary and Romania (Bulgaria was soon to

[3]It may be significant that both Paasikivi and his successor Urho Kekkonen were Finnish conservatives (the former had been a monarchist in 1918). They were conservatives in the proper, not in the nowadays, alas, so often misused, sense: patriots rather than nationalists, realists and not ideologues, thoroughly aware of the necessary limitations of their country's freedom of action, desirous of continuity and conservation.

[4]Jakobson, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

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follow), essential instruments to ensure their complete subordination to the Soviet Union. Now, Stalin wrote, it was Finland's turn to consider such a treaty.

Paasikivi met this ominous prospect with the ability of a great statesman. Responding to Stalin, Paasikivi suggested that he was not opposed to a treaty, but that he had first to assure the consent of parliament for a delegation to negotiate it. More than a month would pass until that Finnish delegation arrived in Moscow. President Paasikivi stayed in Helsinki. In Moscow Stalin agreed to a compromise—a compromise that, as Stalin himself admitted, was Paasikivi's version.

Like any other military alliance the treaty curtailed Finland's liberty of action. But the text did not follow the model of other treaties Stalin had concluded with his east European satellites. The preamble mentioned "Finland's desire to stay outside the conflicts of interests between the great powers." The word "neutrality" was avoided; but during its ratification debates in the Finnish parliament Paasikivi would use that term, at least on one occasion.

One of the reasons for Stalin's relative moderation was his view of the Scandinavian military situation. In 1948 the American alliance system was about to include Norway (the only NATO ally that, on its northernmost frontier, directly bordered the Soviet Union). It seems that Stalin had told the Finns, *quieta non movere*: tell your friends the Swedes not to join the American alliance system, for in that case I would feel compelled to advance my military presence into Finland.

Unlike the autumn of 1940, when Moscow opposed a close relationship between Sweden and Finland—as it turned out, wrongly, in view of Moscow's own interests—now Moscow had learned its lesson: it could benefit from the geographic complementarity of Sweden and Finland. Also, unlike 1939, Stalin seemed to have little interest in the Finnish communists. In May the communist minister of the interior left his post. In July the communists, having done poorly in the elections, left the government.

Thus in 1948, in that first full year of the Cold War, Finland, by its own efforts, saved itself from communism. Much of the credit for this remains due to Paasikivi and to those Finnish conservatives whom he trained and who would eventually succeed him. He was nearly eighty years old. In 1950 he was reelected for another six years.

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IV

It would be wrong to believe that from that time on the independence of Finland was definitely and permanently secured. The year 1948 was a milestone in the development of Finnish-Soviet relations; but it was not a turning point.

The uneasy maintenance of good and proper relations with Moscow involved many matters besides the customary limits of foreign relations. It necessarily involved self-imposed and sometimes government-imposed restrictions on free expression in the press, in publishing and other kinds of communications in order to avoid anything that would irritate Moscow or impel it to present new demands. It involved a scrupulous observance of all trade and economic arrangements with the Soviet Union—even as Paasikivi endeavored to keep Finnish trade from becoming unduly dependent on its neighbor. (Indeed during the last 45 years the volume of Finnish-Soviet trade rarely exceeded 25 percent—Paasikivi's own benchmark—of total Finnish foreign trade.) It also involved in 1945–46 an unjust and unlawful act of political appeasement: the trial and conviction of those Finnish political leaders who had led Finland into and during the Continuation War. (There were no executions in Finland; all of those national figures were eventually released before the completion of their terms, some returning not only to private but public life, respected by both the government and nation.)

In foreign policy, of course, the restrictions were obvious. In the United Nations Finland did not vote against the Soviet Union (though on certain occasions it abstained rather than vote along with Moscow's satellite delegations). Helsinki solved the difficult problem involving recognition of the two Germanies in a unique way: it did not give formal recognition to either, but maintained extensive trade and cultural relations with both. It kept up this practice successfully until 1971, when the Western powers themselves agreed to recognize both German states. During the 1956 Hungarian uprising the Finns had to bite their tongues and make no public expression of support for the Hungarians (as Finnish leaders had advised during the Polish rising in 1863). The Finns knew that their great eastern neighbor could be supersensitive and unpredictable, and that some of the most surprising Soviet actions were motivated by considerations never properly analyzed or perceived by the West. Thus, for example, the United States and

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the Western powers were surprised when in 1955 Khrushchev announced that the Soviets would return the Porkkala-Udd naval base to Finland. They did not know that one of the Russian reasons was Paasikivi's confidential commitment that his successors would renew the 1948 Finnish-Soviet treaty for another twenty years. Worse, the Western powers (with the partial exception of Britain) failed to see the emerging pattern of the Soviets' European policy at that time, parts of which were the return of Porkkala, the Soviet willingness to evacuate eastern Austria and Khrushchev's reparation of the Soviet break with Yugoslavia.

The Finns were aware of Khrushchev's idea of a neutral zone across Europe—separating the Warsaw Pact and NATO—comprising Finland, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland and perhaps even the two Germanies, or at least one of them. The Western powers were not. That an American and Soviet disengagement from the middle of Europe was a definite possibility—indeed that it had already begun, as in the case of Austria—was dismissed by Washington and Bonn. As a matter of fact it was hardly noticed by people in the West (one exception being George Kennan).

When the aged Paasikivi resigned in 1956, Urho Kekkonen succeeded him. He was a less experienced and perhaps more opportunistic politician; his very election was made possible by the support of the communists. In 1962 the Soviets made a rather crude intervention in Finnish domestic affairs: they asserted that Soviet-Finnish friendship depended on Kekkonen's reelection to the presidency. Kekkonen may have been less dignified and restrained than Paasikivi in his assertions of a special Finnish relationship with the Soviet Union. Yet in essence Kekkonen followed the main line of the Paasikivi (or even the Mannerheim-Paasikivi) policy. Considering that these three national leaders could hardly have been more different in their respective backgrounds and personalities, that alone is an illustration of a congealing national consensus.

On two occasions—1961 and 1978—the Soviets pressured the Finnish government to extend Soviet military coordination with Finland—that is, to change the balance of Finnish-Soviet relations in Moscow's favor. The 1961 crisis was the more serious of the two. It was in part the result of a few incautious remarks about eastern Europe and the Baltic by the influential German politician Franz-Josef Strauss. Ironically it was Strauss, too, who a decade or so later coined the word

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"Finlandization." Soon that term became current in western Europe and the United States. It suggested an ominous advance of Soviet influence, whereby the Soviets would permit the continuation of the economic and political freedoms of certain countries—perhaps even including many west European states—in exchange for restrictions on their independence, especially in matters of foreign policy. That use of "Finlandization" turned out to be nonsense, as it was nonsense from the beginning. Finland's relationship with the Soviet Union was unique; it was not a precedent; it was meant for Finland alone.

As early as 1955 it began to appear to some Soviet leaders (Khrushchev, for example) that the Soviet Union's relationship with a democratic Finland was potentially less dangerous than its relationships with seething and potentially explosive satellites. Thirty years later Mikhail Gorbachev came to understand that fully. Among his reforms in Soviet foreign and domestic policies, perhaps the most important and most lasting was acceptance of the "Finlandization"—not of western but of eastern Europe, completed in 1989.

As early as 1980 Finnish leaders began to perceive that events in Poland and the uncertain Russian reaction thereto were leading to profound changes in the Soviet position in eastern Europe. In 1982 two significant events in Finland suggested a change. For the first time some people (mostly intellectuals) openly challenged the validity and usefulness of the renewal of the 1948 treaty—that is, of the special Finnish-Russian relationship. Also in 1982, for the first time (Kekkonen had left the presidency for reasons of health) the president-elect, Mauno Koivisto, was from the Social Democratic Party, a party often opposed by Moscow in the past. But Koivisto, too, made it very clear that he was not about to abandon the foreign policy of the Mannerheim-Paasikivi-Kekkonen pattern that by now had become a Finnish tradition.

Nor did Finnish leaders and people indulge in thinking that Russia's troubles were simply Finland's opportunity. During the convulsions within the Soviet Union in 1990 and 1991, Finnish-Russian relations remained unvexed. When in January 1992 the new Treaty of Friendship was complemented by the exchange of notes terminating the 1948 treaty, the last remnant of restrictions on an independent Finnish foreign policy were formally removed. The "Finlandization" of Finnish foreign policy of the last 47 years was finally vindicated.

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V

In the history of nations (as in that of every human being) continuity is as important as change. If the 1948 treaty was a milestone rather than a turning point, so was that of 1992. Long before its signing the present character and situation of Finland—democratic, Scandinavian and Western—were solidly established. Long after its signing the principal problem and task of Finland will be to maintain mutually acceptable relations with its eastern neighbor, no matter what kind of government exists in Moscow.

But the very texture of history is changing. The main danger to Finland (as to many other countries) is no longer the incursion of a large foreign army across its frontiers. It is the incursion of an untold and uncontrollable number of migrants. The proximity of Finland to western Eurasia and the length of its frontiers aggravate this problem. Forerunners of such a migration—a constant and probably increasing trickle of unregistered migrants from the erstwhile Soviet Union—have already begun to trouble the authorities of a country that otherwise maintains one of the strictest immigration quotas in Europe.

The problem of Finland's economic well-being is more evident. The danger in the recent past was that of too much trade with Russia; now the danger is that of too little. Change, yes, but continuity in essence: in both cases the problem is Finland's dependence on trade with Russia. Because of the uncertainties prevailing in Russia, Finnish trade with Russia has suddenly fallen to a low level, leading to all kinds of consequences, including unemployment. Finland's eventual association with the European Community will come about, a goal toward which Helsinki proceeds with careful deliberation; but many years will pass until the benefits of such association may balance the losses that Finland now incurs because of the sharp decline of its trade and commerce with Russia.

Their historical experiences seem to make the Finnish people take the long view of their relationship with Russia. No emotional sympathy binds them to Russians, whose civilization to them is largely alien. (Compared to the number of Finns who learn English, those who learn Russian are almost infinitesimal.) Yet they know better than to ignore a consideration of their great eastern neighbor. In 1918 their future depended on the rapidly evolving three-way struggle between communist

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Russia, Germany and Britain; in 1939–40 and again in 1944–48, with the United States eventually replacing Britain, but still very far away. Their closest and most dangerous neighbor was Russia. Will German power—not forever and not necessarily restricted to economics—replace the dominant presence of Russian power in the Baltic, sooner or later? We, as well as the Finns, cannot tell. Yet there is reason to believe that they know something akin to what Bismarck had once put into words: that Russia is never as strong—or as weak—as it seems.

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Charles Gati

FROM SARAJEVO TO SARAJEVO

From Gdansk on the Baltic to Dubrovnik on the Adriatic, from Prague in the heart of the old continent to Sofia near Europe's eastern periphery, freedom has come to east-central Europe: freedom of assembly, freedom of the press and freedom of religion. Throughout the region elected governments are in place.

Unfortunately, if understandably, what attracts more attention is the ugly underside of the transition to democracy: war, political fragmentation and economic despair. Instead of dialogue and debate, there is demagoguery. Instead of consensus, there is contention and confrontation. Instead of new governments adopting a forgive-but-do-not-forget policy toward the communist past in order to deal with the tasks ahead, mysterious sources leak politically inspired, doctored lists of former agents, informers and collaborators. Especially in countries where the communist regimes were relatively mild, as in Poland and in Hungary, there are even signs of nostalgia now for the authoritarian order of recent years.

The main questions remain as they have been since 1989: Will the fragile democracies of east-central Europe take hold and last? Will they become stable enough to join the west European political and economic order? The war tearing Yugoslavia apart now overshadows these questions and exacerbates the problems of transition to democracy. The related but more pressing questions today are the war's international repercussions and implications: Does it portend the beginning of the Balkanization of Europe, east and possibly west? If so, do American and west European interests call for more timely and active Western engagement aimed not only at preventing the proliferation of small wars but moderating the region's growing instability as well?

The horrors of Sarajevo 1992 bear scant resemblance to the events that followed Sarajevo 1914, but the collapse of com-

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Charles Gati, Professor of Political Science at Union College, is author of *Hungary and the Soviet Bloc*, *The Bloc That Failed*, and the forthcoming *Verdict in Moscow: The Hungarian Revolution and the Murder of Imre Nagy*.

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

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munism has rekindled ancient political feuds as antagonistic and passionate as ever. They spring from the suddenly freed stresses and strains of the communist era itself, from the memory of destruction and dislocations during and after World War II and from real and perceived injustices imposed by the post-World War I territorial settlements. Countering if not canceling the region's democratic impulse, these passions—the enduring historical legacy of the twentieth century—delimit the pace and define the substance of postcommunist transformation.

II

Mainly because of the powerful lasting impact of communist political culture, the road to democracy in east-central Europe is paved not only with bumps but with long detours that could lead to dead ends. Making it so are unrealistically high popular expectations of prosperity and, in general, the widespread identification of democracy with economic well-being. Few people in the area understand, and even fewer accept, the proposition that democracy is but a means to electoral choice; that democracies, unlike communist systems, base their claim to legitimacy more on respect for proper constitutional procedures than on economic performance.

For those raised in a communist political culture the distinction between delivering the goods and upholding the sanctity of the process is often lost if not altogether meaningless. Thus if they blame democracy and not only their current governments for economic pain, the Weimar syndrome may recur, meaning that people will turn from freedom altogether and embrace authoritarian rule, transforming their disillusionment with performance into a rejection of democracy itself. Another possibility—that which is happening in Poland already—is a recurrence of the Italian way, meaning that people will continue to opt for democracy but will produce constantly changing, unstable governments and thus experience protracted political crises. The most likely result, however, is somewhere between the Weimar and Italian models: the proliferation of semi-authoritarian regimes masquerading in democratic disguise (as in Romania today).

Among those who may fish in troubled waters in the years ahead will be former communist party members. In countries where they present themselves as social democrats, as many of them have become, they are now quiescent, even accommo-

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dating—but numerous. About a quarter of the region's present adult population belonged to a communist party at some time since 1945. The early recruits may have joined out of idealism; those who followed them were often opportunists in search of power and privilege. Today former party members, believers and opportunists alike, are suspect. Few have lost their jobs but many expect to do so, assuming that in the present political climate their careers will soon come to an end. Only those with marketable skills in the private sector get ahead, earning more money than ever before but missing the status and prestige conferred on members of the old political and economic elite.

Except for Serbia, Croatia, Romania and Slovakia, where communists parading as nationalists are in power, former party members everywhere else hold mid-level positions in the press and in the state bureaucracies, including the potentially critical ministries of defense and internal affairs. These officials and professionals constitute a large section of the region's frustrated, disaffected and often disoriented middle class. They cast a long shadow over the processes of democratic transformation, not because of what they are presently doing but because it is unclear what they could or would do in a moment of systemic crisis born of major domestic confrontations, intra-regional conflicts or outbursts of large-scale violence in the former Soviet Union.

The communist past also reveals itself in the intemperate personal attacks voiced in the region's legislatures and published in the press. Those who make the charges are not veteran anticommunist democrats of long standing, nor—with some exceptions—are leading communist officials the usual targets. Instead the most preposterous accusations and nasty insinuations are being advanced by populist demagogues of questionable background who were not known for their oppositional political views or activities during the communist era. Compensating for their acquiescence in the old order, these McCarthyites of east-central Europe are presently ransacking their current political rivals' past in search of evidence of collaboration with the communists.

Thus Lech Wałęsa, the heart and soul of the Solidarity movement that toppled the Polish communist regime, has been publicly accused of ties to the old secret police and then promptly disavowed even by his fellow rebels at the labor union's last congress. Thus Václav Havel, hero of Czechoslo-

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vakia's "velvet revolution," has been the subject of persistent rumors about his past. The prevailing atmosphere of recklessness has left leaders of the pre-1989 democratic opposition disheartened and disgusted; some have withdrawn from the political arena, others have failed to get reelected. As always the revolution is devouring its children.

The lies and insinuations that have surfaced may resemble charges made during heated, hard-fought election campaigns in many Western countries. The difference is that in east-central Europe practically everyone but the very young is politically scarred and thus vulnerable; few have impeccable credentials. Could it not be said that the chief accountant of a much-hated collective farm, who performed his job conscientiously, "supported" communism? Did not the museum director, who accepted a state award for his devoted service from a communist minister of culture, "serve" the system? What about the scholar who reported to the so-called international department of the academy of science on his foreign trips, and thus kept the police informed, in order to assure future professional association with Western colleagues—did he not "aid and abet" the regime and compromise his integrity?

The fact is that, Poland aside, no more than a few hundred people in all of east-central Europe actively confronted tyranny in the years prior to 1989. Those staying on the sideline may have been apathetic, fatalistic, cautious, timid, calculating or fearful, but for the most part they were decent. In a memorable passage, the Polish writer Kazimierz Brandys summed up the chilling dilemma faced by those unfortunate enough to have lived under communism: "Two intellectuals—a scientist and a film director—were once asked to sign a protest," Brandys relates. "One refused: 'I can't. I have a son.' The other one unscrewed the cap of his pen: 'I have to sign, because I have a son'."[1] Havel explained the consequences this way: "We have all become used to the totalitarian system. . . . None of us is just a victim; we are all responsible for it."[2]

As the psychological legacy of communism is thus an environment contaminated with guilt and suspicion, and as the political arena is already overcharged with ambition, the sine

[1]Kazimierz Brandys, *A Warsaw Diary, 1978–1981*, New York: Random House, 1983, p. 152.

[2]Václav Havel, "New Year's Address," *Uncaptive Minds*, January-February 1990, p. 2.

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qua non of democracy—tolerance—is all but absent. This is why the region's legislatures should adopt a new approach, forgive-but-do-not-forget, which would heal old wounds and thereby ease the problems of transition. For the same reason the populist guardians of probity should overcome the Manichean political mentality that communism has bequeathed—a mentality they profess to spurn but in practice, ironically, exhibit—and start treating their rivals as opponents rather than as enemies.

III

Obstructing the processes of transition in more tangible ways are the consequences of World War II and especially World War I. Yugoslavia's civil war is the obvious case in point; but the painful, if so far peaceful, separation of Czechs and Slovaks reminds us that the Yugoslav experience is hardly unique. While international borders have not changed, there is growing interest in revising them so that they correspond more closely to ethnic and linguistic characteristics. Romania has already proposed a "treaty of fraternity and integration" with Moldova, now a war-torn sovereign republic with a Romanian-speaking majority, which turned the offer down. Albanians dream of Greater Albania of the World War II era that would include the now-Serbian province of Kosovo with a 90 percent Albanian and only 10 percent Serbian and Montenegrin population. Raising a seemingly subtle if potentially ominous point, the Hungarian prime minister has noted that the territories his country lost to Yugoslavia following the Paris peace conference of 1919–20 were ceded to a state that no longer exists.

The issues that divide stem from the collapse of four empires—Ottoman, Russian, German and Austro-Hungarian—at the end of World War I, and from subsequent territorial settlements that created the two new nation-states of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, revised the boundaries of several others and restored Poland's sovereignty. The principles that concerned the peacemakers, notably President Wilson, were ethnic justice for the peoples of east-central Europe and, to a lesser extent, the curtailment of German and Russian (Soviet) potential for war. Pressure for ethnic justice and self-determination followed a century of nationalism in Europe, accelerating during World War I especially in the Balkans. That the new nation-states, like the empires they

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would supplant, also included a number of antagonistic minorities, and that the new states would be too weak to resist either Germany or Russia later on, were seen as serious problems but were left unresolved. The main task for the peacemakers was to deal with the burning issues of the past and present rather than anticipate those that might arise in the future.

Thus they carved out Yugoslavia from the already independent states of Serbia and Montenegro; from the formerly Austro-Hungarian Slovenia, Istria, Dalmatia, Croatia-Slavonia, Vojvodina and Bosnia-Herzegovina; and from the once Ottoman-ruled Macedonia. Fragmented by regional, economic, cultural, linguistic and religious differences that prevailed both among and within these communities, peoples of the new kingdom of Yugoslavia—whose state was no more homogeneous than the empires it replaced—nevertheless welcomed the withdrawal of imperial powers.

As for Czechoslovakia, the other newcomer and a seemingly more viable entity, it was made up of the traditional Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia that had been under Austrian control; of Slovakia and Ruthenia that had belonged to Hungary for a thousand years; and of a small section of Silesia with a largely Polish-speaking population. From the beginning Czechoslovakia suffered from divisive ethnic strife that would eventually contribute to its dismemberment. The tragic finale to Czech-German discord in the Sudetenland, an ethnically German area in Bohemia and Moravia, was the 1938 Munich accord that assigned the Sudetenland to Germany. The same year, assisted by German and Italian diplomacy, Hungary recovered some of the heavily Hungarian-populated chunks of southern Slovakia and southern Ruthenia. In March 1939, after what was left of Slovakia declared its independence, Czechoslovakia—the pride of the Paris peacemakers—was no more.

Poland, having been repeatedly partitioned by Prussia, Austria and Russia, reemerged as the largest state in east-central Europe in 1918, though some of its frontiers were set only in 1922. With two-thirds of its population Polish and Catholic, the country's ethnic problems with the Ukrainian-Ruthenian, Jewish, German and Belorussian minorities were serious but not quite as troubling as its preoccupation with the security of its borders. Memories of sovereignty lost and gained throughout its thousand-year history, combined with

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fear of German and Russian revenge, made Poland both apprehensive and vulnerable. Its fears turned into a nightmare in 1939 when, experiencing still another partition (the fourth), the country was swallowed up by the invading armies of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia.

Unlike Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, which were created in Paris, and unlike Poland whose sovereign existence was restored in the aftermath of World War I, Romania benefited from the peace conference by having its prewar territory and population enlarged. More than doubling the area under its control, Greater Romania was pieced together by Hungary giving up Transylvania, Austria relinquishing Bukovina, Russia returning Bessarabia (part of which now belongs to Moldova) and Bulgaria ceding southern Dobruja. With about two-thirds of its population composed of ethnic Romanians, the country's integration seemed a more promising prospect, and a somewhat less complex task, than that of ethnically fragmented Yugoslavia. However, persistent Hungarian complaints about Romanian assimilationist pressures against the significant Hungarian minority in Transylvania and strong Romanian rejoinders about Hungarian interference in Romania's internal affairs circumvented the goal of integration from the beginning. In 1940, supported by Germany and Italy, Hungary recovered and then held during the war a large part of Transylvania, which was then returned to Romania in 1945. Traditional mistrust and antagonism between the two countries have yet to subside.

The beneficiaries—Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania—had little reason to celebrate; their triumph, such as it was, was bittersweet. Throughout the interwar period their security was precarious, their internal peace shaky. While Austria, ready to attach itself to Germany, rather graciously adjusted to the loss of empire, Hungary and to a lesser extent Bulgaria pressed hard for a major revision of the Paris peace treaties.

Hungary justified its irredentism by claiming losses that were indeed excessive, not only in absolute terms but also compared to those of World War I's main culprit, Germany. According to Western rather than Hungarian calculations (as the latter included the loss of Croatia-Slavonia as well), Hungary was left with only one-third of its former territory and two-fifths of its population, becoming a rump state smaller

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than the territories it ceded to Romania alone.[3] More than half of the 3.5 million ethnic Hungarians who were separated from their homeland lived in areas contiguous to Hungary. By comparison Bulgaria's losses were modest—less than ten percent of its prewar territory—but its lack of access to the Aegean Sea and the burden of heavy reparations produced considerable economic hardship and a stormy political climate. Incensed especially by the controversial transfer of part of Macedonia to Yugoslavia, various irredentist groups and parties succeeded in making that issue dominate political life in interwar Bulgaria.

In the West the multitude of claims, counterclaims, arguments and rebuttals was received with indifference bordering on contempt. Observations that these weak and small states were but inviting targets for German and Russian penetration were rather lightly dismissed; and proposals for a confederation or a federation of east-central European countries to temper intra-regional conflicts gained no Western sponsor. In 1920 the British historian E. H. Carr expressed the unspoken consensus when he cautioned a group of Western ambassadors "not to take the new nations of Europe too seriously" because their affairs "belong to the sphere of farce."[4]

Now, with more than 20,000 people dead in the former Yugoslavia, and with over two million people homeless, the farce that never was must be seen as the tragedy it has always been. Indeed, with the old hatreds and ancient feuds so much in evidence, it seems as if little of significance has changed. The worlds of Sarajevo 1992 and Sarajevo 1914 suffer from the same disease.

One wonders who is unfortunate enough to be next in line on Serbia's list of victims: the Albanians of Kosovo or the Hungarians of Vojvodina? How much additional territory will satisfy Croatia? Further north, can Czechs and Slovaks conclude their divorce without a fight? Unrestrained by Prague, will the fervently nationalist Slovaks ever learn to live in peace with their large Hungarian minority? Sad to say, the harrowing ethnic problems the past has bequeathed to the

[3]Cf. Joseph Rothschild, *East Central Europe between the Two World Wars*, Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1974, p. 155.

[4]As quoted in Norman Davies, *White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War, 1919–1920*, London: MacDonald, 1972, p. 105.

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region's fragile democracies are as intractable as they may be destructive in their consequences for European stability.

IV

Further aggravating the problems of transition are at least three economic trends and circumstances that history has passed on to the countries of east-central Europe.

First is the region's relative developmental backwardness, especially of its southeastern parts. These areas have almost always been on Europe's economic periphery, their condition altered but a few times under high-minded political leadership. In the 1880s and 1890s, for example, several countries of the Austro-Hungarian empire experienced a long period—a golden age—of rapid industrialization, urbanization and modernization that brought the region's transportation and communications facilities, as well as its literacy rates and institutions of higher education, within striking distance of west European standards.

Because of irredentist fervor and the rise of fascism, combined with the consequences of the Great Depression, that hopeful trend was reversed during the interwar period. The political and economic environment generated by the region's authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes was inhospitable to business and discriminatory against most foreign investors. Once again east-central Europe found itself on the periphery—but once again there was an exception. Thanks to Czechoslovakia's democratic leadership, Bohemia and Moravia were able to defy the prevailing trend of economic decline. As late as the mid-1930s, in the shadow of Nazi Germany, they managed to keep pace with neighboring Austria and Germany.

While being stuck in Europe's economic periphery was thus almost always a fact of life and a problem, it was never so widely recognized and so acutely felt as it is today. Tens of millions of people can now watch Western television and millions travel abroad, seeing for the first time the contrast between Western prosperity and Eastern backwardness and wondering about the discrepancy. Without denying the heavy legacy of over four decades of communist economics, they ask why the region's economic decline has accelerated, and the gap between East and West widened, following the collapse of the communist regimes. Could it be that the new regimes they have put in power, the Czech lands excepted, are not support-

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ive enough of private enterprise? While the recent experience of having observed Western achievements at first hand does not change the fact of economic backwardness, it may yet induce pressure for a more liberal political order that would help move the region up and away from the periphery.

The second economic circumstance—the combined consequence of fascism in the interwar years, World War II and the communist era—is the weakness of the region's professional and entrepreneurial middle classes, which used to include large numbers of Jews and ethnic Germans. During the golden era of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries these entrepreneurs played an active and indeed critical role in bringing countries like Poland and Hungary closer to west European norms. Jews, for example, were allowed to advance and excel in business, finance, medicine, journalism and the emerging social sciences at that time.

They are not there to play that role anymore. Tens of thousands of educated or well-to-do Jews left for the West in the 1930s, with millions left behind to perish in the Holocaust. After World War II all ethnic Germans, including gifted businessmen, agricultural specialists and farmers, were accused of collaboration with the Nazis and expelled from their homelands in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Finally, escaping from communism, most of the Jews of east-central Europe who survived the Holocaust have since moved to the West or settled in Israel.

There is now a pressing need for a new entrepreneurial class. Western-sponsored business schools can and to some extent already do compensate for the lag. Judging by the past, however, only a calm political environment free of ethnic and religious discrimination would prompt talented people, whether they belong to a minority group or not, to stay in their homelands (rather than emigrate) and provide professional leadership to the ongoing processes of transformation.

The third circumstance, of course, is the legacy of communist economics, which has instilled patterns and expectations altogether different from those present in market economies. The list of such patterns and expectations is endless. A simplistic summary of communist economics is that the state decides everything: which factory to build and what it will produce, who will run it and how many will work there and how much they will be paid; the state sets the price of whatever it has decided the factories will make. The people, in turn, are

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guaranteed a job that does not pay well, and thus they have no reason to work hard, and so forth. In the end the state is unhappy because socialism is "bankrupt"; but it takes comfort in the knowledge that it controls the (nonexistent) bankruptcy court.

This caricature of communist economics is meant to suggest not only the enormity but the uniqueness of the tasks ahead. Such radical institutional, as well as social and psychological, changes as are needed lack both precedents and guides. As many have noted there are no textbooks on what steps to take to get from a communist to a market economy—on how to convert one into the other. It might be easier to erect a market economy from scratch than to build one from shambles.

The conclusion is self-evident. The pervasive condition of backwardness, the absence of a strong entrepreneurial middle class and the economic ruin that communism has left behind present formidable obstacles to economic recovery and renewal. In the absence of a more tolerant political culture, chances for economic progress are poor; without economic progress, chances for the new democracies to take hold are equally poor.

V

Because east-central Europe had expected the United States to do far more to assist the transition, there is immense disappointment now, a feeling of blighted hope approaching a sense of betrayal.

The change is remarkable because for so long in times past America could do no wrong. After all, it was—and was seen to be—properly sympathetic to the Hungarian war for independence in the middle of the nineteenth century, generous toward Polish immigrants seeking freedom and prosperity here at the turn of this century, supportive of ethnic justice in the Balkans after World War I, and resolute against fascism during World War II and against communism afterward. Moreover the people of east-central Europe always admired everything American, notably U.S. technological prowess. The region's industrial workers heard that American factories were ultramodern, and peasants heard that farming was highly advanced. Scientists believed America was the world's most inventive laboratory, the place where Nobel Prize winners made stunning discoveries. Products "Made in America," from

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cars never driven to cigarettes occasionally smoked, were synonymous with high quality.

During the early phase of the Cold War especially, these views and sentiments were reinforced by America's anticommunist stance. Which country sought the liberation of east-central Europe from Moscow's oppressive tyranny? Which country stood up to communist aggression in Berlin and Korea? Which country defended western Europe against a potential military onslaught, and which one financed Radio Free Europe to keep hope alive in the other Europe? For most people of east-central Europe the political equation was simple: as the communists were known to be bad, Americans must be good. Perhaps only after President Kennedy's assassination did perceptions of the United States begin to reflect some familiarity with complexities.

Now, feeling abandoned, people are more critical, their judgments less favorable about the United States. It is a measure of their current mood that populist demagogues can seek popular approbation by blaming America for some of the region's historical misfortunes. Hinting at conspiracy revives old questions: Did President Roosevelt sell out east-central Europe to Stalin at the 1945 Yalta summit? Did Washington send word to Moscow during the 1956 Hungarian crisis saying it did not favor governments unfriendly to the Kremlin near Soviet borders? Did President Johnson convey a similar message to Moscow during the Prague Spring of 1968? But the worst may be the latest one: Is present U.S. indifference toward the region due to a Bush-Gorbachev secret pact at the 1989 Malta summit that confirmed Moscow's sphere of influence—as decided in Yalta? From Yalta to Malta!

The conspiracy theories are false, and most people in east-central Europe know it. Yet these people have plenty of reason to feel misled. Early American rhetoric about liberation and the practice of prayers during Captive Nations Week aside, successive U.S. administrations missed few opportunities to challenge the communist dictatorships and press for change and human rights, declaring repeatedly that Europe must be "whole and free" again. The very aim of American foreign policy was to replace the "evil empire" with democratic states, on the correct assumption that democracy was the best guarantee for lasting peace. If the aim was only to create tension in the bloc and thus put Moscow on the defensive, as the communists used to charge, how could the people of

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east-central Europe know? Henry Kissinger put it well: "It is hardly to the credit of the West that after talking for a generation about freedom for eastern Europe, so little is done to vindicate it."[5]

What could the United States do, then, to meet some of the region's expectations, fulfill some of its own moral obligations and mitigate some of the problems of transition?

—*Recognize that the expected proliferation of small wars and conflicts in Europe calls for new thinking about security.* At issue now is the stability of Europe, East and West. It is a problem completely different from, but potentially as serious as, the Soviet threat to western Europe, because the peace of Europe is not divisible. In the former Yugoslavia, proliferation began with the almost peaceful separation of Slovenia from the rest of that country, continued with a civil war between Croats and Serbs and turned into a bloody nightmare in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Let us hope that the hostilities end there, but it is more likely that they will spread to other parts of the region. Then, as the flood of refugees seeks food and shelter abroad, various xenophobic and populist movements in western Europe are bound to gain new strength and new supporters. Might they even succeed in undermining that most promising trend of the postwar era that the United States has so vigorously and unselfishly promoted for over four decades—the trend toward European integration and unity? Surely the most important task for U.S. foreign policy in the 1990s is to prevent the Balkanization of Europe.

—*Clarify what the United States will do and what it cannot do.* Clearly there are, and should be, limits to what the United States can do. Aside from stimulating private investment and granting modest sums for specific purposes, it should not assume responsibility for the region's economic reconstruction. The United States should invest most of its attention in countries with some geopolitical significance and in those with the best prospect of carrying out a successful transition to democracy. This means the central European states that lie between Russia and Germany (Poland, Hungary and the Czech lands) and possibly Slovenia. The United States should press NATO and encourage the European Community to accept

[5]*New York Post*, March 3, 1992.

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these countries as full members—as soon as possible, but certainly before the end of this decade. Both NATO, thus given a new lease on life, and the EC should offer a fixed date for membership, provided their conditions for such are fully met.

—*Mobilize private investment in east-central Europe.* Contrary to the received wisdom of the moment, a vast assistance program on the pattern of the Marshall Plan would not do much good. Privatization has not yet gone far enough for the region's economies to absorb large amounts of foreign funds. What is needed is small-scale private investment that is less likely to be wasted. If the White House and the Department of Commerce were to hold frequent consultations with American bankers and industrialists, and advise them of profitable business deals to be made and the U.S. national interest to be served in east-central Europe, it would make a difference. If politically stable the region is a potential gold mine for small- and medium-sized American companies. There is probably no other place in the world, for example, where so many educated people are unable to make good use of their skills and talents.

—*Pursue preventive diplomacy before the next conflict erupts.* In 1991 Washington engaged in verbal acrobatics by stating its preference for Yugoslav "unity and democracy," a statement the Serb leadership chose to interpret as a green light to make Croatia stay within a united Yugoslav federation. It took 11 long months and tens of thousands of deaths for the United States to mobilize the international community. Even then, for reasons having to do with American domestic politics, the issue was still presented as one of "humanitarian" concern rather than a threat to European stability. If the United States had done in mid-1991 as much as it is doing in mid-1992, the Serbians in Belgrade and in Bosnia-Herzegovina might well have been deterred from proceeding as they have.

Sadly, European and U.N. warnings have gone unheeded without American-backed initiatives. Even the opening of Sarajevo airport, however temporary, was due to U.S. warships making their presence felt in the Adriatic. The lesson for American diplomacy elsewhere in east-central Europe, then, is to clarify U.S. preferences early and state them without equivocation and without worrying about charges of interference in a country's or the region's internal affairs. While some politicians will undoubtedly resent such interference, most will welcome it. President Árpád Göncz of Hungary has publicly

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challenged the West in general and the United States in particular "to give frank answers to central Europe's agonizing questions."

VI

Celebrating the defeat of communism while underestimating the dangers ahead, America is turning inward. Europe lacks leadership. In the midst of domestic chaos Russia faces upheavals both at home and in the other successor states of the former Soviet Union. From the United Nations to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, international organizations are engaged in defining their new role after the Cold War. Given a recessionary economic environment, too, international circumstances favoring the rise of a democratic east-central Europe and the perdurability of a stable Europe are thus less auspicious than previously assumed. Sarajevo is back to haunt the last decade of the century, as it did the generation of 1914.

The key missing ingredient is domestic pressure in the United States for a more active engagement in the region's future. Such pressure is absent because the issue is invariably, if mistakenly, identified in terms of new expenditures, and because American political intellectuals who shape public opinion have been so strangely silent. Where are the conservatives who used to speak out on behalf of the "satellite nations"? Where are the neoconservatives who tried to make the struggle against communism part of the liberal agenda? Where is the whole liberal community with its insistence on a pro-democratic foreign policy? With due respect to some notable exceptions, the silence of American political intellectuals is deafening. Yet, in the absence of an American-led international effort, postcommunist Europe may get no further than the gates of the promised land.

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Sabrina Petra Ramet

WAR IN THE BALKANS

In late June 1991 Yugoslav army tanks rolled into the newly declared Republic of Slovenia, igniting a war long feared among the peoples of Yugoslavia. Now, more than a year later, the war has resulted in some 50,000 deaths (mostly civilians), more than two million homeless and as much as $60 billion in property damage. Numerous Croatian, Serbian and Muslim villages have disappeared from the map in the fighting, with what was once the thriving city of Vukovar, population 45,000, reduced to rubble. The Bosnian capital of Sarajevo, the city where World War I began, was placed under siege by Serbian forces in March, and in the daily bombardments that have followed, the unique cultural blend that gave Sarajevo a special charm has been extinguished, probably forever.

The war is increasingly being felt beyond the borders of what was once Yugoslavia. Austria and Hungary, Croatia's neighbors to the north, have taken in about 50,000 refugees each. Germany, which had taken in some 125,000 as of late April, subsequently closed its borders to refugees lacking German visas, but relaxed the restriction on July 20. The number of refugees in Germany has since shot up to 200,000. There are also some 40,000 refugees from the Balkan war in Sweden, 13,000 in Switzerland, 4,000 in the Netherlands and as many as 50,000 in other countries. Italy, which has already accepted 7,000 refugees, is starting to brace for what its politicians fear may become a full-scale exodus if and when the war spreads to the Albanian-populated Kosovo region of the former Yugoslavia.

Other European states, such as France, Britain and Spain, however, have done precious little to relieve the pressure from the flood of refugees straining the economies of Germany, Hungary and Austria. Meanwhile the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees expects the war in Bosnia—if it is

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allowed to continue—to result in up to one million additional Bosnian refugees seeking new domiciles. Few of these are expected to return to their homeland.

Albania, Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey have all signaled that they may be unable to remain aloof from the fighting if Serbia takes military action to drive the largely unarmed Albanian population of Kosovo out of the so-called autonomous province, which is under Serbian political control. Indeed the leaders of those states fear that a Serbian assault on Kosovo, the "southern front," is only a matter of time.

Macedonia, an independent republic of the former Yugoslavia, is aware that in the event of military action in Kosovo, it would quickly feel the effects because of the large Albanian minority that resides in the western part of Macedonia.

Consequently there is a serious threat that the conflict will spread to Kosovo and Macedonia, and that it will draw in Albania, Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey. If that eventuality is not averted, the damage to west European and American interests will rise considerably. The longer Western statesmen put off military action, the higher the stakes will become. Indeed, if these other powers were to be drawn into the conflict, their economies would be further strained and the democratization process under way in places like Albania and Bulgaria would become more tenuous still.

II

Western officials and publications circulate myths that perpetuate misunderstanding about the nature of the war and render any effective countermeasures more elusive. Of those myths the most popular are these: the conflict between Serbs and Croats is "centuries old"; the war is primarily a "religious" war (between Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats or Bosnian Muslims); "no one" anticipated the war (the usual canard circulated by people who have not been paying attention); and, since the Croatian government is also repressive (alongside the Serbian government), it must share near-equal blame for the war. None of these myths is true, and yet each has gained a certain currency.

Regarding the first myth: Serbs and Croats have, in fact, lived together peacefully for centuries prior to the twentieth century. There was no rancor until after World War I, when the two nations united in a single state. The Serbian regime ignored the protests of Croatian and Slovenian politicians

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(who wanted regional autonomy) and introduced a centralized government based in Belgrade and a centralized constitution. During the interwar period the Serbian-dominated government in Belgrade introduced unequal taxation for the various nationality groups, gave preferential treatment to Serbs in military promotions, imposed the Cyrillic alphabet on the Croats, denied the Macedonians schooling in their own language (claiming that they were Serbs), closed all state schools for Kosovo's Albanians and forcibly expelled about 45,000 Albanians from Kosovo province—confiscating their land and turning it over to some 60,000 Serbian "colonists." It was this legacy of Serbian repression that gave birth to the Yugoslav "national question."

Second, the war is not a religious war. The war is about land, not religion. The Serbs, with 11.6 percent of the population of Croatia and 31.5 percent of the population of Bosnia, have seized some 30 percent of Croatia's land and about 70 percent of Bosnia's territory. Religious differences did not impede interethnic social contact in either republic until Serbia's politicians began to manipulate religious sensitivity and historical memory to kindle collective hatred for non-Serbs.

Third, various observers both within Yugoslavia and in the West had been warning for nearly a decade about the dangers of civil war in the country. As early as 1983, Dušan Biber, a historian living in Zagreb, pointed to the country's growing internal tensions and warned that, if not corrected, they could lead to the ultimate "Lebanonization" of Yugoslavia.[1] This warning was soon echoed in the West.[2] By 1987 ordinary Yugoslavs were talking openly about the growing danger of civil war, and by the summer of 1989, with the Croatian suppression of the illegally established Zora Society, a Serbian cultural association, it had become clear that there was a significant new escalation in Serb-Croat polemics. By February 1991 it was possible to predict that a Serb-Croat war was only weeks away.[3]

And fourth, regardless of the Croatian government's marked drift toward authoritarian rule, it is important to remember that the Serbs were the first to set up irregular

[1]Quoted in Slobodan Stanković, "Threat of a 'Big Stick' Regime in Yugoslavia," *Radio Free Europe Research*, Nov. 23, 1983, p. 2.

[2]Pedro Ramet, "Yugoslavia and the Threat of Internal and External Discontents," *Orbis*, Spring 1984, pp. 112–115.

[3]See Sabrina P. Ramet, "The Breakup of Yugoslavia," *Global Affairs*, Spring 1991, p. 97.

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militias, that the hostilities in both Croatia and Bosnia were started by Serbian forces and that since July 1991 the fighting has been confined to Croatia and Bosnia: to date there has not been a single attack on Serbian soil.

III

For nearly forty years, from 1943 to 1980, Yugoslavia was guided by the firm hand of President Josip Broz Tito. Tito's brand of liberalized communism offered Yugoslavs regional pluralism but not political pluralism (though this was enough to guarantee that rival viewpoints could be voiced in the daily press, albeit largely across republics rather than within them). The Titoist system had been founded on three core principles: self-management (embodied in its well-known workers' councils), brotherhood and unity (the doctrine of ethnic harmony through one-party rule), and nonalignment in foreign policy. All three began to decay in the years following Tito's death in 1980.

At first this process of political decay contributed to a genuine democratization, as Communist Party elders lost both the capacity and the will to assert firm control. In the context of political weakness and increasing fluidity, new associations and groupings emerged, many with clear political programs. Some of the founders of these associations are now in the leadership of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia.

But another process was also under way—ethnic polarization. This process must be traced to the Kosovo riots of April 1981, when Albanian inhabitants of that province protested against the failure of Belgrade's economic policy to improve their living standards. The riots took on an anti-Serbian tone, and local Serbs reacted with anger and by spreading stories of Albanian atrocities against Serbian women. The waxing Serbian backlash crested in March 1986, when the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts drew up a memorandum claiming that Serbs were being oppressed in communist Yugoslavia—that the Serbs, not the Albanians, were the true underdogs of the system. The memorandum became the manifesto of the Serbian nationalist opposition.

In mid-December 1987 an internal coup in the Serbian party organization brought to power Slobodan Milošević, a banker by training. Milošević promised to carry out the Serbian nationalist program demanded by the academy. Milošević, unlike his predecessors, spoke simply, without ambiguity. For Milošević the task was to "restore" the Serbs to

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their rightful place. Some of his hardline rivals even called for a line-for-line restoration of the laws and institutions of the old interwar kingdom, which had proven so burdensome to Croats, Albanians and Macedonians. Kosovo, often called "the Serbian Jerusalem" (because it had once been a core part of medieval Serbia, but now has a population that is 90 percent Albanian) lay at the heart of Serbian frustration.

A speech by Milošević at an outdoor meeting in Belgrade in November 1988 played on Serbian fears of Albanian demographic growth and provided a clue of things to come:

> This is no time for sorrow; it is a time for struggle. . . . We shall win the battle for Kosovo regardless of the obstacles facing us inside and outside the country. . . . We shall win despite the fact that Serbia's enemies outside the country are plotting against it, along with those in the country. We tell them that we enter every battle with the aim of winning it. . . . And there is no battle in the world that the people have lost.

Milošević wanted to overturn the old Titoist system, with its sundry institutional checks and careful proscription of all nationalist points of view. To do this he cultivated a populist style, appealing to the Serbian people's passions and inflaming their desire for "justice." If the old system was "unjust," then clearly it had to be overthrown and, just as clearly, Milošević was the person to do so.

An extra-legal organization, the Committee for the Protection of Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins, emerged in 1988 and became an important organizational tool for Milošević's subversion of the political system, not merely in Serbia, but also in its two provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina) and in the neighboring republic of Montenegro. The committee built a network in the villages and organized a series of rallies, involving up to 160,000 persons, which destabilized the governments of these federal units. By the spring of 1989 the committee had organized almost 100 protest actions, with an average of 50,000 participants per demonstration. Through these demonstrations Milošević was able to bring down the governments of Vojvodina (October 1988), Montenegro (January 1989) and Kosovo (February 1989). In each case office-holders hostile to Milošević were forced to resign and, in each case, they were replaced by Milošević's supporters. In February 1989 Milošević succeeded in obtaining constitutional changes that eliminated the provinces' authority to pass their own laws and that established the Supreme Court of Serbia as the highest

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court of appeal for Kosovars and Vojvodinans alike, prior to appeal at the federal level.

Milošević had taken politics to the streets in order to accomplish his ends. He had drawn the bulk of his support from Serbia's villages. Milošević's overthrow of the Titoist system represented, thus, the revolt of the countryside against the city. But the recourse to street protests to settle disputes had set a dangerous precedent.

IV

By the summer of 1989 politicians in Slovenia and Croatia were becoming convinced that Milošević posed a threat to the stability of the entire country. But there was little they could do. In the course of that summer, debates between the writers' associations of Slovenia and Serbia sparked more general polemics between the still-communist leaderships of the two republics; the polemics started by focusing on Serbia's policies in Kosovo, but gradually grew into a wide-ranging debate about the political future of the country. By the beginning of autumn 1989 Slovenian patience ran out and, over loud Serbian protests, the Slovenian Assembly passed a series of amendments to the Slovenian constitution: claiming for Slovenia the unilateral right to secede, and the exclusive right to impose a state of emergency in the republic or to authorize the presence or movement of military formations within its borders. These amendments sounded the death knell for Yugoslavia.

As the growing tensions between Slovenia and Serbia over alternative political visions reached a climax, the Serbian Socialist Alliance of Working People—an organizational handmaiden of Milošević's Communist Party—called on Serbian businessmen to sunder all forms of economic contact and cooperation with Slovenian firms. Serbia's enterprises enthusiastically complied. Meanwhile political, cultural and academic contacts between the two republics atrophied. In late December the Slovenian Communist Party held its Eleventh Congress, endorsed a multiparty system and drifted toward final organizational rupture with the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. The LCY convened an extraordinary congress the following month, but the congress collapsed when the Slovenian delegation walked out. Shortly thereafter the Slove-

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nian party pulled out of the LCY and was followed in turn by the other parties.

As 1990 wore on it was increasingly clear that Yugoslavia was already dead and that its federal institutions, whose powers and revenues were now steadily shrinking, were no more than an empty shell. When the Slovenian parliament met in early October 1990 and adopted a constitutional law partially or entirely annulling 30 federal laws in the areas of the economy, politics and defense, it was only confirming a course that had by then become inexorable.

Meanwhile a series of local elections transformed the political landscape of Yugoslavia. By the end of 1990 Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were under noncommunist governments and Macedonia under a coalition government in which the communists were a minority. Only in Serbia and Montenegro did the communists continue to hold onto power.

Milošević had been talking for years of the need to recentralize the system. Croatia and Slovenia, by contrast, felt strongly that the system needed to be fully confederalized, with the retention of only an economic union and coordination in foreign policy and military matters. The governments of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia fashioned a joint compromise that embraced elements of both the confederal plan and the centralist plan. Montenegro, which had been backing the Serbian (centralist) proposal, now gave encouragement to the compromise plan and ironically on June 26, 1991, the very day that Yugoslav army tanks attacked Slovenia, the "Yugoslav" legislature assessed that the compromise offered by Bosnia and Macedonia contributed "a solid basis for [the] continuation of negotiations on Yugoslavia's future organization."

At the turn of 1991 the leaders of Yugoslavia's six republics held a series of meetings ostensibly designed to avert a showdown. But the two chief antagonists—at this point, still Slovenia and Serbia—showed no signs of reaching a compromise, and Milošević seemed unimpressed that his was a minority position. Slovenia and Croatia served notice that unless some interrepublican agreement were reached on a new political formula for Yugoslavia by June 26, 1991, they would terminate their association with the federation. Throughout May and June there were violent incidents in several locations in Croatia that resulted in a number of deaths. As the late June deadline approached it was less and less likely that a peaceful solution would be found. On June 25 Slovenia and

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Croatia announced their intentions to secede from the Yugoslav federation, and the following day, the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) began its destructive attack, striking first at Slovenia, but later withdrawing from that republic and opening hostilities in Croatia. Milošević probably realized the impracticality—if not impossibility—of annexing Slovenian territory, in which hardly any Serbs live, to the "ethnically cleansed" state he and his cohorts are building. Shortly after the initial shots, in fact, Milošević announced that Belgrade had no objection to Slovenian secession.

Slovenia and Croatia had agreed in December 1990 to coordinate defense and security policies—an accord that sounded very much like a mutual defense pact. Milošević was determined to pry this alliance apart. Thus he contacted Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and, at a secret meeting between the two presidents, offered him assurances of his goodwill and cooperation in resolving the dispute peacefully and to Croatia's satisfaction, provided that Tudjman stay out of the impending Slovenian conflict. Subsequently, when the JNA attacked Slovenia, the Croats remained aloof, thus signaling to the Slovenes that the Croats were not making much of their "coordination in defense." This lesson proved its value later when the Slovenes returned the compliment and declined to help an embattled Croatia.

By the end of the year Serbian irregulars, equipped with JNA arms and fighting alongside the JNA, had driven native Croats out of more than 30 percent of Croatian territory. The historic Croatian cities of Osijek, Zadar, Dubrovnik and Vinkovci were under siege. Some 40 percent of Croatian industry had been destroyed. Croatia's Serbs proclaimed the establishment of a "Krajina" republic and requested annexation by Serbia; Croatian President Tudjman, meanwhile, swore that Croatia would never yield any of its territory and would keep fighting until it had retrieved all of its lost territory. Tudjman seems to have meant it but, short of a U.N.-sponsored intervention, he is unlikely ever to achieve that goal.

V

With the spread of the war to Bosnia in the spring of 1992 the idea of an eventual partition of the republic between Serbia and Croatia came to seem ever more inevitable. *Vreme*, a privately owned weekly magazine published in Belgrade and known for its critical stance toward Milošević, published a

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report in September 1991 alleging that Radovan Karadžić, president of Bosnia's Serbian Democratic Party, had met with Milošević to discuss the timing of an eventual army assault on Bosnia. Ironically, on the very eve of Serbia's attack on Bosnia, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović told the Zagreb weekly *Danas* that he was convinced that Bosnia would neither be attacked nor slide into war. But Milošević had set his sights on bringing Serbian-dominated parts of Bosnia into his "New Yugoslavia." Less than two weeks later Bosnia found itself at war as JNA artillery began pounding the Bosnian city of Bosanki Brod.

Macedonia is not yet affected by the fighting. But local politicians are aware of the danger that the war could spread across that republic's borders. Macedonia does not have a significant Serbian population, though its Albanian minority has become increasingly outspoken and will be a factor in any effort to consolidate an independent Macedonian state. Macedonia's Albanians, who constitute as much as 21 percent of the republic's population (according to the 1991 census), are disconcerted with their present status.

Sali Berisha, president of Albania, has asked that Albanians in Macedonia be afforded better possibilities for schooling in their native language and an expansion of Albanian-language radio broadcasts. Ibrahim Rugova, president of the republic of Kosovo (thus, leader of the Albanian opposition in Kosovo), has demanded that Macedonia either allow its Albanians to seek annexation by Kosovo or grant them wide internal autonomy. Yet most of Macedonia's political parties are hostile to the idea of any enhancement of the status of the republic's Albanians.

The Macedonian republic adopted a declaration of sovereignty in September 1991, subsequently declared its independence and was said to be building up a small army of some 30,000 troops. Bulgaria hastened to recognize the Macedonian republic, as well as Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia—declaring at the same time its full respect for Macedonian sovereignty. But Bulgaria qualified this by repeating its long-standing claim that Macedonians are merely western Bulgarians.

Greece, which was demanding that Macedonia relinquish its "Greek" name as a condition for diplomatic recognition—the Greeks have suggested that the Macedonians call their state "the Republic of Skopje"—protested Bulgaria's initiative. Bul-

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garia's recognition of Macedonia, said Antonis Samaras, the Greek foreign minister, "endangered the security and stability in the Balkans." (Ironically, less than a week earlier, Greek and Bulgarian military delegations had concluded four days of discussions and had agreed on military cooperation "at a high level," as well as "close contacts . . . between combat units.")

Bulgarian and Greek intentions are unclear, the future proclivities of Macedonia's sizeable Albanian minority cannot be predicted with any certainty and, at last count, Serbia's strongman Milošević had not yet reconciled himself to the secession of Serbia's southern neighbor (which Serbs recall was once the southern province of the "kingdom of Serbia"). Serbs, who constitute two percent of the Macedonian population, have been complaining about "discriminatory" treatment in that republic, which they describe as an "artificial state." For all these reasons the future of Macedonia seems especially uncertain, even by post-Yugoslav standards. Macedonia's parliament did try to assuage Greek sensitivities by incorporating into its constitution a clause indicating that Macedonia did not have any territorial designs on any of its neighbors. But the Greek government has remained unimpressed.

VI

In Kosovo the remnants of self-rule were gradually stamped out between 1989 and 1990, when Milošević suppressed the Kosovo assembly and tried to have its deputies arrested. Serbian occupation has been maintained at the cost of widespread dismissals of Albanians from their jobs, general disenfranchisement of the local Albanian majority and the tough policing of the province, extending, according to a Priština newspaper, to the blockading of Albanian villages.

Although less than ten percent of Kosovo's population is Serbian, Milošević had forced through in 1988 the adoption of Serbo-Croatian as the official language in Kosovo. Serbian authorities subsequently terminated all secondary schooling in Albanian, dismissing about 6,000 ethnic Albanian secondary-school teachers. The policy of suspending Albanian-language secondary education "for an indefinite period" was reaffirmed last October.

In July 1991 the Serbian assembly passed a law authorizing the distribution of 6,000 hectares of land among Serbs wishing to settle in Kosovo. To carry out this plan authorities have confiscated the property of Albanians and turned it over to

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Serbian "colonists." These colonists have been granted Albanian land at bargain prices, and to date, protests from the Albanian owners have been without effect.

Serbian police have jailed prominent Albanian journalists and political activists and broken up weapons-smuggling rings organized by local Albanians, while Serbian authorities have refused to recognize Rugova's legitimacy as spokesman for the Albanian population of Kosovo (despite Rugova's expressed readiness to enter into dialogue with Belgrade).

The Kosovo problem is inherently dangerous. As long as Kosovo is occupied by Serbia, such occupation can only be achieved at the expense of democracy and self-determination. An independent Kosovo, living peacefully between two hungry neighbors, scarcely seems conceivable. In May there were confirmed reports that the Serbs were reinforcing military forces in several districts in Kosovo, especially along the borders with Macedonia and Albania. In addition arms were once again being distributed among Serbs and Montenegrins living in the province. Meanwhile Tanjug, the Serbian news agency, has reported that Kosovo's Albanians have succeeded in smuggling some arms and have set up guerrilla forces to oppose the Serbs. These Albanian guerrillas were said to have obtained basic training across the border in Albania.

VII

The war has done major and irreparable damage in much of Croatia and Bosnia. Serbs as well as non-Serbs have suffered in the fighting, and many important cultural landmarks have been destroyed. Yet the West has fumbled around for more than a year. At first many in the West were unconvinced that any Western interests were at stake. Later, doubts were raised about the propriety of helping Croatia to repel Serbian forces when the Croatian government of President Tudjman is itself becoming increasingly authoritarian. Former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, now serving as the U.N. special envoy for the Yugoslav crisis, repeatedly advised the State Department to withhold recognition from Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia on grounds that Washington should avoid "precipitious" moves.

For the most part diplomatic activity aimed at resolving the crisis last year was premised on the assumption that both parties were prepared to negotiate in good faith. The failure of more than a dozen ceasefires showed how wrong this

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assumption was. The ceasefires were useful, however, in allowing the contending armed forces to regroup. It was not until the Serbian attack on Bosnia that Western resolve gradually stiffened.

In early May 1992 the United States asked the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to suspend Serbia. The CSCE at first declined to do so, primarily as a result of Russia's objections, but eventually, on July 8, it suspended Serbia for three months.

Over the summer foreign ministers of the 12 European Community states, in a show of solidarity, announced that they were recalling their ambassadors from Belgrade. In the same statement they declared that they were recognizing Serbia-Montenegro as a new state and would not view it as the successor to former Yugoslavia. A few weeks later Austria followed suit. At around the same time the governing council of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade effectively suspended Serbia.

Most significant the U.N. Security Council voted overwhelmingly on May 30 to impose trade sanctions on Serbia. The sanctions require all countries to cease trading with Serbia-Montenegro in any commodity, including oil, to freeze all foreign assets of the Serb-Montenegrin federation, to refuse to repair, service, insure or provide spare parts for aircraft registered in Serbia or Montenegro and to suspend all air traffic with those countries. (Russia, which at first opposed the application of sanctions against Serbia, eventually decided to support their adoption.)

The sanctions have the potential to cripple the already strained Serbian economy. Although self-sufficient in hydroelectric energy, Serbian oil fields produce at most 25 percent of the country's needs. Moreover, with the cancellation of foreign contracts for the importation of exploration equipment, experts believe that Serbia may not be able to maintain current levels of oil production. As a result of the sanctions the official price of gasoline was doubled in early June in both Serbia and Montenegro, and the Belgrade government announced it would introduce gasoline rationing. Serbia's chief suppliers of oil hitherto have been Romania, Greece, Iran, China and Russia.

In addition the Serbian government failed to build up adequate reserves of raw materials and spare parts. Andraj Vince, a Hungarian economist living in Belgrade, pointed out that Serbia was dependent on Hungary for most of its chem-

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ical needs. Furthermore the country's steel mills were already running out of coke and iron ore, which had been imported from Latin America and eastern Europe. This, in turn, will have immediate effects on the Serbian arms industry.

The Serbian war economy has functioned on borrowed time. To increase its hard currency coffers the Serbian government confiscated some $12 billion in private hard-currency bank accounts, taking an even larger slice from its state-controlled enterprises. It also authorized the unrestrained printing of money, thus fueling inflation; but by mid-June the Serbian mint was running out of banknote paper and watermarks, which it had been importing from Slovenia. As the situation grew more difficult, Serbian authorities began selling much needed flour from Kosovo to Russia, in exchange for oil, producing a local bread shortage. Already in March Serbia announced a unilateral moratorium on repayment of its $2.5 billion hard-currency debt. Meanwhile by early May the Serbian airline JAT reached the brink of economic collapse, while other industries, including textiles, clothing, upholstery and tobacco (which have already experienced hardship as a result of the war) are expected to suffer further as a result of the sanctions.

Moreover industrial production in Serbia has declined 18 percent since 1991, and unemployment in Serbia stood at 20 percent in June. As a result of Serbian fiscal policies, prices in May 1992 were 1,915.7 percent higher than in May 1991, and the inflation rate last May alone stood at 80.5 percent (80.9 percent in Montenegro), or an annual 120,000 percent.

The social fabric in Serbia is unraveling, and a growing number of observers believe that civil war could break out in Serbia itself, between rival Serbian parties. In response the Serbian government sketched a plan to bring most sectors of the economy under state control if U.N. sanctions were to extend into the latter half of the summer. In the meantime, notwithstanding the sanctions, Serbia has reportedly continued to import oil, food and weapons from Greece, Romania and Russia. The cargo is loaded onto ships nominally headed for states in Africa but is rerouted, thus eluding customs controls.

Hence, in such an atmosphere, it is not surprising that rumors about Milošević's imminent resignation or disappearance abound. By early June a new wave of rumors held that Milošević had been stashing away gold in a secret bank account

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in Cyprus and that, if the situation became too precarious, he intended to flee. These rumors are important insofar as they indicate the state of mind among ordinary Serbian citizens.

VIII

Despite the economic and political uncertainty within Serbia, there is no assurance that either the economic collapse of Serbia or the removal of Milošević from power would end the conflict. On the contrary there are reasons to believe that the conflict will continue and spread to Kosovo and Macedonia, quite apart from those factors—unless the West takes decisive steps to change the situation.

On the streets of Belgrade today one sees men in uniform everywhere one looks—in fatigues from half a dozen rival military and paramilitary organizations. And nonuniformed citizens frequently carry pistols.

On the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina today there are at least 150,000 persons under arms, organized in various paramilitary formations. In addition the Croatian armed forces have built up their strength to a level of 200,000 troops, 350 tanks and 400 artillery pieces. The JNA, by comparison, has 138,000 troops on active duty, 400,000 troops in the reserves, 1,850 battle tanks and 2,000 artillery pieces.

In late May, moreover, the Sarajevo government belatedly announced the formation of a Bosnian army. All of these militias and formations have been built up at tremendous economic cost, and their organizers are determined to keep fighting. Radovan Karadžić, the Bosnian Serbs' party leader, put it quite simply: "This is not an ideological but a civil war. We shall fight to the death."

Sentiments in Serbia are no less marked by zealotry. In fact it can be argued that Milošević's removal would not clear the way for a pacifist government in Belgrade. Dobrica Ćosić, the renowned Serbian novelist who on June 15 was named president of the new "Yugoslavia" (the Serb-Montenegrin federation; Milošević is president of Serbia) is himself a fervid nationalist. Ćosić had been expelled from the Central Committee of the Serbian Communist Party in 1968 for opposing recognition of the national identity of the Bosnian Muslims and, in 1986, he was the principal author of the notorious memorandum of the Academy of Sciences and Arts that fanned Serbian nationalist sentiment.

Then there is Vojislav Šešelj, whose Serbian Radical Party

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seeks the incorporation into Serbia of all of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Dubrovnik, Lika, Kordun, Slavonia and Macedonia. In an August 1991 interview with the German magazine *Der Spiegel*, Šešelj said he aspired to reduce Croatia "to as much as one can see from the tower of the cathedral in Zagreb. If this is not enough for the Croats, then we will take everything."

And yet there is rising antiwar and anti-Milošević sentiment within Serbia, above all in Belgrade, the scene of numerous street demonstrations calling for the Serbian strongman's resignation. Matija Bečkovič, president of the Serbian Association of Writers, sent Milošević an open letter in June, calling on him to resign. Even *NIN*, the Belgrade newsweekly once controlled by Milošević, has asked the Serbian leader to step down.

Meanwhile Crown Prince Alexander, living in exile in London, is waiting in the wings to be asked to become king of Serbia. The crown prince promises that, as a constitutional monarch, he would be "outside and above politics," and that he would work for a system in which "all political parties . . . adhere to . . . democratic principles and contribute to the development of genuine parliamentary democracy in Serbia." The crown prince is perhaps the one ray of hope for pacifists in Serbia. "Monarchy," he promises, "will guarantee equal rights to all citizens of Serbia including those who are ideological opponents of monarchy as a form of government. In this lies the essential difference between monarchy and a regime that classifies its political opponents as 'enemies of the people'."

Finally there is Vuk Drašković, leader of the Serbian Renaissance Party, who has pledged that if he is ever sworn in as Serbia's president, he will pull all Serbian forces from Croatia and Bosnia and will personally visit Zagreb and Sarajevo to extend his apologies for the war. Whether this should be taken literally or not, it is clear that Drašković is speaking a different political language from Milošević and could not be treated by Western powers in the same way, if he ultimately should come to power.

IX

There is very little chance of the war winding down without external international involvement, despite the increasing political vulnerability of the Milošević regime and the economic

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difficulties faced by Serbia. Indeed the chief actors on both sides show an undiminished will to fight to realize extravagant aims. Ćosić, the new "Yugoslav" president, has offered to talk with the Albanians about partitioning Kosovo, for example, even though Albanians constitute 90 percent of the population of the province and though Albanian leaders in Kosovo have repeatedly emphasized that the borders of Kosovo are nonnegotiable.

Most recently Croatian forces have launched campaigns to take back territory lost to Serbs earlier. Croatian forces also enjoyed some successes against Serbian forces in Bosnia in June, and were at that point moving troops toward Trebinje, headquarters for Serbian troops who had besieged Dubrovnik. So much has changed since the outbreak of the war in June 1991 that some observers have recently started to suggest that Croatia might defeat Serbia in the long run, and end up the primary territorial beneficiary of the war. Indeed Croatia has territorial designs on Bosnia-Herzegovina as well and has already annexed parts of that republic.

The casualties from the war are, for the size of the affected communities, staggering. In addition to the estimated 50,000 dead and two million homeless, there are also about 20,000 wounded and 6,000 missing in Croatia and more than 25,000 wounded and 30,000 missing in Bosnia, while 60,000 people are languishing in Serbian and Croatian prisoner-of-war camps.

The West had hoped that imposition of an international arms embargo would end Serbian aggression. This strategy ignores the fact that the JNA had stockpiled huge quantities of weapons, especially in the months immediately preceding the war, and that the JNA had enjoyed access to a formidable domestic arms industry. On the other hand the embargo has slowed Croatian and Muslim efforts to import arms and, as a result, Croats and Muslims in Bosnia have only a limited amount of artillery and some small arms, purchased in eastern Europe, with which to hold off Serbian militias equipped with rocket launchers and other sophisticated gear. As *The New York Times* pointed out in July, "Western officials say the embargo's main accomplishment may have been to prevent the breakaway republics of Croatia and Bosnia from buying the types of heavy weapons that could turn the tide on the battlefield." Recently, however, Croatia has succeeded in purchasing 150

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205-mm. Messerschmitt howitzers and about 150 Leopard tanks from Germany.

X

What should the West do? Pressures for international military intervention against Serbia have been growing. Bosnian and Croatian officials have sought international military intervention, restating their requests in May and June. In Germany Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, CDU/CSU foreign policy spokesman Klaus Lamers and Western European Union assembly president Hartmut Soell have all demanded the creation of an international military force to push back the Serbs, although all three ruled out the use of German troops, for well-known "historical reasons."

The Italian high command has reportedly declared its readiness to commit Italian naval forces to military action against Serbia. Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev declared himself in favor of a NATO intervention in the former Yugoslavia as early as June 1991 and restated this view a year later.

In the United States, Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) urged the Bush administration to take the lead in putting such intervention on the U.N. agenda. "The time for drawing the line has come," he said. "The U.N. should authorize nation states to use force. NATO should draw up plans for a comprehensive use of force as thorough as that formulated for air, sea and ground forces in Desert Storm." If Serbia should refuse to yield to a final demand for withdrawal, Lugar added, "it should face sufficient military force to ensure its certain and swift defeat."

In mid-July U.N. Security Council member Austria, backed by Germany and Hungary, proposed that the United Nations consider "further steps" (meaning military intervention) to end the fighting in Bosnia. But the United States, Britain and France refused to support the Austrian proposal.

As of late July authorities in Belgrade (among them, prominently, the new federal prime minister, Milan Panić) were promising to present a plan for resolution of the crisis. But even as the authorities talked peace the Serbian forces of Karadžić, supplied by the Yugoslav Army, continued to bombard Sarajevo and Goražde, and to expel non-Serbs from the areas of their control. Whether this means that Karadžić's forces and other paramilitary groups are no longer responsive to Belgrade's wishes, as many observers believe, or that the

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Belgrade government is not willing to show its good faith by an immediate cessation of hostilities is almost beside the point. The conclusion remains the same: the continued use of force against innocent populations in Croatia and Bosnia will end only when effective countervailing force is marshaled (or, in a pessimistic scenario, when one side accomplishes its objectives).

Meanwhile the embargo has had leaks. Various reports have suggested that Greece, Russia and perhaps also Israel are continuing to sell oil (and in Greece's case, food) to Serbia, circumventing the embargo with various artifices. Weaponry has also continued to flow into Serbia, much of it coming via Greece and Romania.

The Bush administration, however, like the EC more generally, has been slow to conclude that the mobilization of decisive force against Serbia is necessary. "We're not the world's policeman," President Bush said on June 11, when asked about speculation that the United States was planning military intervention against Serbia. And although Washington decided to commit air force and navy combat aircraft to protect an international relief mission in Bosnia in early July and sent six warships bearing 2,200 marines into the south Adriatic, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney indicated that in the administration's view, "the situation doesn't merit a Desert Storm-like military coalition, involving substantial U.S. ground power."

And yet the postponement of an international military intervention entails the risk that, if unchecked, Serbian forces may further expand the war, raising the stakes, driving even greater numbers of refugees into west European countries and possibly drawing Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey into the fighting. Turkey has maintained close diplomatic contact with Bosnia-Herzegovina and has rallied the Islamic world in protest of Serbian aggression.

Given Greece's perceptible pro-Serbian tilt throughout the crisis—a result both of Greek-Serbian economic interdependence and of longstanding Greek animosity toward the Macedonians—it is likely that Greece and Turkey would find themselves on opposite sides of the war. In such circumstances the entire situation would become vastly more complicated, vastly more devastating to the regional economy and vastly less susceptible to surgical intervention.

An argument can be made, thus, that it has become a matter of self-defense for western Europe—and hence in the strategic

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

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

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

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interest of the United States—to organize a plan for the use of military forces to end Serbian aggression before the war spreads any further. Such military intervention would not necessarily require the use of ground forces. On the contrary the implementation of the following policies might be sufficient to drastically diminish Serbia's capacity to prosecute the war: first, the imposition of an effective sea, land and air blockade, and the use of surgical air strikes to destroy Serbian hydroelectric plants, dams, bridges, army depots and arms factories in both Serbia and Bosnia (including an important factory in Serb-held Banja Luka, as well as certain farms operated by Serbian militias near the front); second, the lifting of the ban on weapons sales to Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia, and the provision of limited armaments to the Muslim and Croatian forces loyal to the legitimate government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Intervention at this level would be sufficient to tilt the balance in Croatia's and Bosnia's favor, and perhaps to relieve the pressure on Macedonia. But the war would likely continue for years, even under these revised circumstances, as an attrition campaign on the part of militia leaders. Indeed one of the conclusions to be drawn from this war in the Balkans is that ethnic war is apt to be more ferocious and vindictive than other types of conflagration, and its combatants more tenacious (at least in the absence of external intervention).

To effect an absolute cessation of hostilities ground forces would ultimately be necessary, as an increasing number of observers agree. Their task would be a complicated one—to force both Serbian and Croatian forces to withdraw from Bosnia, to obtain the withdrawal of Serbian militias currently in Croatia and ultimately to disarm irregulars on all sides. Only then could a just and stable peace be sought, on the basis of respect for the pre-June 1991 jurisdictional borders and some limited population exchanges between Croatia and Serbia, and between Bosnia and Serbia.

The deployment of American ground troops into Bosnia would surely stir up at least as much domestic opposition—probably more—as the preparations for Desert Storm. But the failure to marshal countervailing force to push back the Serbs could end up destabilizing much of the Balkan peninsula. It could produce a wave of refugees that exceeds the capacity of west European countries to absorb.

At yet another level, allowing Serbia to mount a war of

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aggression with impunity, to engage in "ethnic cleansing" and to redraw the boundaries of sovereign states by force would signify that the United States and the European Community view the Helsinki agreement on human rights as a dead letter—a dangerous precedent. For all these reasons I am inclined to view the employment of countervailing force under a U.N. aegis as the lesser evil.

In June 1991 most west European and American politicians viewed the war as a "Yugoslav affair," having little importance for their own states. A year later it has become clear that the crisis is already a "European affair," with the threat of igniting a more general Balkan war, one that would affect U.S. interests as well.

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Bernard Lewis

RETHINKING THE MIDDLE EAST

In the period immediately following the ceasefire in the Gulf War many voices were raised saying, "Everything has changed. The Middle East will never be the same again; this is a new world, a new Middle East, and all the problems and answers are different." And then, when the new world order failed to materialize in days, or weeks or even months, many voices—some of them the same voices—were heard saying, "Nothing has changed. Everything is back where it was before, the same actors playing the same parts and acting out the same scripts."

Momentous events may happen quickly, as they surely did in Kuwait and Iraq last year, but some time is needed to understand the changes that events have revealed, accelerated or caused. By now it is becoming increasingly clear that there are indeed many changes in the Middle East, and that while these vary considerably in their scope, scale and range, few things and few participants remain as they were before.

These changes are related to two sequences of events: one short-term and regional, namely the war in Kuwait and Iraq; the other long-term and global, namely the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Some changes may perhaps be ascribed directly to these events; others—probably most—had been in progress for some time and were revealed, and perhaps also accelerated, by the cataclysmic events in the region and in the world.

II

We may begin with the regional events—the Gulf War and its aftermath. Many of the consequences of this war are still problematic. Some are becoming clear and can be listed without much danger of disagreement. One of them, a cause rather than a consequence of the Persian Gulf crisis and war, is the failure—some would say the demise—of pan-Arabism

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Bernard Lewis is the Cleveland E. Dodge Professor of Near Eastern Studies Emeritus at Princeton University. This article is adapted from the 1992 Henry M. Jackson Memorial Lecture, delivered at the University of Washington.

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and perhaps even of the Arab world as a political entity. The decline of pan-Arabism as a force shaping the policies of Arab governments can be measured in the level and intensity of their support for other Arab governments and peoples. In 1948 the Arab states were unanimous in rejecting the U.N. partition resolution and in attempting, by military as well as political and economic measures, to prevent the establishment of the Jewish state—and also, incidentally, the Arab state—proposed by that resolution. By 1982, when the Israelis invaded Lebanon, entered its capital and evicted the Palestine Liberation Organization, the reaction in Arab countries was remarkably restrained. One reason for this restraint was the Iran-Iraq War. Both governments and public opinion in the Arab world were sharply divided by the war, and Syria, a major Arab country, was a nonbelligerent ally of Persian Iran against Arab Iraq.

Perhaps even more striking was the American air raid on Tripoli in 1986, when Middle East experts gave warning that this action against Libya would unite the whole Arab world against the West, and against the United States in particular. Nothing of the kind happened. In 1967 a false rumor that the United States had intervened in the June war on Israel's side brought attacks by enraged crowds on American installations in many Arab capitals. By 1986 a direct American assault on an Arab capital evoked, at the most, mixed feelings in other Arab capitals and virtually no popular outcry. In the meantime the Arab states were increasingly indifferent to the plight of the Palestinians. Some of them are now even willing to call Israel by its name and—apart from Egypt—for the first time since the ceasefire negotiations of 1948–49 to sit and talk face to face with Israeli representatives.

There have of course always been quarrels and rivalries between Arab states, and these sometimes impeded Arab unity or cooperation—such as the mutual distrust between King Farouk of Egypt and King Abdallah of Jordan, which hampered Arab military operations in 1948. There have been frontier disputes and even border skirmishes, for example, between Algeria and Morocco, between Egypt and Libya, and between the Saudi kingdom and its neighbors. When Saddam Hussein invaded, conquered and annexed Kuwait in August 1990 he completed, and in a sense formalized, a change that had been developing over a long period.

Now for the first time, in defiance of all the accepted norms

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of inter-Arab relations and in violation of the Arab League Charter, which precludes the resort to arms in inter-Arab disputes, one Arab state had launched a full-scale war against another. This in turn led to an inter-Arab conflict in which a group of Arab states, with Western powers as allies, fought against another Arab state. This was not an American-Arab war, despite attempts to present it as such. It was not an Israeli-Arab war, despite attempts to transform it into one. It was not an ideological war, despite Saddam Hussein's belated but surprisingly effective appeal to fundamentalism and populism, and the coalition's brief and perfunctory obeisance to democracy. It was, in the last analysis, a war between Arab rulers, in which America reluctantly became involved, in support of its allies and in defense of the perceived common interests of the free world, and in which Israel was used, briefly, painfully and unsuccessfully, as a distraction.

These events marked the formal abandonment of the long-cherished dream of pan-Arabism, of a united Arab state or even a coherent Arab political bloc. It would be rash to say that pan-Arabism is dead, since many of the features that led to its emergence are still there. But as a matter of current politics and for the foreseeable future it no longer counts as a political force. It survives among diminishing groups of intellectuals, mainly outside the Arab lands; it is still cherished by a variety of special interests, often for reasons unrelated to the concerns or well-being of the Arabs themselves. But it is not a factor in international or inter-Arab or even domestic Arab politics.

Is this change irreversible? Nothing is impossible, and it may be that the U.S. or Israeli governments will succeed where all the Arab governments have failed, in reviving the cause of pan-Arabism and recreating an Arab political bloc. What is much more likely, however, is that the position of the Arab world will more closely resemble that of Latin America—a group of countries linked by a common language and culture, a common religion, a common history, a common sense, even, of destiny, but not united in a common polity.

A second major change that has been revealed rather than caused by the Gulf War is the end—at least for the time being—of the effectiveness of oil as a weapon in the hands of the producer countries. This weapon, so powerful as an instrument of policy in past crises, was in this particular crisis totally ineffectual. At a time when the oil supplies from two major producers were cut off—Kuwait's by the Iraqis, Iraq's by

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the coalition—with the consequent serious drop in the productive capacity available, the price of oil actually fell.

Is this change reversible? Perhaps, though it seems unlikely. Other sources of oil are being found and developed, notably in the former Soviet republics; existing producer countries will desperately need oil revenues and will compete with each other in production. Meanwhile growing awareness of the environmental and political fallout of oil has spurred the search for less destructive and less hazardous fuels. A time will come, perhaps in twenty-five years, perhaps in fifty, when oil will be superseded by other, cleaner, safer sources of energy. That time is not near, but producers are increasingly aware that the unwise use of oil power for financial extortion or political blackmail will bring that time closer. To make oil a weapon once again in the hands of the producers would require a special—but not unprecedented—combination of foolishness and incompetence on the part of those who make the world's political and commercial decisions.

The Gulf War shattered some illusions and endangered other cherished beliefs. One of those concerned the efficacy of bought technology. If you have the money you can buy all kinds of sophisticated technology and weaponry—there is no lack of sellers, supplies and expert advisers, even of credit. But buying technology does not make an advanced technological society, nor does it enable the buyer to field an advanced technological army. In the military sense this was probably the most important lesson of the war. The swift and overwhelming defeat of the Iraqi armed forces reminded the world of something that it had begun to forget: the technological and military edge that the modern West had achieved over the rest of the world, and which in the past had enabled even small European countries like Holland and Portugal to conquer and govern vast empires in Asia and Africa. That technological edge is much diminished and in some countries, for example in Japan, it has disappeared altogether. It still remains in the Middle East, and may help to explain the repeated victories of Israel against vastly more numerous and powerful neighbors.

The Gulf War and, more particularly, events since the ceasefire have also demonstrated the baselessness of the illusions that were held concerning the effectiveness of sanctions as a way of bringing Saddam Hussein to heel. There were many who argued that the United States should "give sanctions time to work," often with the unspoken second line:

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"And if they don't work, let's forget about it." By now it should be clear, even to those who had no such original intention, that the second line would have been the inevitable result.

Both the Western and the regional powers, it would seem, still hold on to beliefs that, though battered, are not dead. But there are questions. Can the Western powers really safeguard their vital interests in the region through local proxies or protégés? Do they even have such interests? Can Middle Eastern powers defend themselves from subversion and invasion without Western help and, if not, what level and type of help would they need? All these are open questions at the present time. It is sadly probable that the course of events during the coming months and years will provide answers to them.

III

The ending of the Cold War also undercuts the other main cause of Middle Eastern importance: the overland transit routes and bridges between Europe, Asia and Africa. Specifically the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of Russia as a major player on the international scene have brought, and will continue to bring, changes of global importance affecting the Middle East as every other part of the world.

The most immediately visible and probably the most enduring of the regional consequences of this global change is the redefinition of the Middle East. We have always been a little vague about the geographical meaning of this expression, which was invented in the West in the early years of this century and which has since been adopted by the whole world, including the Middle East itself. Originally denoting only the countries around the Persian Gulf, it has since extended in all directions. While the geographical definition of the region denoted by this term has varied considerably at its eastern, western and southern edges, there has hitherto been no doubt at all about the northern limit of the Middle East, which was, of course, the Soviet frontier.

That dividing line no longer exists. It was always artificial, alien and misleading, a frontier established by the expanding power of imperial Russia, which in the early and mid-nineteenth century conquered and annexed vast territories in Transcaucasia and Central Asia that culturally, ethnically,

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linguistically and religiously formed part of the historical Middle East.

With the breakup of the last of the great European empires and the independence of the southern Soviet republics, the Middle East has resumed its historical dimensions. Six of these republics are predominantly Muslim. One of them, Tajikistan, speaks a form of Persian; the other five speak languages closely related to Turkish. In addition there are important enclaves of Turkish-speaking Muslims in many places in the Russian and other non-Muslim republics. The countries north of the former Soviet frontier are closely related to the countries south of it, speaking the same or similar languages, professing the same religion and sharing the same historical memories. Samarkand and Bukhara are, after all, as much a part of the historic Middle East as are Esfahān and Damascus. Many of the great creators of Middle Eastern Islamic civilization were born in these countries—to name but a few examples: the poet Nizami, the scientists Biruni and Kharazmi, the philosophers Farabi and Ibn Sina, known in the West as Avicenna, and, perhaps most remarkable of all, Bukhari, whose magisterial collection of Muslim traditions is second only to the Koran itself in the reverence in which it is held all over the Muslim world.

The emergence of this new Middle East may indeed be one of the most important changes of all for the older Middle East. Even the Islamic bloc will not be the same again, with six new republics added to it from an entirely different background. Already these newly independent republics are being intensively courted from various quarters in the Middle East. Saudi agencies and individuals have been spending vast sums of money to finance a revival of Islam—meaning, of course, their own traditional and conservative version of Islam. The Iranians, with somewhat less money but at least equal personal dedication and with far closer contacts in geography, language and culture, are working hard to spread their own brand of radical, militant, anti-Western fundamentalism. In some ways the Saudis are unwittingly making the Iranians' task easier. Secular, modern Muslims are usually immune to the Iranian type of propaganda, while those who have received a traditional Islamic education are open and responsive. Saudi religious activities are, in a sense, funding prep schools to prepare candidates for Iranian-style advanced education. Pakistan appears to be interested in establishing diplomatic, cultural and

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commercial links; even Israel has won noteworthy initial success in cultivating good relations with these republics through technical and agricultural aid of various kinds.

More important than any of these is the effort being made by the Turkish Republic to restore the links, long since broken, with their Turkish brethren to the east and to share with them the Turkish vision for the future—a lay state, an open society, a market economy, a liberal democracy and a westward orientation.

The choices before these republics are symbolized in the current debate over the alphabet. Before the Russian revolution they wrote their languages in the Arabic script. Under Soviet rule, after a brief interval with the Latin alphabet, they were given new alphabets based on the Cyrillic script, which have remained in exclusive use for all these languages. They are now discussing three possible choices. Some wish to retain the Cyrillic script, a choice that would obviously involve a continuing relationship with whatever replaces the Soviet Union. Some wish to return to the Arabic alphabet, to restore their broken links with the Muslim world to the south—with Iran and Pakistan and more remotely the Arab lands. Some wish to adopt the Latin alphabet as it is used in the Turkish Republic—a choice that has already been made in Azerbaijan. Their alternatives might be summarized as some form of post-Soviet association, Khomeinism or Kemalism. The choices they make will be momentous, not only for themselves, but for the whole Middle East.

IV

Both for the former Soviet republics and for the older independent countries of the Middle East there is one great change that transcends all others and will shape the history of the region for a long time to come. This change is still unrealized, or perhaps half-realized. It is the end of an era in history, and some time may yet pass before its full effects are felt and its implications understood.

By common convention the modern era in Middle East history began in 1798, when a French general named Napoleon Bonaparte landed in Egypt, then an Ottoman province, and occupied the country with surprisingly little difficulty. The French stayed there for several years until, significantly, they were evicted, not by the Egyptians or the Ottomans, but by the British. This inaugurated a period of almost two hundred

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years when the Middle East was dominated by foreign great powers—sometimes from outside, sometimes, as in the inter-war period, from within the region.

This means that as far back as living memory can reach, and for some time further than that, the countries of the Middle East have been disputed between rival, more developed outside powers whose strength greatly exceeded their own. There were times—before the rise of Rome and again after the fall of Rome—when Middle Eastern powers competed for the domination of the known world. But those times are long past, and for many centuries now the countries of the Middle East have variously enjoyed and endured the attention of outsiders: first, the commercial and diplomatic rivalries of mercantilist European states, then the successive clashes of the British, French and Russian empires, of the Allies and the Axis and, most recently, of the United States and the Soviet Union. In both peace and war, the governments and sometimes the peoples of the Middle East were the object of intensive efforts by outside powers to win their hearts and minds, so as to gain access to their communications and resources.

Governments, ministers and foreign policy experts in the Middle Eastern countries have known no situation other than that in which ultimate power resides elsewhere, and in which their task is to avoid the dangers and exploit the opportunities that this rivalry presents. This was the only way they could look at politics; they had known no other. Much the same is true of the Middle East experts, whose professional task it was to deal with these statesmen and who often interpreted that task as doing whatever was necessary, preferably at third-party expense, to gain and to retain their goodwill. Like their regional colleagues, they too have known no other situation.

Few of them appear to have understood the momentous change that has taken place, and its meaning for them and for their countries—indeed, many politicians and advisers continue to operate rather like those familiar characters in movie cartoons who walk off the edge of a cliff and advance some distance in the air before they look down, realize that there is nothing underneath, and drop.

Half the change was understood fairly quickly. Russia, because of its internal problems, is at least for a while out of the game. It has in consequence been observed that now for the first time ever there is only one superpower with over-

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whelming strength and no real rival to challenge its power or will in the Middle East or anywhere else.

In a substantial sense this perception is true. But some of the inferences drawn from it, especially regarding the Middle East, rest on dubious or false assumptions.

Because of some resemblances of language and institutions, there is a widespread belief in the Middle East that the United States is the British empire back in business with new management, a new trading name and a new address. This is not so. The United States is not an imperial power in the sense in which that term could be applied in the past to Britain, France, Holland, tsarist Russia or the Soviet Union. The government of the United States is ultimately answerable in this, as in all else, to the people of the United States, who have no appetite whatsoever for overseas imperial adventures. This is a society different from that of the old empires, with different self-perceptions and aspirations and different policies.

The United States will no doubt seek to remain the predominant outside power in the Middle East, but the operative word is "outside." Any attempt to get more closely involved inside the region would be bitterly—and probably effectively—opposed at home. The present mood that one can sense very strongly in this country is one of reluctance bordering on revulsion. This is not due only to current economic difficulties, though obviously they contribute significantly, but to something in the basic structure of the American society and polity. One simply cannot see the United States playing a classical imperial role in the Middle East. It failed painfully to do so even on its doorstep in Central America, and it is not likely to succeed any better in an area that is so remote, both geographically and culturally.

Empire does not go well with liberal democracy. The British and French empires in their day were doomed when the disruptive idea of freedom affected both their own people and the peoples over whom they were ruling, making the one unwilling to impose, the other to accept, imperial domination. Something of the same sort may be happening in Russia now, but it is basic and intrinsic in America.

I have no doubt at all that Russia will be back—a country with the size, the numbers, the resources, the talents, the experience, the ambitions of Russia will not stay out indefinitely. There will be a hard time, which may last well into the 21st century, but sooner or later Russia—under whatever kind

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of regime—will be back as a major player in the international game. Unlike the United States, Russia would have no structural impediment. It would also have a well-grounded concern with events in a volatile region adjacent to its southern frontier, wherever that may finally lie.

What other possibilities are there? Europe? Certainly no individual European power, probably not even the European Community, which Mark Eyskens, the former Belgian foreign minister, aptly remarked is an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm. This judgment was confirmed by the EC's failure to deal with the on-going crisis in Yugoslavia—a European state on its borders. Before it could play any significant role in determining the course of events in the Middle East, there would have to be a major restructuring and redistribution of power within the EC, and that, for the time being at least, would be strongly resisted both at home and abroad.

Far Eastern powers, Japan, even China? This is a distinct possibility, but not for the immediate future. If the prophets of doom are right, if Western civilization declines and decays and the center of gravity of the world shifts from the Atlantic to the Pacific, as it had already previously shifted from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, then perhaps the Middle East might be contested by Far Eastern powers, as it was once contested by the powers of Europe. But this is a matter for philosophical speculation rather than for immediate political concern. A less apocalyptic possibility is that the rising powers of east and perhaps south Asia might seek a political and military role to match their growing economic role in the countries of the modern Middle East, from which they are separated by much shorter distances than is the United States.

But that too is not for the immediate future, and in the meantime the United States, so it would appear, remains alone. Today the only serious restraint on the American administration is American public opinion. Of the many blunders made by Saddam Hussein, the greatest of all was to infuriate the American administration and antagonize public opinion at the same time. Without this double shock it is unlikely that American democracy would have allowed the dispatch of an army to a Middle Eastern battlefield. And after the shock it became clear that American public opinion would not tolerate keeping American troops in the Middle East a day longer than was strictly necessary, and perhaps not even as long as that.

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THE ISLAMIC THREAT

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

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

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

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

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V

Since Russia cannot, and America will not, play the imperial role, and since no other claimant is as yet in sight, this creates an entirely new and unprecedented situation. Currently the countries of the Middle East face a challenging and, for some, frightening prospect: the prospect of having to take responsibility for their own affairs. It may be a while before Middle Eastern leaders realize that they can no longer compel foreign aid, nor plausibly blame foreign domination when things go wrong. In this new situation both outside and regional powers must reassess their interests, purposes and possibilities. There are as yet few signs that such a reassessment is in progress—few, but not unimportant.

The first concern of any American government is of course to define U.S. interests and to devise policies for their protection and advancement. In the period following the Second World War American policy in the Middle East, as elsewhere, was dominated by the need to prevent Soviet penetration. The United States regretfully relinquished the moral superiority of the sidelines and became involved in stages: first supporting the crumbling British position and, then, when that clearly became untenable, intervening more directly and, finally, replacing Britain as defender of the Middle East against outside attack, specifically from the Soviet Union.

The first postwar concern was to resist Soviet pressure on the northern tier—to secure the Soviet withdrawal from Iranian Azerbaijan and to counter demands on Turkey. This policy was clear and intelligible and, on the whole, successful in saving Turkey and Iran. But the attempt to extend it to the Arab world by means of the Baghdad Pact backfired disastrously and antagonized or undermined those it was intended to attract. The Egyptian president, Gamal Abdel al-Nasser, seeing the pact as a threat to his leadership, turned to the Soviets; the pro-Western regime in Iraq was overthrown, and friendly regimes in Jordan and Lebanon were endangered to the point that both needed Western military help in order to survive. From 1955, when the Soviets leap-frogged across the northern tier into the Arab world, both the threat and the means of countering it changed radically. While the northern tier held firm, the Arab lands became hostile or, at best, nervously neutral. In this situation the American relationship with Israel entered a new phase.

This relationship was for a long time shaped by two entirely

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different considerations: one of which one might call ideological or sentimental; the other one, strategic. Americans, schooled on the Bible and on their own history, can readily see the birth of modern Israel as a new Exodus and a return to the Promised Land, and find it easy to empathize with people who seem to be repeating the experience of the pilgrim fathers, the pioneers and their successors. The Arabs, of course, do not see it that way, and many Europeans share their view.

The other bond between the United States and Israel is the strategic relationship, which began in the 1960s, flourished in the 1970s and 1980s and appears to be in abeyance now. The value of Israel to the United States as a strategic asset has been much disputed. There have been some in this country who viewed Israel as a major strategic ally in the region and the one sure bastion against growing Soviet penetration. In this sense the American strategic relationship with Israel, absent in the early years of the state, was a consequence, not a cause, of the growing Soviet influence in the Arab lands. Others have argued that Israel, far from being a strategic asset, has been a strategic liability, by embittering U.S. relations with the Arab world and causing the failure of U.S. policies in the region.

But if one compares the record of American policy in the Middle East with that of other regions, one is struck, not by its failure, but by its success. There is after all no Vietnam in the Middle East, no Cuba or Nicaragua or El Salvador, not even an Angola. On the contrary, throughout the successive crises that have shaken the region, there has always been an imposing political, economic and cultural American presence, usually in several countries—and this, until the Gulf War, without the need for any significant military intervention. Those who look only at the Middle East are constantly aware of the difficulties and failures of policy in that region, but if one looks at the picture in a wider perspective, one cannot but be astonished at the effectiveness of American policy in the Middle East as contrasted with, say, southeast Asia, Central America or southern Africa. It seems likely that this record of relative success may owe much, first, to the steadfastness of the northern tier and, second, to the presence of a powerful, self-reliant and stable democratic power in the region.

Whatever value Israel might have had as a strategic asset during the Cold War, that value obviously ended when the Cold War itself came to a close. The change was clearly manifested in the Gulf War last year, when what the United

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States most desired from Israel was to keep out of the conflict—to be silent, inactive and, as far as possible, invisible. President George Bush was surely right to ask Israel not to respond to the Iraqi Scud missile attacks, and Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir was surely wise to accede to this request, though it is a pity that those Israelis who warned him that Israel would be taunted for its compliance were so quickly proved right.

In any case Israeli inaction was the right policy at that moment for both Israel and the United States, and it was clear that in the Persian Gulf crisis and war, Israel was not an asset, but an irrelevance—some even said a nuisance. Some of the things that the Israeli government later said and did were unlikely to change this perception.

Meanwhile a new American policy has emerged in the Middle East, concerned with different objectives. Its main aim is to prevent the emergence of a regional hegemony—of a single regional power that could dominate the area and thus establish monopolistic control of Middle Eastern oil. This has been the basic concern underlying successive American policies toward Iran, Iraq and now perhaps once again toward Iran, or to any other perceived future threat within the region.

The policy adopted so far, in order to prevent such a hegemony, is to encourage, arm and when necessary support a regional and therefore mainly Arab security pact. This policy inevitably evokes the unhappy memory of earlier attempts, which did more harm than good. This time the proposed pact has a somewhat better chance. The presumed enemy is no longer the redoubtable Soviet Union, and regional rulers are taking a more sober view of the world and their place in it. But such a pact, based on unstable regimes ruling volatile societies, is inherently precarious, and the chain is no stronger than its weakest link. The recent history of Iraq illustrates the different ways that such a policy can go wrong. By embracing the monarchy, we procured its overthrow; by fostering Saddam Hussein, we nurtured a monster. It would be fatally easy to repeat either or both of these errors, with considerable risk to our interests in the region and terrible consequences for the people who live there.

In the present situation the willingness of some Arab governments to negotiate peace with Israel, and the American concern to push the peace process along, become intelligible. Many Arabs are beginning to realize that on the best estimate

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of Israel's strength and the worst estimate of Israel's intentions, Israel is not their most serious problem, nor is it the greatest threat that confronts them. An Israel at war with its neighbors would be a constant danger, a distraction that could always be used by a new—or even the same—Saddam Hussein, perhaps more successfully next time. But an Israel at peace with its neighbors could provide, at the very least, an element of democratic stability in the region.

Recent elections in Israel have certainly improved the prospects for successful negotiations. But even with the most pacific of Israeli governments the peace process will be long and difficult. There are so many bitter memories, such profound suspicion on both sides, which even now some of the parties do little to diminish and much to augment. The United States can make a major contribution by convincing both sides of its steadfastness, fairness and good faith. A posture of judicial impartiality would be neither appropriate nor credible for a power that, like all the other participants, is rightly and inevitably concerned first and last with the pursuit of its own interests. Policymakers would be wise to recall the excellent advice of a medieval Arab author, Ibn Hazm, who said, "He who befriends and advances friend and enemy alike will only arouse distaste for his friendship and contempt for his enmity. He will earn the scorn of his enemy, and facilitate his hostile designs; he will lose his friend, who will join the ranks of his enemies."

The principal concern is of course oil. Contrary to a widely held view, this is not primarily a question of price or access. The general assumption, probably fairly sound, is that sellers of oil would have greater difficulty in finding other customers than would customers in finding other suppliers. The real danger is not commercial extortion, but politically motivated monopoly. If Saddam Hussein had been allowed to continue unchecked he would have controlled the oil resources of both Iraq and Kuwait. If the rest of the region had observed that he could act with impunity, the remaining Persian Gulf states would sooner rather than later have fallen into his lap, and even the Saudis would have had either to submit or be overthrown. The real danger was monopolistic control by a megalomaniac dictator of Middle Eastern oil—which is a very large proportion of world oil.

In addition to oil there is another concern, perhaps not immediate but already causing some alarm: the coming nucle-

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arization of the Middle East by the acquisition of nuclear weapons, or perhaps even the building of a nuclear capacity by one or more potentially hostile powers in the region. This is in the long run probably inevitable. At best it can be postponed, limited and perhaps controlled. It cannot be prevented, and this change, when it comes, will totally transform the situation in the region.

In a nuclearized Middle East, with the emergence of one or more nuclear powers, Israel would almost certainly recover and, indeed, increase its strategic value to the United States and, more generally, to the West. But this is not imminent and has little effect on current policies. In the current perception the urgent issue is to prevent the monopolization of oil by a regional power. The best way to achieve this is by some sort of security arrangement with regional powers. The Persian Gulf crisis and war showed how such an arrangement could work—and what little role there would be for Israel.

VI

Another element that also has potential strategic value is what I called the ideological or sentimental relationship. There are, in general, two quite different kinds of alliance. One of them is strategic and may be a purely temporary accommodation on the basis of perceived common threats. Such an accommodation may be reached with any type of ruler—the kind of government he runs, the kind of society he governs, are equally irrelevant. The other party to such an alliance can change his mind at any time, or may have it changed for him if he is overthrown and replaced. The alliance may thus be ended by a change of leader, a change of regime or even a change in outlook. What can happen is well illustrated by events in Libya, Iraq, Iran and the Sudan, where political changes brought total reversals of policy, or in another sense by Egypt, where even without a change of regime rulers were able to switch from the West to the Soviets and back again to a Western alignment.

The same flexibility also exists on the American side. Just as such allies can at any time abandon the United States, the United States has obviously also felt free to abandon such allies, if the alliance becomes too troublesome or ceases to be cost-effective—as, for example, in South Vietnam, Kurdistan and Lebanon. One could name other examples and, as the debate has clearly shown, there are many who would have liked to add

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Kuwait. In abandoning an ally with which there is no more than a strategic accommodation, one can proceed without compunction and without risk of serious criticism at home.

The other kind of alliance is one based on a genuine affinity of institutions, aspirations and way of life—and is far less subject to change. The Soviets in their heyday were well aware of this and tried to create communist dictatorships wherever they went. Democracies are more difficult to create. They are also more difficult to destroy, and their destruction may require some help from their friends and even some of their citizens as well as their enemies. The fate of prewar Czechoslovakia is the classical example.

True alliances, based on common values and standards, exist between the United States and the democracies of western Europe, Australasia and Canada. It seems likely that most Americans would be prepared to add Israel to that list, thereby recognizing stronger links, stronger mutual loyalties and commitments and a more enduring relationship. This remains true despite some recent Israeli actions that, though not unprecedented in democracies at war, have tarnished Israel's democratic image. Israel has an obvious vital interest in maintaining such a relationship in addition to—and in the present situation instead of—a purely strategic one. As other examples show very clearly, purely strategic relationships are neither durable nor reliable on either side. Israel had a substantial strategic value in the past, and may well have a major strategic value in the future. But for the moment—that is, as long as the Arab governments of the coalition stay in power, hold together and remain allies—Israel has little or no strategic value, and this is what counts in a political culture where all too often foreign policy is a series of improvisations, neither informed by any knowledge of the past nor inspired by any vision of the future.

VII

For the governments and peoples of the Middle East the opportunities and the dangers are incomparably greater. What is at stake for them is not only a matter of interests and policies, but the whole future direction of their societies.

What are their choices? The most obvious is the mixture as before—to continue with the same political games, with the same or similar radical dictatorships and traditional autocracies trying to subvert or invade each other—with this impor-

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tant difference: that the West would no longer be concerned but would rather remain indifferent to whatever happened, to wars, disasters and upheavals, as long as the oil continues to flow. There is a parallel, perhaps a precedent, in Angola, a country that was utterly devastated by revolutions, upheavals, civil wars and massacres to the almost total indifference of the outside world. As long as the oil companies continued to work and the oil still flowed, no one greatly cared what the various factions did to each other. This could easily happen in the Middle East. The Western capacity for turning a blind eye, already manifested in other respects, should not be underrated. In the past, outside powers have sometimes intervened to prevent, to limit or to halt Arab-Israeli wars. Arabs and Israelis alike would be unwise to count on such interventions in the future.

Another possibility of which we are acutely aware at the present time is Islamic fundamentalism, a loose and inaccurate term that designates a number of different, and sometimes contrasting, forms of Islamic religious militancy. The eclipse of pan-Arabism has left Islamic fundamentalism as the most attractive alternative to all those who feel that there has to be something better, truer and more hopeful than the inept tyrannies of their rulers and the bankrupt ideologies foisted on them from outside. These movements feed on privation and humiliation and on the frustration and resentments to which they give rise, after the failure of all the political and economic nostrums, both the foreign imports and the local imitations. As seen by many in the Middle East and north Africa, both capitalism and socialism were tried and have failed; both Western and Eastern models produced only poverty and tyranny. It may seem unjust that in Algeria, for example, the West should be blamed for the pseudo-Stalinist policies of an anti-Western government, for the failure of the one and the ineptitude of the other. But popular sentiment is not entirely wrong in seeing the Western world and Western ideas as the ultimate source of the major changes that have transformed the Islamic world in the last century or more. As a consequence much of their anger is directed against the Westerner, seen as the ancient and immemorial enemy of Islam since before the Crusades, and against the Westernizer, seen as a tool or accomplice of the West and as a traitor to his own people.

Religious fundamentalism enjoys several advantages against

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competing ideologies. It is readily intelligible to both educated and uneducated Muslims. It offers a set of themes, slogans and symbols that are profoundly familiar and therefore effective in mobilizing support and in formulating both a critique of what is wrong and a program for putting it right. Religious movements enjoy another practical advantage in societies like those of the Middle East and north Africa that are under more or less autocratic rule: dictators can forbid parties, they can forbid meetings—they cannot forbid public worship, and they can to only a limited extent control sermons.

As a result the religious opposition groups are the only ones that have regular meeting places where they can assemble and have at their disposal a network outside the control of the state or at least not fully subject to it. The more oppressive the regime, the greater the help it gives to the fundamentalists by eliminating competing oppositions.

Militant Islamic radicalism is not new. Several times since the beginnings of the Western impact in the eighteenth century, there have been religiously expressed militant opposition movements. So far they have all failed. Sometimes they have failed in an easy and relatively painless way by being defeated and suppressed, in which case the crown of martyrdom brought them a kind of success. Sometimes they have failed the hard way, by gaining power, and then having to confront great economic and social problems for which they had no real answers. What has usually happened is that they have become, in time, as oppressive and as cynical as their ousted predecessors. It is in this phase that they can become really dangerous; when, to use a European typology, the revolution enters the Napoleonic or, perhaps one should say, the Stalinist phase. In a program of aggression and expansion these movements would enjoy, like their Jacobin and Bolshevik predecessors, the advantage of fifth columns in every country and community with which they share a common universe of discourse. There is also the possibility that they might have nuclear weapons, either for terrorist or for regular military use. Whatever doubts one may have about the ability of the fundamentalists, once in power, to achieve their declared aims, one should not underrate their capacity to gain and to use power.

Another possibility, which could even be precipitated by fundamentalism, is what has of late become fashionable to call "Lebanonization." Most of the states of the Middle East—

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Egypt is an obvious exception—are of recent and artificial construction and are vulnerable to such a process. If the central power is sufficiently weakened, there is no real civil society to hold the polity together, no real sense of common national identity or overriding allegiance to the nation-state. The state then disintegrates—as happened in Lebanon—into a chaos of squabbling, feuding, fighting sects, tribes, regions and parties. If things go badly and central governments falter and collapse, the same could happen, not only in the countries of the existing Middle East, but also in the newly independent Soviet republics, where the artificial frontiers drawn by the former imperial masters left each republic with a mosaic of minorities and claims of one sort or another on or by its neighbors.

It is no doubt to guard against these and other dangers that the Saudis and Egyptians and some others, with the encouragement and support of the United States, are trying to devise and install some kind of regional security arrangement—less than an alliance, but more than the moribund Arab League—to secure protection against aggression and, more difficult, against subversion. At the lowest this would mean that each tyrant confines his tyranny to his own subjects and does not interfere with his neighbors. Apparently some limited compromise might be permitted on the second of these points. Saddam Hussein was left to do whatever he pleased in Iraq, but broke the rules by invading Kuwait. Hafiz al-Asad could do whatever he pleased in Syria, but, playing his cards more skillfully, was accorded a free hand in Lebanon. These two examples illustrate the inherent instability and uncertainty—not to speak of the immorality—of any such arrangement. Sooner or later some tyrant or fanatic, or one who combines both qualities, will break the rules and launch an invasion or subversion leading to a regional conflict in which nonregional powers might, but in present circumstances probably would not, become involved.

Of late, many voices have been heard in the Arab lands, and more openly in the Arab diaspora, speaking of freedom, and more specifically, of liberal democracy. For most of modern history the word "freedom" in Arab political discourse has been a synonym for independence. It meant the freedom of the nation and country from domination by foreigners and had nothing to do with the place of the individual within the nation. Today that kind of freedom has become axiomatic,

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even extending to the newly independent territories of the last great European empire—Russia. Only the most inveterate of conspiracy theorists would now pretend otherwise. The word "democracy" in Arab political discourse has long denoted the sham parliamentary regimes that were installed and bequeathed by the British and French empires—a simulacrum of free institutions, manipulated by small groups of rich and powerful men, unheedful of the mass of the population and, for the most part, unheeded by them. All these regimes were of brief duration: one after another was overthrown and replaced by autocratic regimes that had at least the somewhat equivocal merit of authenticity and the ability to maintain themselves in power.

VIII

More than forty years have passed since the departure of the British and French imperialists from the Fertile Crescent—longer than the entire period of their rule in those countries. The bittersweet experience of independence has given many Arab thinkers and writers a new awareness of the deeper meaning of freedom and a truer sense of democracy. Many now argue that the root cause of all the evils and failures of the Arab world is the lack of freedom and that only democracy can provide the answer to their problems. The record of the past is dismal, but the warning and instruction it provides are all the more cogent.

Democracy is difficult—perhaps the most difficult to operate and preserve of all known forms of government. It arose in a limited region, among the peoples of western and northwestern Europe, and was transplanted by them to their colonies overseas. It has flourished, or at least survived, in some other places; sometimes, as in India, bequeathed by the departing imperial rulers; sometimes, as in the former Axis countries, imposed or implanted by the victors. In Israel democracy was created by a predominantly European population in the aftermath of a British colonial administration. Remarkably it has survived both demographic and political change, and has not succumbed to the pressures of decades of military emergency. In Lebanon a working democracy operated for a while with a mixed Christian and Muslim political elite, but it ended in civil war and foreign occupation.

Only in one country of the Islamic world has democracy continued, despite many difficulties and setbacks, to function

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and even to flourish—Turkey. In Turkey democracy was neither bequeathed by imperial rulers, nor imposed by victorious enemies. It was the free choice of the Turks themselves. The path to democracy for Turkey has been long and hard and beset with obstacles. But the Turks have shown that with goodwill, determination, courage and, above all, perseverance, it is possible to overcome these obstacles and advance on the path of freedom. Turkey is not an Arab country, but it shares with the Arabs a very large part of the religious, political and cultural heritage of the Middle East. The Turks have shown that it can be done, and others may yet find themselves able to do the same.

One of the lessons of Turkey's success and others' failures is that a major prerequisite for the working of any kind of free institutions is the level of social and economic development needed to support it. Even if anti-democratic political traditions and habits can be overcome, the immense economic problems of the region—poverty and social and technological backwardness—would present great obstacles. Indeed, until these are resolved, the prospect for any genuine political democracy is likely to remain a mirage. The Turkish example might suggest that some degree of separation of religion from the state is also a prerequisite.

If indeed the choice is for freedom, the peoples of the Middle East might at long last rid themselves of the politics of tyranny and terror, corruption and cajolery, blackmail and force, domestic or regional or international. They would accept—as well as demand—responsibility for their decisions and for the consequences of those decisions, and find a way to live the freer and better life to which they have for so long proclaimed their commitment. The important difference is that now, for the first time in more than two centuries, this choice is entirely their own, as will be their success or failure in whatever they choose. Those who care about the Middle East and its peoples can only hope that they will choose well and soon, for this window of opportunity will not long remain open.

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John M. Deutch

THE NEW NUCLEAR THREAT

The threat of nuclear weapons spread across the world has displaced the fear of superpower nuclear conflict on the international agenda. Diplomatic and export control efforts arising from the 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) have succeeded in some measure in reducing diffusion of nuclear capability over the past two decades. In that time only India detonated a nuclear device (1974), although experts agree that Israel, Pakistan and South Africa also have a nuclear weapons capability. Several other nations have demonstrated interest in obtaining one.

The world now knows, however, that even though Iraq signed the NPT it managed to mount a massive covert program to acquire nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Governments and international organizations, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), were largely ignorant of Iraqi intentions and capabilities. While aspects of the Iraqi case are unique, it is widely acknowledged that several states in the Middle East, notably Algeria, Iran and Libya, are moving toward nuclear weapons capability, as is North Korea.

A new element of the proliferation problem is the collapse of the Soviet Union, which removes the influence of a strong central government that was relatively responsible in its control of nuclear weapons and technology. The present fluid situation in the former U.S.S.R. increases the risk that significant nuclear expertise, material and technology might be made available to proliferators. Most former Soviet states lack effective policy mechanisms to address the various aspects of proliferation control.

The experience of the United Nations and IAEA in carrying out sanctions against Iraq, alongside the challenge of mounting effective inspections, has sharpened interest in the roles of

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international mechanisms for enforcing nonproliferation agreements.

II

Two heavy metal elements are suitable for making a nuclear fission explosive device. The first, uranium, occurs naturally in ore in two isotopic forms: uranium 235 (U-235) and the more common U-238 isotope. The rare U-235 isotope must be enriched to greater than approximately 90 percent to make a useful explosive device. Because isotopes of the same element have identical chemical behavior, the enrichment process requires special physical separation techniques.

These separation technologies include gaseous diffusion, long in use by the United States, France and the Soviet Union; centrifugation, the choice of the European consortium URENCO and Pakistan; and electromagnetic, under development by Iraq. South Africa has pursued an aerodynamic technique, and the United States has developed laser isotope separation, which is more economical in terms of cost, space and time but requires greater technical sophistication. All enrichment techniques must rely on separating isotopes based on their different masses. The selection of the technique used depends on several factors: the intended scale, level of knowledge and the cost in terms of energy and money. For all techniques, however, considerable engineering sophistication is required to achieve the high enrichments needed for nuclear explosives.

The United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union began with gaseous diffusion in the 1940s, when there was considerably less knowledge about other techniques, contemplating large scale operation. Today a country has a wider range of choices and would be expected to pick a technique that is easily concealed. Until the example of Iraq it was expected that centrifugation would be the separation technique of choice for a nation with a covert weapons program and moderate technical sophistication. In the long run laser isotope separation is of greatest concern because the process can be carried out in a compact space with few external signatures, such as massive power consumption.

The second isotope suitable for a nuclear fission explosive device is plutonium 239 (Pu-239). Plutonium does not occur in nature and must be made from uranium. The most common technique is to irradiate the relatively abundant U-238 in a nuclear reactor; absorption of a neutron converts U-238 into

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the fissile Pu-239. Once produced in the reactor Pu-239 can be separated from the remaining heavy metal by chemical reprocessing. Chemical separation is possible, rather than the more demanding isotope separation, because uranium and plutonium are different elements.

A nation can thus obtain fissile nuclear material either by enriching U-235 by some isotope separation technique or by producing plutonium in a nuclear reactor, followed by chemical separation. From the standpoint of nonproliferation the problem is that a nuclear reactor need not be dedicated to producing plutonium for weapons. Plutonium is produced in all nuclear reactors fueled by uranium, including those built for generating civilian electric power. The United States, Israel and China have relied on special reactors dedicated to plutonium production. The Soviets made frequent use of civilian power reactors to produce special nuclear materials, and the United States had one reactor in Hanford, Washington, which produced both electricity and plutonium for weapons.

Over time a nation with a peaceful nuclear power fuel cycle that includes reprocessing will acquire significant quantities of plutonium that can be used for bombs. A clear distinction between civilian and military applications, therefore, is a major objective of any nonproliferation regime. The traditional role of the IAEA is to maintain this distinction by inspection of civilian nuclear facilities. This inspection, however, is exclusively concerned with accounting for the amount of nuclear material produced at the facility and its custody.

For example a trained inspection team will arrive at a facility with a knowledge of the amounts of material and their location at the time of the last inspection. By examining plant records and conducting tests it is possible to determine changes in these inventories, adjusted for any acquisition of newly enriched material, and thus arrive at a final inventory. The results of the inspection are reported to IAEA headquarters, which investigates any discrepancies that arise.

III

Designing a crude nuclear device is difficult but not impossible, especially given the knowledge of nuclear physics and technology dispersed around the world. There are two classes of nuclear weapons. Fission weapons release energy as a result of the splitting of U-235 and Pu-239; thermonuclear weapons

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release greater amounts of energy through the fusion of light isotopes, mainly tritium, a heavy isotope of hydrogen. Fusion reactions, however, must first be ignited by the energy of a fission explosion.

Current estimates are that only the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China have the capability to detonate a thermonuclear device, although it is possible that Israel may also be able to do so. The proliferation of thermonuclear capability is a long-range threat that differs quantitatively, not qualitatively, from the present threat of proliferation of fission devices.

The central problem facing a nation seeking a bomb is obtaining an adequate quantity of uranium or plutonium. Unique equipment and technology are required for high enrichment or chemical separation. Acquisition of these nuclear materials and technology thus signals the intention and capability of proliferating states and provides a useful basis for establishing export controls. Weapons of mass destruction based on chemical or biological agents, on the other hand, require no correspondingly unique materials or techniques, making export controls more difficult.

A conventional high explosive trigger and fusing are required to initiate a critical nuclear reaction by implosion. This expertise and equipment are unique to nuclear weapons, with the possible exception of application to advanced conventional munitions, such as shaped charges for piercing tank armor. High explosive triggers also require a good deal of experimentation. Acquisition of high explosive technology, then, may indicate a nation's intention for nuclear weapons capability and can be targeted for export control.

Assembling a nuclear device requires specific knowledge of machining heavy metal, forming a high explosive shaped charge and integrating a fusing device. These demanding tasks present the greatest engineering challenges to a would-be proliferator. The quality of assembly determines whether the device will have the desired yield, a problem not of central importance to a nation seeking its first bomb.

Testing a device is technically desirable but politically risky. The political reaction to India's 1974 detonation led other states to eschew testing. Thus Israel, Pakistan and South Africa, while credited with nuclear capability, have never detonated a device (one should exclude a single suspicious event in the south Atlantic in 1979). The consequence is

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modest uncertainty about whether the device will indeed work, though no initial test of a nuclear device has been known to fail. It also creates considerable uncertainty as to whether the bomb will have the intended yield.

Finally for a nuclear device to be a credible threat it needs a means of delivery. Ballistic missiles provide potentially accurate delivery. Simultaneous proliferation of nuclear and ballistic missile capability is of special concern, such as intermediate-range Scud missiles in Iraq and North Korea and the Israeli Jericho missile. The longer-range Chinese CSS-2 is a particularly worrisome export; it has already been acquired by Saudi Arabia. Although canceled in 1990, joint development of the Condor missile by Argentina, Egypt and Iraq is another troublesome example.

Producing ballistic missiles is difficult and requires a significant supporting industrial base. Many nations thus import ballistic missiles; currently North Korea and China are the countries that export ballistic missiles to any buyer.

Air delivery can also be used for a nuclear device. A crude device might weigh 500 kilograms, and could of course be delivered by either military or civilian aircraft. An at least rudimentary system must be in place to control, target and command the use of the weapon. An unstable fragile command and control system could be as threatening as any menacing dictator because of the possibility of accidental or unauthorized use.

As concern mounts about attack from even a rudimentary weapon of mass destruction, increased attention is devoted to defensive systems, especially those against ballistic missiles. One could perhaps imagine an expensive and complicated defensive system that could destroy a significant fraction of a several-dozen-weapon attack. It is impossible, however, to guarantee complete protection, particularly against a single device surreptitiously delivered.

IV

The conventional view of proliferation is that a country's leadership at some point makes an explicit decision to seek a nuclear weapon, launches a secret program and finally achieves nuclear status by testing a device on a particular date. In reality the path to nuclear weapons capability requires many important and complex choices along the way.

The fundamental motivation to seek a weapon is the per-

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ception that national security will be improved. Most nations prefer nuclear weapons because the devices are highly destructive and confer a symbolic status; chemical and biological weapons provide an alternative, however, if the nuclear option is unavailable. Most nuclear proliferating states also have chemical and biological programs and vice versa.

The more sophisticated a nation's technological capability, the easier are the steps to gain a nuclear weapon, especially if the nation already has a civilian nuclear power industry. It would be a simple matter for nations like Japan, Germany, Switzerland and Canada to build a number of weapons in a matter of months, with no advanced preparation.

Less industrialized nations face more complex choices. Nations like Israel, Pakistan and Iraq established covert nuclear weapons programs at the outset. Other nations like India, Argentina and Brazil moved closer to weapon capability through ambitious civilian nuclear power programs. India produced plutonium from natural uranium in a heavy-water reactor provided by Canada for a "peaceful" nuclear energy program. Brazil and Argentina attempted to acquire reprocessing capability in the late 1970s, much earlier in their civilian power programs than made economic sense.

North Korea's and Algeria's pursuit of nuclear technology for civilian purposes may well conceal nascent weapons programs. Given the significant international political penalty incurred by a proliferating nation, it is not surprising that many seek to shroud their intentions in ambiguity. American law, for example, requires the president to deny foreign aid to any nation known to be seeking nuclear weapons capability; the United States thus denied aid to Pakistan in 1990.

It is important to distinguish between intentions and capabilities. A country might wish to keep its nuclear option open in order to reduce the time required to acquire a weapon, without risking adverse international reaction in advance. Such a state would then advocate an aggressive civilian nuclear energy program with enrichment and reprocessing components. It would be neither necessary nor politically desirable to have a national-level policy decision; there would be no need to inform the foreign ministry, and the nation might well adhere to the NPT and agree to the full scope of IAEA inspections. In a few years the state would realize significant improvement in its ability to produce a nuclear weapon, yet its intentions would remain purposely ambiguous and above

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international suspicion. Over time actions to improve nuclear capability would become detectable, but not through normal IAEA inspections.

Announcement that a nation is abandoning a nuclear weapons program may be a reliable indicator of its intentions but it does not provide any indication of its nuclear weapons capability. Brazil and Argentina, for example, have "abandoned" nuclear weapon ambitions, but there has been no accompanying change in their civilian nuclear power programs or nuclear technology export efforts: their capability to acquire a bomb remains undiminished.

Willingness to sign the NPT is not a guarantee against proliferation, as the examples of Iraq, Iran, Libya and North Korea illustrate. Nations have signed the NPT for widely different reasons. North Korea's and Iran's signatures were undoubtedly the price for receiving further nuclear assistance from their principal nuclear suppliers, respectively, the Soviet Union and the United States. It is even possible that when Iraq and Libya signed, they had no nuclear ambitions.

V

The nature of the Iraqi deception provides important lessons for nonproliferation. Iraq's case exquisitely illustrates how the international community has been willing to delude itself.

Iraq's interest in a bomb was dramatically highlighted by the 1981 Israeli bombing of Iraq's French-supplied Osirak reactor. Yet Western governments still wildly underestimated the scope and magnitude of the Iraqi effort. U.S. and U.N. on-site inspection teams have since learned that Iraq had a massive covert program that encompassed every aspect of nuclear weapons development—from mining uranium ore, through enrichment by electromagnetic separation, to weapons design. The Iraqi program involved more than 10,000 qualified technical people who remain in place as a competent cadre. Can such a failure be avoided in the future?

The Iraqi program was greatly assisted by transfer of sensitive technology through trade, mostly from Germany. Most exporting companies would claim that the equipment, such as precision lathes, had multiple uses and that they had no knowledge of Iraqi intentions. Moreover the Iraqis concealed their efforts to acquire technology by systematically placing orders through cover agencies and businesses. Success-

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ful export control requires greater appreciation of the potentially dangerous use of equipment and technology. Proper safeguards for dual-use items should include export licenses specifying ultimate destination and enforcement mechanisms able to detect diversion.

The mission and culture of the IAEA has been to focus narrowly on material accountability in declared facilities without regard to other activity. Before the Gulf War IAEA inspectors in Iraq confined themselves strictly to accounting for material at those facilities declared by Iraqi authorities. They did not have responsibility for investigating or reporting the obviously high level of activity in the buildings surrounding those facilities. The IAEA did not report any material discrepancies; it is now known that the Iraqis diverted a few grams of plutonium from one of the declared reactors for radiochemical testing.

Even armed with the full force of U.N. sanctions and intelligence supplied by the United States and other governments, the IAEA has had considerable difficulty locating and inspecting Iraqi nuclear facilities. While IAEA inspectors are familiar with the commercial power fuel cycle—enrichment, power reactor operation and reprocessing—they have no experience with nuclear weapons programs. Thus IAEA efforts had to be augmented with American, French, British and Russian nuclear weapons experts.

Limited to declared facilities IAEA inspections will obviously have difficulty detecting covert programs. There is thus enthusiasm for strengthening the IAEA's implicit authority to carry out challenges to suspected, undeclared sites. While expanding IAEA authority is worthwhile, as the example of North Korea illustrates, its effectiveness will have limits. To know which undeclared facilities to challenge, the IAEA will need to rely on external sources of information, primarily intelligence supplied by Western nations. Moreover intrusive inspections are only possible with near-unanimous backing by the U.N. Security Council. In cases more ambiguous than Iraq's it will be difficult for the IAEA to act. Most nations with suspect covert weapons programs will not agree to proposed inspections, and it is far from clear what mechanisms will be available to the IAEA to assure compliance.

There thus must be greater efforts to collect intelligence on the capabilities and intentions of countries considered proliferation threats. The willingness of intelligence analysts to com-

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pile a picture—necessarily based on fragmentary information—and to present that view to policymakers is essential. But policymakers themselves must be willing to listen to intelligence estimates. The failure of American policymakers to receive or believe realistic assessments of the Iraqi threat was undoubtedly influenced by Iraq's political role as a counterweight to Iran and Syria; acknowledging Iraq's proliferation threat would have complicated the pursuit of other diplomatic objectives in the Persian Gulf.

The point is not how wrong the United States was about Iraq's timetable for acquiring a bomb, but rather how greatly the United States underestimated the magnitude of the Iraqi covert effort. As it stands, such a massive miscalculation of a nation's capability, high or low, can surely happen again.

VI

Of the several mechanisms in place to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons the Nonproliferation Treaty is politically the most important. The NPT requires nonnuclear weapon signatories to forgo nuclear weapons capability, not to transfer or receive nuclear weapon-related technology and to submit facilities to IAEA safeguards. In exchange nuclear weapon states agree to cooperate fully in supplying nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and to negotiate on arms control. The treaty also includes a provision for peaceful application of nuclear explosives, an unfortunate item since the dangers of peaceful nuclear explosives outweigh imaginable benefits.

By establishing the illegitimacy of proliferation the treaty politically constrains its 144 signatories and nonsignatories as well from openly seeking nuclear weapons. The treaty's openly discriminatory distinction between nuclear and nonnuclear states, however, has been a continuing point of contention at NPT review conferences held every five years. Most nations are simply unwilling to accept a status quo in which the United States, Russia and a few other nations have the right to possess nuclear weapons while the remainder of the world does not.

A second nonproliferation mechanism is the London Nuclear Suppliers Group, which in 1978 adopted guidelines intended to regulate commerce in material, equipment and technology with potential nuclear weapons application, including sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technology. The

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success of these export controls depends on the willingness of supplier nations to accept export constraints and to keep watch on other exporting nations and problem countries. The credibility of such observations frequently depends on intelligence that provides crucial evidence of misuse. Participating nations must thus balance the benefits of controlling sensitive exports against the cost of revealing intelligence sources and methods. A similar export control effort to slow the spread of ballistic missile technology, through the Missile Technology Control Regime, also contributes to nonproliferation.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union presents entirely new problems for export control. Several republics, notably Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, have had significant nuclear arsenals and facilities on their territories. With the exception of Russia these nations have limited technical or political capacity to formulate and enforce nuclear nonproliferation policies. Moreover desperate economic conditions in these countries provide considerable incentive for individuals, laboratories or factories to profit by exporting nuclear materials and technology. Even if leakage of nuclear devices and materials can be avoided, there is significant opportunity for personnel at facilities to export know-how. While there is a good deal of agreement about Western financial assistance to prevent such leakage, the prospects for credible assistance are too dim to be reassuring.

A third mechanism for controlling proliferation is the IAEA's inspection regime. Conventional IAEA inspections serve a useful role, and there are no significant examples of diversion from safeguarded facilities. Expanding IAEA inspections to suspect sites is also welcome. But since IAEA inspections are not designed to detect covert programs, there should be realistic expectations about how much warning the IAEA can provide, even with expanded authority for challenge inspections. These limitations make it necessary to maintain the option of insisting on inspections outside the IAEA framework. This could be done through bilateral arrangements, such as the United States is encouraging between North and South Korea and like Brazil's and Argentina's agreement under the 1968 Treaty of Tlatelolco. It could also be done, perhaps, under the direct auspices of the U.N. Security Council.

Under its present leadership the IAEA is willing to take a more aggressive posture toward inspecting suspect facilities. If greater reliance is placed on IAEA safeguards, however, many

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IAEA member states will wish to see accompanying expansion of the agency's peaceful nuclear cooperation activities. This undoubtedly will require increases in member state contributions to the IAEA budget, increases that have, until recently, been resisted by the United States and other nations.

Several nations, notably India and Pakistan, stress the discriminatory aspects of the nonproliferation regime and the unwillingness of nuclear states to meet NPT obligations to negotiate arms control agreements. These states argue that, by taking actions with regard to their own arsenals, the major nuclear powers can strongly influence nonproliferation elsewhere. In particular there is a call for the United States and other nuclear powers to adopt a comprehensive test ban. The CTB proposal recently received new attention and support in the United States on the premise that the collapse of the Soviet Union makes nuclear weapons less important to U.S. security, and nuclear weapons testing less necessary.

The need for testing must be balanced against possible nonproliferation benefits of testing restraints. There are, however, several reasons to distrust linkage between testing by nuclear weapon states and the pace of proliferation. The motivation of most nations to acquire a nuclear weapon has little to do with the size or characteristics of the U.S. arsenal. Their motivations reflect security concerns or geopolitical ambitions. These concerns will not go away if nuclear weapon states cease testing. Indeed regional security concerns are more likely to be reduced by security guarantees extended by the United States and other nuclear weapon states, which hopefully will persuade have-not nations to forgo acquiring weapons of their own. The effectiveness of U.S. security guarantees in deterring conflict relies on America's political-military strength, which is, in part, supported by its nuclear arsenal.

Even if a CTB might reduce the likelihood of proliferating nations crossing the bright line to testing, it does not mean those nations have not already acquired a nuclear weapons capability. To be sure a prohibition on testing may slow the pace of proliferating nations to acquire thermonuclear weapons, but possession of crude fission weapons is the essential threat that the world seeks to avoid. A CTB (or a similar proposal to ban production of special nuclear materials) is not a solution to serious proliferation problems.

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VII

The examples of North Korea and Algeria illustrate the difficulties of making progress on nonproliferation. North Korea has major nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, about 90 kilometers north of the capital Pyongyang. That site, operating since 1987, has a 30-megawatt thermal graphite reactor fueled by natural uranium.

There have been suspicions since the late 1960s that North Korea has had a nuclear weapons program. What brought these fears to center stage was the discovery of Yongbyon's large reprocessing facility; though as yet not operational, it could be used to separate plutonium for nuclear weapons production. Possession of both a reprocessing plant and operating nuclear reactors means that North Korea could be close to acquiring the plutonium needed to make a bomb. North Korea's characterization of this sizable facility as a "radiochemistry laboratory" is simply unbelievable. It has been publicly reported that French SPOT satellite photographs have confirmed the presence of these facilities, as well as nearby craters that appear to be the result of high explosives testing. Experience with Iraq makes the United States and other nations more concerned about what North Korea is actually doing and more prone to taking serious steps to stop it from acquiring nuclear weapons.

North Korea denies having a nuclear weapons program and claims to be pursuing nuclear power development to supply badly needed electricity. Under Soviet pressure Pyongyang agreed to sign the NPT in 1985 and place its reactor facilities under IAEA inspection. But implementation of a full-scope safeguards agreement did not occur until January 30, 1992, and only preliminary inspection visits have been made.

Algeria presents a more ambiguous case. In the late 1980s the world was surprised to learn that Algeria had a Chinese-supplied reactor under construction at Oussera, about 123 kilometers south of Algiers. The reactor, originally estimated at 40-megawatts thermal, is now believed to be smaller, approximately 15-megawatts thermal, and is therefore less troubling. Acquisition of the reactor nonetheless increases Algeria's capability over time to acquire sufficient plutonium for a nuclear bomb.

Algeria's intentions remain unclear. Unlike North Korea, Algeria has plentiful hydrocarbon resources and cannot cred-

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ibly argue that it needs nuclear power for electricity. Moreover Algeria and China kept the project secret for some years—a matter for concern since China has not always responsibly exported sensitive nuclear technology. Argentina supplied a reactor to Algeria in 1987, believing itself to be Algeria's only vendor, and required that the reactor be placed under IAEA safeguards. The Argentine-supplied reactor is a one-megawatt thermal natural uranium research reactor, too small to be a proliferation risk. Algeria is not a NPT signatory; international pressure nonetheless led Algeria to agree to IAEA inspections of the Oussera complex beginning February 1992.

In both North Korea and Algeria progress has been made toward full inspection of known and declared nuclear facilities. This permits international verification of the technical characteristics of these facilities and accountability for nuclear material at those sites. There is no monitoring of technical personnel in these countries, no systematic knowledge of their technology imports and no control over plutonium or other strategic nuclear material. The extent of covert military technology efforts lies outside the scope of IAEA safeguards. There is broad international support for requiring the two states to accept full IAEA safeguards. But it is doubtful whether the IAEA board of governors or the U.N. Security Council would support challenge inspections against suspect sites, especially in Algeria. North Korea, Algeria and other nations will continue to be sources of concern in proliferation matters for some years to come.

VIII

The United States needs to move nonproliferation to a higher priority. Washington has been too quick to sacrifice nonproliferation goals to other foreign policy objectives. Perhaps the most flagrant example is Pakistan. In the late 1970s the United States reduced diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to abandon its nuclear weapons program in order to gain Pakistani assistance for the Afghan rebels. That may well have seemed a reasonable decision at the time, and there is no certainty that U.S. pressure would have ended Pakistani efforts. But Pakistan now has the bomb, and this makes southwest Asia a more dangerous place.

In all recent cases of proliferation—Israel, India and Pakistan—the United States and the United Nations have not acted decisively. South Africa has recently moved away from a

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nuclear weapons program, but not in response to nonproliferation pressures. Significant action occurred only in the case of Iraq—following a war and Iraq's military defeat. Such a record can only breed cynicism on the part of would-be proliferators about the risks of acquiring nuclear weapons and violating the NPT.

The United States, preferably in a multilateral context, should state that any use of a nuclear weapon would be considered a casus belli and that violation of the NPT would trigger specific sanctions, including the possibility of multilateral and, in exceptional cases, unilateral military action. A step in this direction was taken on January 31, 1992, when the U.N. Security Council, at the heads of state level, unanimously declared that proliferation constituted a threat to international peace and security. Corresponding policies should be adopted for chemical and biological weapons once a multilateral chemical weapons treaty is adopted. The United States should maintain military forces appropriate to make such a threat credible.

Intelligence is critical to carrying out nonproliferation policies. In particular the United States must make a major effort to obtain information about nations that present a proliferation risk. In order to arrive at a net assessment of the proliferation risk posed by a particular country, information about technical capabilities must be blended with informed estimates of a nation's intentions. This means that, while communications and photographic intelligence are important, human intelligence is especially vital in obtaining information about the plans and intentions of a country's leadership in political, military and technical affairs.

Such intelligence is not only needed to provide warning but also to support diplomatic efforts and international sanctions on a multilateral basis. The effectiveness of export controls, international IAEA inspections and sanctions depends in great measure on the intelligence provided by the United States, as experience demonstrates with the U.N. special commission on Iraq. Without access to U.S. intelligence all international efforts to control proliferation will be weaker.

It will take a combination of measures to slow the spread of nuclear weapons: security guarantees, multilateral technical and export constraints as well as unilateral measures. Avoiding an epidemic of new weapons states is the highest priority. If governments are uncomfortable with dealing with the prolif-

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eration problem, they will be all the more uncomfortable managing a proliferated world.

In the final analysis several nations are determined to seek nuclear weapons capability, and some may eventually attain that goal. The world will almost certainly confront additional nations that either overtly or covertly possess a nuclear capability. This altered balance of power will influence political and military events in unpredictable and dangerous ways. It must always be remembered that the ultimate objective is to assure that there is no nuclear use.

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Alfred E. Eckes

TRADING AMERICAN INTERESTS

In the aftermath of the Cold War the United States has the opportunity to stop trading access to the American market for foreign policy favors. Import concessions should generate reciprocal export opportunities for American goods and services in foreign markets, not votes in the United Nations or goodwill in diplomatic negotiations.

For 45 years a succession of presidents, beginning with Harry Truman, have consciously subordinated domestic economic interests to foreign policy objectives. To strengthen free world economies and help contain Soviet expansionism the executive branch has rolled back tariffs and removed trade restrictions, opening the giant American market to the world's manufacturers.

This strategy produced some impressive foreign policy victories, but also much domestic dislocation. Trade liberalization accelerated recovery from World War II in Europe and east Asia, and ignited export-led growth in many developing countries. It helped revive international capital flows and hasten the globalization of production. Consumers found that the market system could produce and distribute goods at affordable prices, while state planning could not. The success of free markets therefore exposed the failures of the Soviet empire and contributed to its collapse.

Freer trade has its costs. The record suggests that for diplomatic and national security reasons the U.S. government sacrificed thousands of domestic jobs to create employment and prosperity elsewhere in the noncommunist world. Bowing to external pressures and foreign policy concerns, presidents from Truman to Reagan refused to grant import relief to trade-sensitive industries in the interests of winning the Cold War. In doing so they may have compromised America's

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future competitiveness and alienated public support for international cooperation in the post-Cold War world.

II

Introduced in 1934 as a temporary recovery measure to restore the American living standard, the reciprocal trade program acquired new significance after World War II—becoming a powerful tool for reshaping international economic relations. From 1947 to 1972 the United States agreed to reduce its tariffs from an average 32.2 percent ad valorem on dutiable goods to a negligible 8.5 percent. Thus by January 1972, when the Kennedy Round concessions were fully implemented, tariffs no longer sheltered high-wage American workers from low-paid labor abroad. American producers and workers now found themselves competing in a relatively open international economy at a time when other improvements in transportation and communications and the emergence of many new suppliers intensified competition.

Former Senate Finance Committee Chairman Russell Long (D-La.) was one of the first to perceive that the executive branch's enthusiasm for free trade to assist overseas allies clashed with this nation's long-term economic interest in maintaining high-paying jobs and a viable manufacturing base at home. For nearly twenty years, until his retirement from Congress in 1987, Senator Long regularly criticized the State Department for using trade concessions as bargaining chips in foreign policy negotiations or to buy votes in the United Nations. He charged that to "save the world from a great war" the State Department believed "it would be worth giving away every industry we have."[1]

The trade agreements program increasingly became an instrument of administration foreign policy after World War II. Britain and other World War II allies lay exhausted—their industries generally outmoded, their finances weakened—while the Axis powers were left with devastated economies. For nearly a decade after 1945 a "Marshall Plan mentality" caused Washington to pursue economic foreign relations designed to make overseas allies self-sustaining participants in

[1]U.S. Senate, Committee on Finance, *Nomination of Veronica Haggart,* Hearing, March 2, 1982, 97th Congress, 2nd session, p. 6.

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a thriving open international economy, even at the expense of domestic American economic interests.

As part of the overall containment strategy U.S. economic foreign policy had three principal goals. First, it sought to facilitate the recovery and economic viability of Britain and other west European allies so that they might stand as bulwarks against the expanding influence of the Soviet Union. Second, the United States sought to integrate former enemies Germany, Italy and Japan into a thriving international economy, and thus anchor these nations to the West economically and militarily. And third, the United States sought to deny the Eastern bloc valuable Western technology.

To achieve these ends Washington initially provided reconstruction assistance and then sought to make Europe and Japan self-supporting. From 1946 to 1953 the United States extended some $33 billion in nonmilitary aid, an amount equal to one-fourth of all its exports. This aid helped rebuild steel mills in Europe and textile mills in Japan, while offshore defense procurement also enabled friendly countries like Japan to build up production bases. Over the longer term, however, American officials encouraged aid recipients to become self-supporting and competitive in the international economy.

Eager to promote "trade, not aid," and thus lighten the direct costs of reconstruction, officials actively encouraged U.S. imports, not exports. The State Department, Commerce Department and Economic Cooperation Administration all promoted foreign exports to the dollar bloc, as did U.S. occupation forces. They wanted to reduce the U.S. merchandise trade surplus in order to relieve a dollar shortage abroad. They approached this task with enthusiasm, unconcerned about long-term competitiveness and employment issues or the need to secure market access for U.S. exporters. Indeed, in communicating to domestic audiences, the State Department espoused the view that this country's balance of trade surplus posed a "serious" problem: "We have an unfavorable balance of trade, unfavorable to the taxpayer and unfavorable to the consumer. . . . We must become really import-minded."[2]

Public officials seem to have had complete confidence in America's ability to lead during the 1940s and 1950s. At a time

[2]U.S. Department of State, *The United States Balance of Payments Problem*, Commercial Policy Series No. 123, Department of State Publication 3695, December 1949, pp. 8–14.

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when imports of goods and services were less than four percent of gross national product they spoke and acted as if American manufacturing would remain permanently strong, efficient and invulnerable to foreign competition. A 1953 report, prepared by President Truman's Public Advisory Board for Mutual Security, even called for the United States to eliminate "unnecessary" tariffs on industries producing automobiles, machinery and consumer electronics, such as radios and televisions. These industries are so "highly developed and very efficient" that "this country has nothing to fear."[3]

President Truman was concerned that foreign policy matters should take priority over domestic economic interests: "Our industry dominates world markets. . . . American labor can now produce so much more than low-priced foreign labor in a given day's work that our working men need no longer fear, as they were justified in fearing in the past, the competition of foreign workers."[4]

This emphasis on opening the huge American market to aid foreign allies first surfaced during the 1947 Geneva trade negotiations, which produced the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). American officials were initially determined to crack the discriminatory British Commonwealth preferential system, but, when the Labour government refused, neither side wanted to break off negotiations. London desired Marshall Plan aid to facilitate European recovery and Cold War cooperation, and Washington shared these goals. So, apparently convinced that an unbalanced deal was better than no deal at all, the United States signed an agreement that cracked open only one market—its own. The State Department acknowledged that Washington gained concessions at Geneva with a trade value of $1.19 billion, but yielded concessions worth $1.77 billion. American tariff reductions averaged 35 percent on dutiable items.

Participants in the talks commented on the way U.S. negotiators abandoned their quest to open the British preferential system. According to declassified British records, the agreement came after British negotiators were invited to make "innocuous improvements" on offers that would enable the U.S. chief negotiator to "dress up his statistics so as to have. . .

[3]Public Advisory Board for Mutual Security, *A Trade and Tariff Policy in the National Interest*, Washington: GPO, February 1953, pp. 18–21.

[4]Unpublished pages from "Memoirs," Truman Library, Independence, MO.

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a chance of getting away with it with Congress."[5] In an unusual display of dissension among U.S. delegates, Tariff Commissioner John Gregg refused to approve the result, believing the United States had received inadequate compensation for its many concessions.

As it turned out many of the claimed U.S. gains were placed in cold storage. Convinced that the foreign dollar shortage hampered unregulated two-way trade, the United States acceded in 1947 to discrimination against U.S. exports on balance-of-payments grounds. Thus the pattern was established. In the interests of global economic recovery and containment the United States would lower its duties on imported goods while tolerating continued discrimination against dollar exports.

III

Reviving the economies of wartime adversaries presented special difficulties in light of negative public opinion. Determined to bind these former enemies to the West the United States extended most-favored-nation trade treatment to Italy, Germany and Japan after the war and also sponsored their membership in GATT.

The bilateral trade agreement signed with Japan in 1955 was the most egregious example of sacrificing domestic interests for foreign policy advantage. Concerned about Japan's economic viability and political stability, Washington embarked on a program of one-sided tariff concessions to stimulate Japanese exports. In August 1952 the National Security Council insisted that the United States should facilitate the entry of Japanese goods into the U.S. market.

State Department officials championed efforts to promote Japanese exports. They actively lobbied European allies to buy Japanese products, argued for Japan's membership in GATT and sought a bilateral trade agreement to facilitate Japanese exports. The Commerce Department opposed that recommendation, fearful of ruinous competition from cheap labor. In June 1953 it yielded to the foreign relations judgment of the State Department, that anything less than Japanese accession to GATT would jeopardize U.S. objectives in Japan.

President Eisenhower strongly backed a program of trade

[5]U.K. delegation to Foreign Office, Oct. 2, 1947, Board of Trade 11/3648, British Public Records Office, London.

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concessions for Japan. He accepted the State Department argument that "Japan cannot live and Japan cannot remain in the free world unless something is done to allow her to make a living." Indeed Eisenhower told Republican congressional leaders that "all problems of local industry pale into insignificance in relation to the world crisis."[6]

The president's preoccupation with foreign policy considerations troubled businessmen in his own cabinet, including Treasury Secretary George Humphrey and Commerce Secretary Sinclair Weeks. They felt that Eisenhower's policy was wrong, and they anticipated that cheap foreign labor would bring vast unemployment to this country.

Nonetheless Secretary of State John Foster Dulles discounted any future Japanese commercial challenge. At a meeting with visiting Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida in November 1954 Dulles held up a "brightly patterned flannel shirt made in Japan of cheap material, copying a better quality cloth made in the United States" and commented that "this is one of the reasons the Japanese have difficulty in expanding their trade." A year later, in August 1955, he told Japanese officials there "will always be an imbalance in Japan's direct trade with the U.S." Dulles and the State Department took the view that trade concessions were necessary to secure Japanese cooperation in mutual defense activities and in national-security export controls.

State won the interagency battle, asserting that national security required taking steps to bind Japan to the free world. At the White House officials also considered "the Japanese negotiations . . . vastly more important than efforts to raise minimum wages in Puerto Rico." Thus the Eisenhower administration continued to subordinate U.S. domestic commercial interests to foreign policy considerations.[7]

What tangible benefits did the United States obtain from its bilateral negotiations with Japan and with third countries in 1955? Despite official claims that the United States received concessions on exports valued at $394 million, while yielding

[6]Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Public Papers*, 1954, pp. 585–90; Feb. 8, 1955, Whitman File-Legislative, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.

[7]U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1952–54, XIV, p. 178; *FRUS*, 1955–1957, XXIII: pp. 112–113; Carl Corse memorandum, Oct. 22, 1954, White House Central File, Eisenhower Library.

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concessions of only $123 million, the reality was an unbalanced agreement loaded with bogus concessions—benefiting Japan.

The *Mainichi Daily News* reported that "domestic industries in Japan will not suffer any unfavorable influence. . . . Fifty-six out of 75 tariff rates concessed [sic] by Japan are reduced only by less than 5 percent"; the *Nippon Times* also cited Japanese government sources who "anticipated that the adverse effects the Japanese concessions would bring on the domestic industries would be negligible as compared with the benefits Japan would gain."[8]

While Japan provided few major tariff concessions, the United States granted extensive tariff reductions covering almost all of Japan's major export items: many of them labor-intensive manufactures like earthenware, chinaware, textiles, apparel, tile and electrical products. Furthermore it was understood that the United States would not immediately gain the benefit of Japanese concessions, because Japan continued to retain other trade and exchange controls to conserve foreign exchange reserves.

The 1955 agreement contained other controversial aspects. For example Washington cut duties on products of primary interest to third countries in exchange for their extending export opportunities to Japan. Negotiated at a time when other nations actively discriminated against Japanese goods, official Washington viewed these tariff cuts as essential to helping Japan establish a viable pattern of expanding trade. Such benefits went to Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Norway and Sweden. U.S. officials therefore purchased market share in Europe and Canada for Japanese exports at the expense of American producers and workers.

How did the reciprocal trade agreement with Japan affect bilateral trade? From 1955 to 1960 Japan more than doubled its share of America's manufactured imports, from 7.6 percent to 15.4 percent, and Tokyo achieved its first postwar trade surplus with Washington in 1959. Over the same period, however, the U.S. share of Japan's manufactured imports declined from 66.3 percent to 51.7 percent.

In subsequent tariff negotiating rounds this pattern of exchanging access to the U.S. market for foreign policy advantages continued. During the Dillon Round of GATT,

[8]*Mainichi Daily News* and *Nippon Times*, Tokyo, June 10, 1955.

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which concluded in 1962, the Kennedy administration sacrificed import-sensitive domestic producers and agricultural export interests to appease Britain and the European Community. Eager to reach a commercial agreement with Britain and to encourage the movement for European integration, the State Department persuaded the White House to ignore the Tariff Commission's peril-point recommendations on some 70 tariff items—including steel, machine tools, tableware, ferrochromium, toweling and linen handkerchiefs. Even though the Tariff Commission had made statutory findings that cuts below the peril-point might injure domestic industries, President Kennedy decided to accommodate foreign trading partners. On agriculture the United States made another particularly damaging concession. It acquiesced to the EC's highly protective Common Agricultural Policy, over objections from the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

The State Department's insensitivity to domestic concerns during the Dillon Round created bitter feelings on Capitol Hill. Several months later Congress retaliated in passing the Trade Expansion Act. It established the special representative for trade negotiations and stripped State of its dominant role in trade policy.

IV

Despite this reorganization, foreign policy concerns continued to drive U.S. participation in the Kennedy Round. Eager to continue the trade liberalization process begun in 1947 the executive branch initially sought an accommodation with the emerging EC on outstanding trade problems, especially agricultural protectionism. Indeed President Johnson warned in April 1964 that the United States would enter no agreement unless Kennedy Round participants made progress toward liberalizing trade in agricultural products. Another important negotiating objective was to modify the Japanese government's highly protective attitude toward its industries.

Preoccupied with managing the Vietnam War President Johnson gave little attention to details of the Kennedy Round negotiations. When the EC refused to yield on agriculture, and when Japan stonewalled on market access, his negotiators reluctantly abandoned the farm export issue and recommended that Johnson accept an agreement on industrial products that left the United States in substantial deficit with Japan. At the moment of decision Johnson heard from his

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

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

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

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

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

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advisers what foreign negotiators had long suspected: the U.S. interest in a "successful" Kennedy Round outcome required accepting a compromise that did not satisfy principal U.S. negotiating objectives.

Failure to achieve an agreement, a staff aide informed the president, risked "spiraling protectionism" and "even more serious" political implications. "It would encourage strong forces now at work to make the EC into an isolationist, anti-U.S. bloc, while, at the same time, further alienating the poor countries." Thus the Kennedy Round ended with a face-saving agreement intended to sustain the multilateral process and demonstrate U.S. support for European unification.[9]

From this distance, however, Japan appears to have won the Kennedy Round tariff-cutting negotiations. While average post-Kennedy Round duties on nonelectrical machinery fell to 5 percent ad valorem for the United States and 6.6 percent for the EC, Japan insisted upon retaining rates averaging 12 percent. Moreover Japan retained its discriminatory industrial policies, including subsidies and import restrictions, and continued to bar access to the Japanese market. Indeed on nonelectrical machinery Japan's average tariff in 1972 actually exceeded 1954 levels, reflecting increased protection for computers and other office equipment.

For transportation equipment the average import duty at the end of the Kennedy Round was 3.8 percent in the United States, 7.1 percent in the EC and 12.2 percent in Japan. Moreover many countries, including Japan, imposed high nontariff barriers, such as excise taxes and registration fees on large American-style vehicles.

Not surprisingly the Japanese press hailed the Kennedy Round agreement as paving the way for continued export expansion. Government sources in Tokyo indicated that "Japan will gain much eventually . . . because U.S. products to be affected by the Kennedy Round include many heavy industrial and chemical products, which this country [Japan] intends to emphasize in the future." Another reason for anticipating that Japanese exports would rise more than imports from the

[9]Francis Bator to Johnson, May 10, 1967, National Security File, Johnson Library, Austin, Texas.

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United States was that Japan excepted "almost all strategic industrial goods" from tariff cuts.[10]

Early in the Kennedy Round in March 1964 economist John Kenneth Galbraith, a former ambassador to India, had written President Johnson the following warning: "If we are screwed on tariffs this will have an enduringly adverse effect on the balance of payments. It will be a serious problem for you for years to come."[11]

Galbraith's forecast was prescient. As Kennedy Round tariff cuts were implemented, the U.S. merchandise trade surplus vanished. From 1893 to 1970 U.S. exports consistently had exceeded imports, but beginning in 1971 the United States generated merchandise trade deficits in 19 of the next 21 years. Some economists attributed the emerging trade deficit to inflation, an overvalued dollar and ballooning energy costs, but a series of Tariff Commission investigations reached a different conclusion. At the industry-specific level the commission found that rising imports, resulting from tariff concessions, were a major factor causing unemployment among workers producing shoes, radio and television receivers, audio equipment, flatware and textile products. President Nixon concurred in those findings and authorized federal adjustment assistance.

V

Congress was not oblivious to the domestic consequences of trade liberalization. Repeatedly, in renewing the trade agreements program, Congress made procedural changes intended to assure that domestic industries injured as a result of tariff concessions obtained escape-clause relief. In 1947, for instance, President Truman agreed that an independent agency, the Tariff Commission, forerunner of the International Trade Commission (ITC) would hear complaints from domestic industries and make a recommendation to the president. If the commission found that increased imports of a product granted a tariff reduction caused serious injury to the domestic industry, it could recommend withdrawal or modification of the appropriate tariff concession.

But in practice the escape-clause process seldom benefited

[10]*Mainichi Daily News*, May 17, 1967.

[11]Galbraith to Johnson, March 11, 1964, White House Central File, Confidential, Johnson Library.

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domestic industries. The Tariff Commission proved reluctant to find injury, and presidents exhibited even more reluctance to withdraw concessions or impose import restraints. From 1951 to 1962 the Tariff Commission rejected 71 of 112 petitions. Of the 41 findings actually sent to the White House only 15 gained relief. Domestic industries suffered an even lower success ratio under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Until 1969 a Tariff Commission packed with supporters of the trade liberalization program made no escape-clause findings at all. In 1974 Congress modified the law, relaxing the injury standard and authorizing the use of higher tariffs or quotas to facilitate adjustment to increased competition. Over the ensuing years the escape clause gained renewed life. In the next 16 years petitioners brought 62 cases. The Tariff Commission recommended relief in 34, and the president actually provided import restrictions in 15 cases.

At the presidential review level foreign policy considerations frequently directed negative decisions on escape-clause recommendations. This pattern began in 1951 when President Truman rejected for the first time a majority Tariff Commission recommendation for import restraints on garlic imports, primarily from Italy. In accepting the State Department claim Truman insisted that substantial imports must substitute for direct foreign aid and thus assist countries like Italy to contribute to mutual defense costs.

Similar concerns led the Truman administration to reject a Tariff Commission recommendation for relief to the domestic watch industry in 1952. The State Department reminded Truman of his effort to draw Switzerland away from neutrality and to support export controls on shipments to the Soviet bloc.

During the Eisenhower years foreign policy and defense continued to drive trade administration. In 1954 Eisenhower did provide relief to domestic watchmakers, but in the belief that watchmaking skills were vital to military preparedness. The watch case had unique aspects, and Eisenhower generally avoided import restraints wherever possible. At one point he said it seemed "silly" to impose import restrictions on clothespins from 11 foreign countries to protect six small companies in the state of Maine employing 260 workers. Trade restrictions, he said, "which tend to drive away an ally as dependable as Great Britain would do much more harm in the long run to our security than would be done by permitting a U.S. industry to suffer from British competition." He proposed that in

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reaching trade remedy decisions the administration should take into account "the damage to national security which could result from restrictions which might weaken the ties which bind us to our allies in the collective security effort."[12]

In one escape-clause investigation after another the State Department counseled the president to withhold relief to U.S. industries and workers. For instance, in the 1953 handblown glassware case, State warned that import restrictions would have "grave political repercussions in the Federal Republic of Germany . . . and would provide the Soviet Union with unanswerable material for propaganda." In 1954 both State and Defense argued against relief to U.S. producers of scissors. State emphasized that West German production came from areas near the Ruhr where "Soviet propaganda has already had considerable effect." Defense warned that the increase of duty could have adverse effect on Germany, Italy, Japan and Britain. "The increase would affect the morale of such countries as well as their economic welfare and stability."

In a 1954 lead and zinc case involving several western hemisphere nations the State Department was especially insistent. Dulles advised Eisenhower that a decision to provide import relief would "gravely compromise" U.S. foreign policy objectives. "There would be strong popular resentment in Canada and Mexico, which will make our borders much less secure," Secretary Dulles said. "The great opportunity to combat communism in this hemisphere won by the success of Guatemala would be more than canceled out." Moreover, he added, "Soviet communist leaders would be elated and would redouble their efforts to divide the free world."[13]

Cold War concerns also benefited the Nordic countries and Iceland. For instance President Eisenhower approved a 1954 National Security Council policy memorandum asserting that the United States should avoid trade actions adversely affecting Iceland. Washington should seek to increase free world markets for Icelandic fish in order to reduce the country's dependence on Soviet bloc trade.

Given the importance that the administration assigned to Iceland as a base for NATO operations, it is not surprising that

[12]June 4, 1959, National Security Council discussion. *Declassified Documents Reference System* (DDRS): Research Publications Inc., Woodbridge, CT, 1990; 16:970–71.

[13]Department of State to Bureau of Budget, Nov. 2, 1953, and April 20–21, 1954, White House Central File, Eisenhower Library; Dulles to President Eisenhower, Aug. 12, 1954, DDRS:1983, 9:2103.

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President Eisenhower twice rejected escape-clause recommendations to provide relief to New England fish producers who claimed that imports from Canada, Norway and Iceland were injuring the domestic industry. The Defense Department warned in 1954 that trade restrictions benefiting New England fishermen would have effects "adverse to the security interests of the United States." In 1956 the Tariff Commission again recommended escape-clause relief for the New England fishermen—this time unanimously. But again foreign affairs agencies scuttled import remedies. According to the International Cooperation Administration, a 50 percent duty on fish would strengthen "those elements in Iceland which wish to drive out U.S. NATO troops. As fish goes, so goes Iceland." As a result two countries that sold virtually no fish fillets to the United States before World War II gained, with U.S. economic assistance, 20 percent of the U.S. market in 1952. Canada, which held 9 percent of the U.S. market in 1939, obtained another 25 percent. Thirty years later Canada and Iceland held over 80 percent of the U.S. market for frozen groundfish fillets.[14]

After the steep Kennedy Round concessions the Tariff Commission made a number of affirmative escape-clause recommendations but, predictably, the foreign affairs agencies vigorously opposed import remedies.

VI

The labor-intensive nonrubber footwear industry offers an excellent example. Domestic producers repeatedly filed petitions for escape-clause relief in the Nixon, Ford, Carter and Reagan administrations. Although the shoe industry usually persuaded the independent ITC on the merits of the case to find injury and recommend a global import restraint program, it never succeeded in obtaining comprehensive relief at the presidential review level.

The story begins in 1970, as a 50 percent cut in nonrubber footwear duties granted in the Kennedy Round took effect. Shoe imports soared—especially from Italy, Japan and Spain. Indeed the quantity of imports rose from 18 percent of

[14]Department of Defense to Bureau of Budget, June 7, 1954, and Nov. 8, 1956, White House Central Files, Eisenhower Library.

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domestic consumption in 1967 to 30 percent in 1970, while the number of production workers fell from 202,000 to 185,000.

In January 1971 an evenly divided Tariff Commission sent the White House escape-clause findings that included a recommendation for higher duties on women's and men's leather footwear. Swiftly the State Department swung into action. Secretary William P. Rogers warned President Nixon that a decision to impose restraints on nonrubber footwear might invite retaliation against U.S. exports in the EC and against military bases in Spain, as well as arousing opposition to U.S. goals in Japan. Import restrictions would undermine efforts of Mexico, India, Brazil and other developing countries to diversify their economies. Given the intensity of State Department opposition, it is not surprising that President Nixon disapproved trade restrictions and authorized instead only adjustment assistance.

The import assault continued to hammer the shoe industry. Domestic producers lost another 11 points of market share and laid off nearly 50,000 workers. In February 1976 the ITC made a unanimous injury recommendation. But once again international concerns doomed the shoemakers' petition. National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft told President Ford that the "communists would seize on any U.S. import action against shoes. . . to argue that the U.S. was harming Italy during a time of economic crisis." He warned of similar negative reactions from Brazil, Korea and Taiwan as well. President Ford concluded that shoe restraints were not in the "national economic interest," and he too authorized only adjustment assistance to dislocated shoe workers.

Imports surged again. Nonrubber footwear producers filed another escape-clause petition, hoping the Carter administration would be more sympathetic. In February 1977 a unanimous commission found injury, and five commissioners recommended import restraints, including a global tariff quota. But National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski opposed assistance to the shoe industry as harmful to the administration's overall foreign economic policy. He warned that trading partners "see shoes as a test case" and indicated that import restraints could sour the atmosphere for the London economic summit. Weaker European economies, such as Italy, Britain and France, might "erect trade barriers of their own." Moreover implementing the ITC remedies would hit developing countries "hardest" and "raises serious doubts about our

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commitment to the economic well-being of the Third World." Furthermore Spain and Greece warned that footwear exports were "vital" to their respective bilateral relationships with the United States.[15]

Under enormous pressure from domestic as well as foreign interests President Carter sought a compromise. Rejecting the ITC recommendation on the ground that it did not provide balance among the contending interests, Carter authorized more adjustment assistance and directed his trade negotiators to conclude orderly marketing agreements (OMAs) with major foreign suppliers. The administration successfully concluded such pacts with Taiwan and Korea—but not with Italy, Spain or Brazil.

OMAs helped restrain Asian competition, but not competition from other sources. The domestic industry continued to lose market share. After OMAs were removed in 1981 the nonrubber footwear industry in the next three years lost another 20 points of market share, and 28,000 jobs. In 1985, when a unanimous ITC again found injury and recommended restraints, President Reagan declined to use trade restraints. This time the president criticized protectionism as a crippling cure more dangerous than any economic illness. And so the shoe industry continued to move offshore and to lay off domestic workers.

In 1992 imports had 88 percent of the U.S. market and domestic producers employed only 54,100 production workers, a loss of nearly 148,000 production workers since the Kennedy Round tariff concessions.

VII

The pattern of trading away specific domestic interests for foreign policy reasons is not confined to labor-intensive industries like footwear. Available documents in the National Archives and various presidential libraries reveal that similar considerations influenced decisions affecting high-wage industries producing automobiles, steel and consumer electronics, among many others. During the Johnson administration, for instance, the State Department fashioned an automotive products market-sharing agreement with Canada to forestall a

[15]Scowcroft to President Ford, April 12, 1976, Seidman Papers, Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI; Brzezinski to Carter, March 16, 1977, and Special Trade Representative to Vice President, Feb. 4, 1977, White House Central File, TA4–12, Carter Library, Atlanta, GA.

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countervailing duty determination by the U.S. Treasury that had been expected to damage bilateral political relations. The result was a one-sided "free trade agreement" opening the U.S. market to Canadian automotive products. But only original equipment manufacturers could import vehicles and parts freely into Canada; consumers could not. Other separate understandings between U.S. auto producers and the Canadian government effectively transferred auto production—and jobs—to Canada. The result: a $657 million automotive products trade surplus with Canada in 1965 turned negative. Over the last 25 years the United States has experienced automotive deficits with Canada in all but one year.

During Tokyo Round negotiations the archival evidence also indicates that the Ford and Carter administrations rejected trade-remedy petitions from U.S. industries to avoid unsettling allies and disrupting multilateral negotiations. Indeed at the November 1975 Rambouillet economic summit President Ford specifically pledged to deal with bilateral trade problems on a "common sense basis." He said: "Where flexibility exists under our domestic law and procedures, I am prepared to exercise it."[16]

Consistent with his word Ford then rejected import restraints in five of six escape-clause cases. The exception was specialty steel, where the administration faced a certain congressional override. Meanwhile the Treasury strained to avoid imposing countervailing and antidumping duties on foreign producers of automobiles, steel and canned hams. In each instance the available record suggests that foreign policy considerations influenced the trade-administration process.

Similar episodes occurred in the Carter and Reagan years. In 1978 and again in 1984 the ITC recommended import restraints to restrict surging copper imports and, consequently, two presidents faced difficult decisions. In the first instance Special Trade Representative Robert Strauss endorsed a tariff-rate quota as a way to head off efforts in Congress to limit presidential discretion in administering trade laws and to increase congressional receptivity to Tokyo Round agreements. He lost. President Carter sided with the State Department, the National Security Council and other agencies opposing protection. They warned that import restrictions

[16]Notes of Rambouillet Summit, Nov. 16, 1975, Seidman Papers, Ford Library.

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would damage relations with Canada, Peru, Chile, Zambia and other copper exporters, while violating commitments made at the Bonn and London economic summits to resist protectionism.

President Reagan also rejected import restraints on copper. Political instability in Chile reportedly intensified opposition—at the State Department and the NSC—to relief for the domestic producers. Like his predecessors President Reagan assigned priority to free-trade pledges made at economic summits, and his decision pleased manufacturers who consumed large quantities of copper.

According to Clyde Prestowitz, a Commerce Department official in the 1980s, the executive branch was also reluctant to defend U.S. producers from subsidized Japanese and European competition.[17] In the Houdaille machine-tool case Prestowitz notes that President Reagan declined to impose sanctions that would embarrass his friend, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, and harm the overall bilateral relationship with Japan. When the administration considered challenging European subsidies to Airbus—Boeing's leading competitor—Secretary of State George Shultz exhibited similar aversion. Vigorous representations would have upset European governments and harmed cooperation on national security issues.

VIII

Although the Cold War is over, officials in Washington continue to play the old game of trading access to the U.S. market for cooperation on nontrade issues. Each year the Bush administration renews low, most-favored-nation tariff rates for China, in an apparent trade-off for cooperation in the United Nations on matters involving Libya, Yugoslavia and Iraq. As a result China has become the leading U.S. supplier of shoe imports and is a major provider of apparel, toys and other labor-intensive items.

At the July 1992 economic summit in Munich officials of the Group of Seven leading industrialized nations discussed economic aid for eastern Europe. Most-favored-nation status and eligibility for one-way free trade privileges are among the lures enticing Russia and other remnants of the Soviet Union to

[17]Clyde Prestowitz, *Trading Places*, New York: Basic Books, 1988, pp. 217–249.

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cooperate on arms control, human rights and political issues. At first glance each such transaction appears to have merit. Certainly it is important to cooperate on arms control and to strengthen international peacekeeping. It is advantageous to draw the former Soviet Union and China away from autarkic nationalism. It is desirable to promote respect for human liberties.

However, from the standpoint of U.S. workers and producers, such deals lack commercial reciprocity. China pursues highly protectionist import substitution policies—using stiff tariffs, import licensing and other barriers to exclude U.S. and other foreign goods. As a result Washington last year experienced a $12.7 billion trade deficit with Beijing; this year the deficit may widen to $19.9 billion. In effect China is rapidly becoming a second Japan: a nation that restricts foreign access to its own market while feasting on the open U.S. market.

A similar lack of reciprocity may emerge with eastern Europe. Given the West's enormous interest in promoting democratization and securing continued cooperation on military issues, the United States and the EC face a painful political choice. Either they continue direct aid programs, which are unpopular with voters, or they acquiesce to discriminatory and nonreciprocal trading relationships, as the Truman administration did to facilitate European and Asian reconstruction after World War II.

America's current economic problems have roots in those one-sided trade policies. A series of unilateral and nonreciprocal concessions have contributed, cumulatively, to a demise of domestic manufacturing and to the loss of production jobs. Indeed implementation of the final Kennedy Round tariff cuts in 1972 coincides with the beginning of a twenty-year decline in domestic earnings and manufacturing jobs. In 1991 American workers earned average weekly wages 20 percent below 1972 levels. Meanwhile the textile and apparel industries lost over 600,000 jobs, while steel and automobiles sacrificed another 500,000 positions. Measured in declining income and jobs, the burden of global leadership thus has fallen heavily on low-skilled American workers. Labor-intensive manufacturing jobs have moved abroad to low-cost Third World countries, leaving a caste of poorly skilled American workers living in Third World conditions here in the United States.

Not surprisingly the loss of jobs is associated with a revival of protectionism at the grass roots. From World War II to the early 1970s public opinion data show Americans generally

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supported tariff liberalization. But, when the impact of Kennedy Round tariff cuts began to harm workers in a variety of import-competing industries, the public mood shifted. Since about 1973 solid majorities have consistently favored increased import restrictions.

In 1992 rising public dissatisfaction with government and with the costs of international involvement reflects the pervasive perception that American leaders have neglected for too long the bread-and-butter concerns of average citizens. The future of Russia and eastern Europe, the success of the Uruguay Round and the promise of a North American Free Trade Agreement all may mesmerize and motivate Washington policymakers. But in the American heartland these initiatives translate as further efforts to promote international order at the expense of existing American jobs.

Continued public support for a liberal trade policy depends on more than vague promises about future export-related jobs and lectures on the benefits that consumers derive from low-cost imports. In the absence of secure and abundant employment, consumer concerns fade in importance. Most consumers are less concerned about the price of goods than about their own ability to pay the price. And recent experience in the current recession underscores another economic truth: the unemployed worker is not a happy consumer. Indeed the rapid transfer of jobs from high-cost to low-wage countries in a world of deregulated markets multiplies uncertainty and discourages consumption among those lacking employment security. Twenty years ago only production workers had to worry about losing jobs to cheap foreign competition. In the 1990s open borders have spread this insecurity to millions of service and professional workers.

Chairman Long, and his Republican and Democratic colleagues on the Senate Finance Committee, anticipated this reaction years ago. At a hearing in January 1976 he warned Secretary of State Henry Kissinger: "If we trade away American jobs and farmers' incomes for some vague concept of a 'new international order,' the American people will demand from their elected representatives a new order of their own, which puts their jobs, their security and their income above the priorities of those who dealt them a bad deal."[18]

[18]U.S. Senate, Committee on Finance, *Oversight Hearings on U.S. Foreign Trade Policy*, 94th Congress, 2nd session, p. 105.

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IX

To restore public confidence in American leadership and strengthen the domestic economy, the next president and Congress need to focus their efforts closer to home. They must develop policies that will remedy the fiscal mess, help strengthen the competitiveness of domestic industries, improve the quality of the work force, rebuild domestic infrastructure and provide productive jobs for low-skilled workers.

For the United States trade policy must increasingly become an instrument of domestic policy, as it is for our leading competitors. Obviously government cannot construct nineteenth-century style protectionist walls to shelter permanently inefficient industries. But the experience of the Harley-Davidson company and the domestic steel industry in the 1980s shows that prudent and selective use of escape-clause type procedures can strengthen the competitiveness of even mature industries. Harley successfully used a five-year period of tariff relief to regain its competitive edge. Such safeguard actions are consistent with U.S. obligations under GATT.

In essence Washington must revive the concept of genuinely reciprocal trade. We should exchange market opportunities in the domestic market only for meaningful market access abroad. In future bilateral and multilateral agreements each party should gain the same opportunity to invest, distribute and conduct business in the other's market.

Finally the new administration needs to give greater attention to key personnel appointments. Too often in the past the U.S. Trade Representative's Office, the Commerce Department and the ITC have served as training schools for foreign lobbyists. Desire for personal advancement may have inhibited a judicious weighing of facts and assessment of statutory intent in trade remedy cases. Congress needs to undertake a more thorough oversight of trade policy to protect the public interest. To establish a strong domestic foundation for continued global leadership U.S. officials must demonstrate a greater sensitivity to the interests of domestic workers and producers.

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

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Geoffrey Smith

BRITAIN IN THE NEW EUROPE

One of John Major's early remarks when he became prime minister in November 1990 was that he wanted Britain to be at the heart of Europe. It says something for the often fractious nature of Britain's relations with its European Community partners that this was regarded as a novel, even a controversial, statement. The comment was taken to be an implied criticism of his predecessor, Margaret Thatcher, whose dealings with other EC leaders had been more distant when they were not positively stormy.

It has been a beneficial change of tone. The new approach enabled Major to win some concessions from his fellow heads of government in negotiating the Maastricht Treaty on European Union last December—in particular, the right to opt out of the social chapter and to decide later whether to join a single European currency. It has equipped him to play a pivotal role now in the most serious internal crisis that the EC has faced for at least a quarter century.

When Danish voters rejected the Maastricht Treaty in a referendum at the beginning of June they presented the Community with both a legal dilemma and a moral challenge. The Maastricht agreement provides for a number of amendments to the EC's original Treaty of Rome, all of which require the unanimous endorsement of the 12 member states. If the Danes cannot be persuaded to change their minds, Maastricht in its present form is dead.

To get around this legal roadblock there have been some ominous rumblings that Denmark might be pressed to withdraw from the Community. Or, it has been suggested, the other 11 countries might sign another agreement, quite separate from the Treaty of Rome, to implement Maastricht. Neither stratagem would be a satisfactory solution to the dilemma.

Because the legal position has become so messy, people throughout the EC have begun to think more carefully about

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what sort of Europe they want. Before the Danes voted, nobody doubted that Maastricht would be ratified. Britain was the only other country until then where there had been a serious debate on the treaty's implications. Now the critics are raising their voices in a number of member states. The wisdom of Maastricht can no longer be assumed. Hearts and minds have to be won for the treaty, or something different must be found.

There is also the problem of Yugoslavia. Throughout the era of Soviet domination of eastern Europe, the ethnic, national and religious rivalries that have plagued the region for centuries were kept firmly under control. Once that grip was removed there was always the danger that these ancient feuds would resurface. That they should do so first in Yugoslavia is ironic because this was a country that escaped from Stalin's grasp nearly fifty years ago. But what has been happening there is symbolic both of the perils that lurk throughout eastern Europe and of the challenge they present for western Europe. The EC bears no responsibility for the onset of the catastrophe unfolding on Europe's rim. But because the Community appears so powerful, it is expected to find an answer to that crisis on its periphery.

It falls to John Major to play the principal part in attempting to steer the Community through these dangerous waters. For the second half of this year it is Britain's turn to be president of the Council; the British prime minister has a double responsibility. He has the chairman's duty to seek harmony, to guide all the members around the legal and political rocks: there must be no shipwreck on his watch. But he is also the heir to a distinctive British approach to the future of Europe.

II

The sharp difference of Major's style and tactics have obscured the similarity in the substance of the Major and Thatcher European policies. The harshness of Thatcher's rhetoric made it appear that she differed from her predecessors more than she really did. There certainly has not been consistency in the British attitude toward Europe over the past half century. But there have been certain fundamental themes that have kept reappearing, clothed at different times in different detailed policies, since Winston Churchill first

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sparked the imagination with his call upon a devastated Europe to unite.

Churchill began to alert public opinion to the problems of postwar Europe well before the end of World War II was in sight. He had in mind a Council of Europe that would operate under the United Nations "with all the strongest forces concerned woven into its texture, with a High Court to adjust disputes and with forces, armed forces, national or international or both, held ready to impose these decisions." He was evidently thinking in rather generalized terms of an elaborate exercise in regional peacekeeping.

Then, after he was thrown out of office in 1945, there came the loud trumpet blasts for the cause of a united Europe in a series of speeches, first in Zurich in 1946, then in London the following year when launching the United Europe Movement and finally at The Hague in 1948. The scorching, compelling power of Churchill's rhetoric had a dramatic impact on governments and peoples throughout Western Europe. The Council of Europe was established at his instigation in 1949 as an assembly for dialogue among parliamentarians. The process of developing European unity had begun. Never since then has Britain been so clearly at the heart of Europe.

Yet for all their inspirational qualities Churchill's speeches on Europe shared one characteristic with the plays of Shakespeare: it is possible to find in them a text for all seasons. On Europe Churchill used words expansively to convey a sentiment without too much regard for their precise meaning. Not infrequently, for example, he referred to his aspiration for "a United States of Europe." This phrase is used today to point toward a tightly integrated Community, based upon the example of the most powerful nation state in the world. Yet that was not what Churchill had in mind; on other occasions he displayed suspicion of supranational institutions.

Churchill seemed uncharacteristically relaxed in his choice of words on Europe because he was concerned above all to engender a spirit rather than to construct a system. His principal objective was to bring about an ethos of reconciliation, especially between France and Germany. "There must be an end to retribution," he proclaimed during his 1946 speech at Zurich University. "The first step in the re-creation of the European family must be a partnership between France and Germany."

Churchill did not specify how this partnership should be

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formed. Time and again he warned against detailed plans and blueprints. "It would not be wise in this critical time," he declared at The Hague, "to be drawn into labored attempts to draw rigid structures of constitutions." In this he provided a direct contrast to Jean Monnet, the French businessman and administrator who was the godfather of the European Community.

Monnet believed just as deeply in reconciliation between the wartime foes, but his method was to create supranational economic institutions for a political purpose. Locking European economies together in this way would serve a double purpose: another war between Germany and France would become impossible, and Western Europe would become once more a power in the world.

This difference between the pragmatic Englishman and the programmatic Frenchman illustrates a fundamental difference in approach that has bedeviled relations between Britain and its partners. For those of the Monnet school, which has included most member governments for most of the time, the establishment of new structures for ever closer integration is an end in itself. This is what building the new Europe is all about: welding the nation states of the old Europe into a new economic and political entity.

Churchill offered a different vision. It was of a Europe moving toward closer economic, military and political unity, but with the precise arrangements to be determined by the flow of history. It was not to be a narrow, restricted Europe. "We aim at the eventual participation," he declared at The Hague, "of all European peoples whose society and way of life, making all allowances for the different points of view in various countries, are not in disaccord with a Charter of Human Rights and with the sincere expression of free democracy." Nor was it to be an exclusive or inward-looking Europe. "We in Britain must move in harmony with our great partners in the Commonwealth," he said in that same speech. Equally, he would have been the last person to suggest that Britain should modify its relationship with the United States in order to devote itself to Europe.

This strategy—broad, relaxed and generous—provided scope for flexibility, but also for misunderstanding. In 1950, while the British Conservatives under Churchill were still in opposition, two far-reaching European initiatives were launched. Robert Schuman, the French foreign minister,

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proposed the pooling of coal and steel production. René Pleven, the French prime minister, presented a plan for a European army.

The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), comprising France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, became the first step in the process of European economic integration. There could have been no more dramatic beginning than to merge the two basic industries which were essential for conducting war. The scheme for a European Defence Community (EDC) was rejected by the French National Assembly in 1954, but it had dominated the European debate in the early 1950s.

The British Labour government did not join either project. It declined an invitation to take part in initial exploratory discussions on the ECSC with France and Germany because of a difference that may seem trivial but was symptomatic of a much deeper divergence. The French government wanted acceptance of the plan in principle before the details were worked out. The British refused to commit themselves without knowing what the full project would entail.

III

It was the kind of disagreement that has emerged time and again in subsequent years. The French in particular, but Britain's other European partners as well, want the reassurance of knowing that their companions have signed up for the whole voyage. This shows that everyone is together in spirit, even if there may be difficulties along the way.

The British, by contrast, are mistrustful of windy general declarations. They take promises more literally, so they want to be careful what they are signing. It is no accident that Britain has caused more difficulty than anyone else over the years about accepting what seem to their partners to be innocuous statements of intent while, on the other hand, having one of the best records in implementing EC legislation once it has been passed in Brussels.

Churchill criticized the Labour government for failing to take part in the preparatory talks, saying that Britain could have claimed the right to withdraw later if it did not like the outcome. On the European army he was even more positive, telling the Council of Europe that "we should make a gesture of practical and constructive guidance by declaring ourselves in favor of the immediate creation of a European army under

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a unified command, and in which we should bear a worthy and honorable part."

Yet when Churchill became prime minister again in 1951 Britain did not join either project. Britain's exclusion from the process of European integration could no longer be attributed simply to having a Labour government. Thereafter Britain was clearly on the periphery, politically as well as geographically. To some of Churchill's own supporters and to many in other European countries it came as a grave disappointment, almost a betrayal, that the great champion of European unity in opposition was not prepared to take action when he was back in office.

Was it, as Harold Macmillan implied in his memoirs, that Churchill just had other things on his mind? That was no doubt part of it. He had resumed the leadership of a country in grave economic difficulties, and he was preoccupied with the threat of nuclear warfare. His foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, and the Foreign Office at that time did not share his European enthusiasm. They would not have prompted Churchill to remember his earlier words, and he might have hesitated to push them in a direction where he knew they did not want to go.

But there were other reasons as well. Churchill had never committed himself to a precise scheme in either case, and he did not like the way in which the original ideas had been developed. In his June 1950 speech to the House of Commons, criticizing the British government for failing to take part in the original negotiations on the ECSC, he had criticized the French for making precise stipulations before being ready to discuss, and he had commented sourly on "the usual jargon about 'the infrastructure of a supranational authority'." That was not how he wanted Europe to develop.

This was why he did not take Britain into the EDC. It was not just a lapse of memory, as he explained to the House of Commons in July 1954:

> I am sometimes reproached with having led France to expect that Britain would be a full member of the European Defence Community. When in 1950 I proposed at Strasbourg the creation of a European army, I had in mind—and it is clear from my speech—the formation of a long-term grand alliance under which national armies would operate under a unified allied command. The policy of the alliance would, I assumed, be decided jointly by the governments of the participating countries. My conception involved no supranational institutions, and I saw no difficulty in Britain playing a

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full part in a scheme of that kind. However, the French approached this question from a constitutional, rather than a purely military, point of view. The result was that when they and the other five continental nations worked out a detailed scheme, it took the form of a complete merger of national forces under federal supranational control.

So by the mid-1950s a gulf had developed between even the pro-Europeans in Britain and the core movement for European unity. The same six countries that had formed the ECSC and that had tried and failed to set up the EDC were shortly to create the Common Market. In each case there was to be a supranational operating arm subject to the control of a council of ministers from the member governments.

In Britain there were many, far more than there are today, who were either hostile or at best tepid toward the whole idea of European entanglements in peacetime. But even those who were genuinely enthusiastic were often opposed to the supranational preferences of the Six. Many Britons wanted Europe to bury the old animosities, to play a more effective role in NATO, to recover its economic strength and to cooperate politically. But they were not seeking to create a new economic, political or military power in Western Europe. They were prepared to give up some national sovereignty, but only to the extent required for specific practical purposes. To most Britons the merging of sovereignty was not an end in itself.

It was quite consistent with this attitude that, after the collapse of the EDC, Britain should then play the leading role in the creation of the Western European Union (WEU) in 1955. One of the purposes of the EDC had been to provide a framework within which West Germany could be rearmed and brought into NATO without causing alarm to its neighbors. It was now agreed that Britain should join the Six in founding this new defense grouping with a promise to keep significant military forces on the continent. This was an unequivocal British commitment to Europe for a practical purpose, but without the supranational trappings to which Churchill and others had so objected.

The contrast between the failure of the EDC, for which Britain was widely blamed, and the successful negotiation of WEU illustrated the fundamental difference in attitude between Britain and the Six. It was not altogether surprising, therefore, that Britain was not represented when the Six met at the Sicilian town of Messina in 1955 to plan a customs union.

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Britain did send someone to sit on the preparatory committee that followed the Messina conference, but only a civil servant from the Board of Trade, not a person with the political clout of the other representatives.

The British delegation was in an invidious position, outranked around the conference table and unsupported from home. It had difficulty obtaining instructions from London, so it could hardly have played much of a part in the discussions. By then Anthony Eden, the unenthusiastic European, had succeeded Churchill. Macmillan, who had become foreign secretary, had been one of the most ardent of British Europeans in the postwar years. He would have had difficulty in overcoming Eden's skepticism, but Macmillan himself was not enamored of the supranationalism that was evident once again in the proposed structure of the EC. In any case the general feeling in London was that nothing would come of this latest venture in European integration.

When this nonchalance proved to be unfounded, and the Six proceeded to sign the Treaty of Rome that created the Common Market in March 1957, British casualness turned to consternation. The mirage had become a threat. It was to counter the danger of exclusion from this new, powerful economic grouping that Britain now put forward a scheme for an industrial free trade area encompassing the whole of Western Europe, with the EC joining as a single unit.

After tortuous negotiations that proceeded for nearly two years the French government killed the project in November 1958, a few months after de Gaulle's return to power. Yet, though the idea was stillborn, the plan indicated some of the enduring British preferences. The unifying process should be extended as widely as possible across Europe, not confined to a small group of the rich and powerful. Free trade is the economic goal that matters most; the concentration of power at the center is at best a necessary evil. (There would have been no supranational authority for the free trade area itself.)

When this scheme was rejected, the next option was to negotiate the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) with the Scandinavian countries, Austria, Switzerland and Portugal. This 1960 agreement was essentially a gathering of the outsiders. While it served to increase trade substantially among its members, Britain soon concluded that such an arrangement could be no more than second best.

The historic decision to apply for full EC membership came

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in the summer of 1961. There had been no mention of a possible application in the party manifesto when the Conservatives won the general election of 1959, merely a reference to EFTA and the continued aspiration for industrial free trade throughout Western Europe. But after long agonizing, the government decided that if Britain remained outside the Community it would be on the sidelines of European development.

In presenting the British case to the EC governments in Paris in October that year Edward Heath, the minister responsible for the negotiations, put it in terms of a historic conversion. Two months earlier Prime Minister Macmillan had been a little more circumspect in the House of Commons. He had put the emphasis very much upon the economic advantages of being part of a larger market: "The Treaty of Rome does not deal with defense. It does not deal with foreign policy." It was a strange irony that Macmillan should have referred specifically to these two fields of policy, because the Community's incursion into these areas is one of the causes of controversy today. He then spoke more explicitly about the kind of Community into which he hoped to lead the British people:

> I fully accept that there are some forces in Europe which would like a genuine federalist solution. . . . They would like Europe to turn itself into a sort of United States, but I believe this to be a completely false analogy. . . . Europe is too old, too diverse in tradition, language and history to find itself united by such means. . . . The alternative concept, the only practical concept, would be a confederation, a commonwealth, if honorable members would like to call it that—what I think General de Gaulle has called *Europe des patries*—which would retain the great traditions and the pride of individual nations while working together in clearly defined spheres for their common interest.

It is revealing that he should have used the words *Europe des patries*. The phrase is associated today with those who want a watered-down version of the Community—Euro-skeptics lacking a true vision of Europe. Yet this was the concept of the Community given to the British people by the prime minister who first tried to take the country in.

Macmillan was not lacking in European enthusiasm. He probably had been Churchill's closest colleague in the heady days of the early European conferences at The Hague and Strasbourg. It is just that right from the beginning there have been competing philosophies of the direction that European

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unity should take. But Macmillan was thwarted in his endeavor by the man whose phrase he borrowed. At a notorious press conference in Paris on January 14, 1963, de Gaulle made it clear that France would veto Britain's application. His objections were fundamental. Britain was too insular, a maritime power, "linked through her exchanges, her markets, her supply lines to the most diverse and often the most distant countries."

The French leader was not referring here only to Britain's Commonwealth connections. He was known to be particularly disturbed by the fear that Britain was too close to the United States, that Britain would be an American Trojan horse inside the EC—a suspicion that a number of Britain's partners still retain.

It was to be almost another decade before Britain was able to join. Edward Heath, who was by then prime minister, was the most fervent European to lead any British government of either party. Nonetheless he had to be careful. The public opinion polls in the early 1970s suggested that most British people were opposed to membership.

Heath showed considerable diplomatic skill in the way that he maneuvered Britain into EC membership. Recognizing that there was no way to bypass a French veto, he managed to persuade de Gaulle's successor, Georges Pompidou, of Britain's European convictions. Yet he could not afford to sound any clarion call at home, for fear of provoking public opinion. The Conservative manifesto at the election of June 1970, which preceded the opening of negotiations, proclaimed with studied caution: "Our sole commitment is to negotiate; no more, no less."

So before Britain went into the Community in January 1973, the question was not an issue at a general election. Nor was there a referendum on it. There was no dramatic public debate. Heath made the reasonable but low-key pitch that the EC was too important to stay out of, and he made much of the economic benefits of membership. He certainly drew attention to the political considerations, but the British people were not given to understand that they would be embarking on the construction of a European superstate.

Paradoxically it was only after the defeat of the Heath government that British membership ceased to be controversial at home. The Labour government that came to power in March 1974 was, as so often, badly divided on Europe. Seven

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years earlier the then Labour prime minister, Harold Wilson, and his foreign secretary, George Brown, had traveled around the capitals of the Six in the attempt to have the French veto lifted, proclaiming that they would not take no for an answer. They had no choice.

When the Heath government had managed to take Britain in, the Labour Party was severely split, with most of its members of parliament voting against. Back in office most members of the Cabinet wanted to keep Britain in the Community, but they needed a pretext to cover their inconsistency and some device to prevent the party tearing itself apart. So there was an essentially cosmetic exercise in renegotiating the terms of British entry, and the new arrangements were put to a referendum of the British electorate.

The result was a majority of nearly two to one in favor of staying in. From that day on, the question of British membership has never been in serious contention. But the nature of the Community in which Britain has found a home has been and remains in dispute.

IV

The issue was dramatized during Margaret Thatcher's years in power by the pugnacious style in which she conducted her arguments with other EC leaders. There were tempestuous debates on Britain's contribution to the Community budget, on the Common Agricultural Policy, on trade policy and on many other issues.

Her instincts were never those of a European. Her emotional rapport was with the United States, especially during the Reagan presidency. But while in her heart she might not have been too sorry to see Britain leave the Community, that has never been her policy. Her rhetoric may have encouraged the isolationists in Britain, but her world view never stopped at the English Channel. Her difficulty with the EC was that her horizons extended far beyond Europe.

In their very different ways she and John Major have been pursuing similar fundamental objectives, the themes that have been evident in the British approach to Europe over the past half century.

First, the EC should be as decentralized as possible. From the early days of the movement for European unity there has been a powerful school of thought whose primary purpose has been to build Europe into a power in its own right. This Europe was

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to be a bulwark against the Soviet Union at the worst of the Cold War; then, as the Cold War became less intense, it would be a distinctive voice between the Soviet Union and the United States; and now the Maastricht agreement is to make Europe strong enough to compete economically with the United States and Japan. Those who want to build Europe into a major power must wish it to develop into a tightly integrated unit, economically, politically and militarily. The mechanism becomes its own objective.

The British have always had a more modest conception of Europe. The purpose of European unity in their eyes has been to enable the peoples of Europe to live more harmoniously together and to enjoy greater prosperity and influence. Any measure of centralization needs to be justified on pragmatic grounds. For some years this attitude combined with traditional British insularity to keep Britain out of the ECSC and then the Common Market. Now it makes the British suspicious of the authority of Brussels—yet not totally hostile, it must be added, where a specific benefit can be seen.

In 1985 Margaret Thatcher agreed to an increase in majority voting in the Council of Ministers—which must expand the danger of any country having policies imposed upon it against its will—as part of the Single European Act. That legislation provided for the 1992 program, introducing the Single European Market with the elimination of trade barriers between all members of the Community. This is an enlargement of free trade, which Thatcher much approves of, and she was persuaded that more majority voting was required if the program was not going to be blocked by one country or another.

Other integrationist measures will be acceptable with a similar pragmatic justification. In general, though, there is a widespread British belief that there is too much interference from Brussels. The intense debate over the Maastricht Treaty revolves around this issue. The question in Britain today is not whether a decentralized Community is desirable, but whether Maastricht provides for that decentralization.

John Major has claimed that "the Maastricht Treaty marks the point at which, for the first time, we have begun to reverse that centralizing trend. We have moved decision-taking back towards the member states in areas where Community law need not and should not apply." He had in mind two of the decisions at Maastricht: that foreign and security policies, justice and immigration should be matters for intergovern-

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mental cooperation outside the normal processes of the Community; and that in such areas as the environment, health, education and social policy the Community should act only if the objective cannot be achieved by the member states.

This is the principle of "subsidiarity" about which so much is heard throughout the EC these days. Major's critics are deeply skeptical as to whether it will be implemented, and they point to the extension of the Community's power to act in other fields. They believe that the treaty would inevitably impose more integration. But Major is seeking to interpret it, perhaps to reinterpret it, so as to move the EC in the opposite direction. The significance of this dispute is that both sides are claiming to be the better decentralizers.

V

Another consistent British theme has been that Europe should be organized on the basis of competition and free trade. This does not mean free trade just among the existing 12 members. It is one of the reasons why Britain is more eager than others to bring a number of new applicants into the Community as quickly as possible.

It is sometimes alleged that the cause of enlargement is pressed particularly hard by those who believe that it will prevent the EC from becoming too tightly integrated. There is some truth in this. In the long run the larger the Community, the more flexibility will have to be allowed. But the campaign for enlargement is more than a convenient tactical ploy.

There is a direct line of descent from Churchill's desire to encompass the whole of Europe, to Macmillan's fear of splitting Western Europe when the Common Market was founded, to Thatcher's 1988 remark in her controversial Bruges speech that "We must never forget that east of the Iron Curtain peoples who once enjoyed a full share of European culture, freedom and identity have been cut off from their roots. We shall always look on Warsaw, Prague and Budapest as great European cities." Churchill spoke before the Common Market was contemplated, and Thatcher a year before the Berlin Wall came down and therefore before there was any possibility of any of the former Warsaw Pact countries becoming members.

Since then both Thatcher and Major have spoken of the possibility of the EC extending one day even to Russia. As with Churchill in earlier years such remarks should be taken not as

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specific proposals but as evidence of an attitude. Britain does not want a narrow Community.

When Britain first contemplated joining the Common Market, the question was how it could combine membership with its role in the Commonwealth. Then there came the tension between Britain's place in Europe and its relationship with the United States. Britain's view of its place in the world has changed over the years. It is becoming more European. More people travel there, work there and do business there. Europe matters far more than it did and the Commonwealth far less.

The relationship with the United States still matters. Whether it matters as much as Britain's European connection is immaterial. The British interest lies in not having to choose. The new Europe that Britain needs is one where the member states can be European without being false to their history.

The search for Britain's kind of Europe is in some ways more realistic and more relevant now than in the early days of the European movement when Churchill and his friends were in the vanguard, trying to reconcile France and Germany and to build up the strength of Western Europe.

Today the greatest threat to stability in western Europe lies in the threat of disorder in eastern Europe. The former Yugoslavia, with its growing death count and suffering, is a symptom of what could occur elsewhere in eastern Europe, which might in turn undermine security in the West.

To British eyes it is a matter of self-interest to extend a hand to the fledgling democracies to the east. Yet there is a paradox here. In the Gulf War Britain was one of those most ready to use force and was, indeed, palpably disappointed by the caution of most of its European partners. Now Britain is one of those most reluctant to become militarily engaged in Yugoslavia.

The apparent contradiction comes from a difference in strategic appreciation. The British view is that force can be justified (apart from cases of straightforward self-defense) in pursuit of specific objectives that can be achieved in a limited period of time. Those conditions applied in the gulf and in the Falklands.

In the case of Yugoslavia there is fear of being bogged down in a conflict that can be neither won nor lost, while being shot at from both sides. Therefore the British have placed the emphasis on negotiation as the prerequisite for peace.

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Whether this is a wise judgment or not, it does not indicate any lack of concern about eastern Europe.

VI

Just as Britain wants an open and expanding Community in Europe, it no less wishes to avoid presenting a Fortress Europe to the rest of the world. It was John Major at Maastricht who insisted that industrial policy must still be settled by unanimous agreement among all member governments, thereby reducing the risk of a protectionist policy being foisted on the Community. It was Major again who tried, unavailingly this time, at the Munich summit of the Group of Seven leading industrial nations in July to persuade his Community partners to accept a further reduction in European agricultural subsidies, and so remove the obstacle in the way of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

It is easier, however, for Britain to take this enlightened view because it has a much lower proportion of its work force in agriculture than either France or Germany. It would also stand to suffer particularly badly from any international trade war. Although Britain has shifted its pattern of trade much more to the Community, it still sells a higher proportion of its exports outside Europe than any other member.

The risks of a Fortress Europe now seem to have receded. But protectionist pressures remain, and the devil lies in the details: in the implementation of anti-dumping legislation, for example, and in laying down standards for goods. Agreement on the Uruguay Round would be a critical advance, but any chance of a French compromise will have to wait until after their Maastricht referendum on September 20.

French rejection of the treaty via referendum (its National Assembly has already voted in favor of the treaty) would mark a critical turning point for the Community. No other country is still planning to hold a referendum (the Irish have already had theirs and voted in favor), but doubts about the treaty are much in evidence elsewhere. In Germany there is strong resistance to giving up the Deutsche mark later this decade for a new European Community currency. In Britain the government will not find it easy to steer the ratification bill through its remaining stages in parliament.

Even if Maastricht is finally endorsed by all the member countries, the Danish vote has changed attitudes in many parts

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of the Community. The dangers of excessive centralization of the Community are being widely appreciated.

The present uncertainty gives John Major his opportunity. He is positioning himself so as to stand the best chance of guiding the EC in a more decentralized direction, irrespective of whether the treaty is passed or rejected. He proclaims himself the unflinching friend of Maastricht, the loyal member of the EC who has been steady under fire in a critical position. If the treaty is ratified he will deserve a full share of the credit. If it fails he cannot be blamed by his fellow European leaders (yet they will know that he will find it easy, even congenial, to take an alternative course). In either event he should have a reasonable claim to their trust and attention.

Where Thatcher sought to resist the EC, Major is seeking to remold it, quietly and unostentatiously, into a Community in which Britain can feel more comfortable. It is a delicate maneuver, and he may fail. He may find that he has accepted more centralization than he realizes. He may offend both sides: upsetting his supporters at home by appearing to love Maastricht too much, and angering the more zealous European enthusiasts by being too keen on decentralization. But he is a master of the political smokescreen. At the moment that is both his greatest strength and presents his greatest danger.

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

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

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William G. Hyland

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT 70

By the autumn of 1921 the United States was settling into the postwar era. The conservative Republican administration of Warren G. Harding was taking hold. The Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations had been repudiated by the U.S. Senate. Isolationism was beginning, although the term had not yet been coined.

A number of influential Americans regretted the U.S. refusal to join the League. They believed that one reason for the turn against Wilsonian internationalism was public ignorance not only about the League, but about international affairs in general. This was the background to the formation in July 1921 of the new Council on Foreign Relations. The founding fathers, so to speak, convened in New York City: the honorary president was Elihu Root, a former secretary of state and secretary of war; the president was John W. Davis, a Wall Street lawyer who would run for president of the United States as a Democrat in 1924 against Calvin Coolidge. It was the secretary and treasurer, Edwin F. Gay, former dean of the Harvard Graduate School of Business and president of *The New York Evening Post*, who took the lead in urging that the Council publish its own journal.

In January 1922 Gay approached his Harvard colleague, Archibald Cary Coolidge, a distinguished scholar in Russian studies, with the proposition that "you are the man best fitted to act as editor of this publication." Coolidge had served on the American delegation to the Paris peace conference. Gay also recruited as managing editor Hamilton Fish Armstrong, a young Princeton graduate who had broken into journalism as special correspondent in eastern Europe.

Coolidge was distantly related to the new vice president, Calvin Coolidge, and some who had known the professor in Europe got a little mixed up. A Berlin newspaper commented that the vice president was actually better qualified for leadership than Harding, because of his distinguished academic credentials. Vice President Coolidge took arch delight in

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William G. Hyland leaves the editorship of *Foreign Affairs* with this issue.

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forwarding to Professor Coolidge a congratulatory letter from a Hungarian countess who requested that, as vice president, he could make England pay certain claims to her family.

Professor Coolidge stipulated that he would edit the magazine from Cambridge, while Armstrong in New York would oversee the publication. Coolidge also prevailed upon the Council to establish a small endowment to guarantee that the magazine would be published for at least five years. Armstrong estimated that circulation might reach 2,500 during the first year (it turned out to be closer to 5,000).

II

The first issue appeared in the fall of 1922, dated September 15. On the cover was the original subtitle: An American Quarterly Review, and the original colophon, a man on horseback with the watchword "ubique," meaning everywhere.[1] The issue cost $1.25, and included an editorial statement drafted by Coolidge:

> In pursuance of its ideals *Foreign Affairs* will not devote itself to the support of any one cause, however worthy. Like the Council on Foreign Relations from which it has sprung, it will tolerate wide differences of opinion.

Through the years Coolidge, Armstrong and their successors published authors ranging from Leon Trotsky to W.E.B. DuBois, to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Richard M. Nixon and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.

In the first issue the president emeritus of Harvard, Charles W. Eliot, wrote an article urging that the United States join the League immediately, and Coolidge struggled over an assessment of Russia's international position. "By sitting up till two o'clock for the last couple of evenings," the scholarly editor advised his journalist deputy, "I have managed to get theoretically to the end of my Russian article. The last paragraph is a mess."

A copy of that first issue was sent to a representative of the Red Cross in Russia, who passed it to Karl Radek, one of the leading Bolsheviks, who in turn gave it to Lenin himself. The first Bolshevik leader annotated and underlined passages in the journal, mainly economic statistics. Radek eventually re-

[1]Or at least that is what Mr. Armstrong understood the Latin word to mean. Rudyard Kipling, in a poetic ode to the Royal Artillery, wrote: "There's nothin' this side 'Eaven or 'Ell [that] Ubique doesn't mean!"

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turned the annotated copy to the Council's library in New York City. Seventy years later it was shown to Mikhail Gorbachev, who remarked upon the ill fate that eventually befell Radek—shot in 1938.

We chose not to remind Gorbachev that *Foreign Affairs* had also published articles by Trotsky, then in exile, and Nikolai Bukharin, before he was purged. In 1959 Armstrong published an article by Nikita Khrushchev, entitled "On Peaceful Coexistence," and in Spring 1992 *Foreign Affairs* published an essay by the first foreign minister of the post-communist Russian Republic, Andrei Kozyrev.

For all the attention to the Soviet Union the clear focus of the journal's initial decade was on broad questions of the struggle for European security. Preoccupation with reparations and war debts received major coverage. Amid all the pious hopes for a more peaceful world in the early pages of *Foreign Affairs*, Coolidge warned in October 1925 that sooner or later German demands would have to be accommodated. That first decade of the journal was, in fact, a tragic decade, ending with the Great Depression that drove America further into isolation and opened the way for Adolf Hitler in Europe.

III

Hamilton Fish Armstrong succeeded to the editorship after Coolidge's death in 1928. His view of Europe was optimistic, but the journal conveyed a consistent foreboding about Asia. Several articles, some by Japanese authors, warned of Japan's discontent with the postwar settlement and its humiliation by the restrictive American immigration laws. Once the Manchurian crisis broke in 1931–32, *Foreign Affairs* gave Henry L. Stimson, secretary of state for President Hoover, a forum for explaining his policy of nonrecognition of territorial gains from aggression.[2] A. Lawrence Lowell, the president of Harvard, warned against interpreting the Kellogg-Briand pact as a basis for intervention.[3]

By the end of the journal's first full decade, in the fall of 1932, the hopes of the mid-1920s had expired and the world faced the grim realities of the Depression and the arrival of fascism and militarism in both Europe and Asia. Walter

[2]"The Pact of Paris: Three Years of Development," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1932, pp. i–ix.
[3]"Manchuria, the League, and the United States," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1932, pp. 351–368.

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Lippmann, writing in the tenth anniversary issue of *Foreign Affairs*, summed up the failure of liberal internationalism:

> Ten years ago, when this journal was founded, mankind had just been made acutely conscious of the need of more dependable international government. At Paris, in the winter of 1919, drastic reforms in the organization of international society were instituted and certain ideals were proclaimed towards which, it was hoped and believed, mankind would advance. . . . In the perspective of a tumultuous decade it is possible now to examine that philosophy and with the hindsight of experience to see how ephemeral were many of the cardinal ideas with which men tried to promote a better international order.[4]

A plaintive footnote to history came in this same issue, an accounting by Leo Pasvolsky that showed the United States was still owed about $20 billion in war debt, a debt never to be repaid.

The United States was becoming a "hermit nation," in Gay's phrase.[5] Congress escaped further into isolation with the passage of several neutrality laws between 1935 and 1937. For all the popular sentiment in favor of such legislation, the editor of *Foreign Affairs*, along with his co-author, Allen Dulles, then a practicing lawyer, concluded that laws on neutrality were not enough:

> As a guaranty that we shall be able to keep out of war it is entirely inadequate. . . . International trouble-makers are trying to convince themselves that the United States will never do more than give lip service to the cause of peace, that it would not be a factor to be reckoned with unless it were directly attacked. They believe that they can count on a passivity which, as history and current observation show, is quite alien to the American temper. The question is, how can we make them aware of this, and do it effectively and in time?[6]

The United States did not in fact make its weight felt, and Hitler kept to his inexorable march toward war. The "armistice at Munich," as Armstrong described it, proved a failure. In a long 94-page appraisal, published just three months after the agreement, Armstrong wrote of appeasement:

> Might not Mr. Chamberlain have done better to adopt a motto implying more reciprocity than 'appeasement'?. . . Would a bolder choice of the sort

[4] "Ten Years: Retrospect and Prospect," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1932, p. 51.
[5] "The Great Depression," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1932, p. 540.
[6] "Legislating Peace," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1938, p. 12.

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Seventy Years of *Foreign Affairs:* A Portfolio



1922
The first issue, dated September 15, 1922. In an editorial statement the editor expressed his belief "that there is a place as yet unfilled for a review whose dominant purpose is to promote the discussion of current questions of international interest and to serve as the natural medium for the expression of the best thought" on these topics.

The founding fathers of the Council on Foreign Relations and *Foreign Affairs*: Edwin F. Gay (left), the first dean of Harvard Graduate School of Business (and originator of its case method of instruction) was the Council's first secretary and treasurer. He took the lead in urging the Council to publish its own journal and personally recruited Archibald Cary Coolidge and Hamilton Fish Armstrong as editor and managing editor. Elihu Root (center), a former secretary of state and secretary of war, was the Council's honorary president, and its president was John W. Davis (right), a Wall Street lawyer who was the Democratic candidate against Calvin Coolidge in 1924.



1922
Founding editor Archibald Cary Coolidge, a Harvard scholar in Russian studies and a distant relative of Calvin Coolidge, edited the journal until his death in 1928.

1925
Historian and political activist W.E.B. DuBois wrote on the role of racism—"the color line"—in the origins of the First World War, and its legacy in international relations.

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1928
The year Franklin D. Roosevelt delivered his speech at the Democratic convention nominating Alfred Smith for president and waged a successful four-week campaign for governor of New York, he published an article in *Foreign Affairs* on the Democrats' view of foreign policy.



1934
The exiled Leon Trotsky wrote on autarchy in his article "Nationalism and Economic Life" for the April 1934 issue.

1932
Journalist Walter Lippmann contributed several articles to the magazine over the years. In the Tenth Anniversary issue he summed up the failure of liberal internationalism.

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1935
Dorothy Thompson, the outspoken political columnist and wife of novelist Sinclair Lewis, was a strong opponent of isolationism in the late 1930s. She wrote three articles for *Foreign Affairs* between 1935 and 1940 on Nazism and German culture. Here she testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1939 against the Neutrality Act.

1935
In his July 1935 article, "Civilization on Trial," English novelist and historian H. G. Wells wrote, "The choice before us is war or a new world—a rational liberal collectivist world with an ever rising standard of life and an ever bolder collective enterprise."

1947
Anthony Eden, earl of Avon, British foreign secretary and prime minister, authored three articles between 1947 and 1961.

1945
John W. Davis, first president of the Council on Foreign Relations; R.C. Leffingwell, a Council director from 1927 to 1960; Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius; and Editor Hamilton Fish Armstrong.

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1947
The magazine's landmark article, *The Sources of Soviet Conduct*, elucidated what came to be known as the policy of containment. It was written under the pseudonym "X" by George F. Kennan (shown here on the day he was sworn in as U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1952), who went on to write numerous (signed) articles over the next five decades.



1953
Allen W. Dulles, known as "America's spymaster," was appointed by Eisenhower as the first civilian director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He contributed eleven articles between 1927 and 1947.

1957
Senator John F. Kennedy (shown here with his brother Robert) contributed "A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy" to the October 1957 issue, the year he won the Pulitzer Prize for *Profiles in Courage.*





1954
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles authored a total of seven articles between 1922 (in the very first issue) and 1957. He is shown here with West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, himself an author of articles in 1953, 1955 and 1962.

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

1959
Nikita Khrushchev's "On Peaceful Coexistence" was the lead article in the October 1959 issue. The next issue featured "Peaceful Coexistence: A Western View" by George Kennan.



1960
Dean Rusk's article "The President" appeared in April 1960, seven months before the election that put JFK in office. He served as secretary of state in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.



1963
Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru contributed two articles to *Foreign Affairs* in 1938 and 1963. His daughter Indira Gandhi wrote on "India and the World" in the Fiftieth Anniversary issue in 1972.

1965
Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger, two of the magazine's most prolific contributors, at the Council on Foreign Relations.

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Hamilton Fish Armstrong, editor from 1928 to 1972. In 1922, as a young Princeton graduate who had entered journalism as a special correspondent in Eastern Europe, he had been named Coolidge's managing editor.



William P. Bundy, editor from 1972 to 1984, had served in the Johnson administration as assistant secretary for Far Eastern Affairs.

1973
Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir wrote an article on Israel's search for peace in the April 1973 issue. She is shown here with John J. McCloy, one of the "Wise Men" of foreign affairs, who advised every president from F.D.R. to Ronald Reagan, was Council chairman from 1953 to 1970 and authored three articles for the magazine.

1976
At the State Department one month after the presidential election, Henry Kissinger met with Cyrus Vance, who would succeed him as secretary of state. Twelve years later the two collaborated on "Bipartisan Objectives for American Foreign Policy," in the Summer 1988 issue.

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1980
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's "Misconceptions about Russia Are a Threat to America" appeared in the Spring 1980 issue. He is shown here at the 1978 Harvard commencement, his first major speech in this country after his exile from the U.S.S.R.

1982
Gerard C. Smith, McGeorge Bundy and Robert S. McNamara, shown here receiving the Albert Einstein Peace Prize, were the authors with George F. Kennan of "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance" in the Spring 1982 issue, which argued for a U.S. policy prohibiting a first use of nuclear weapons.



1984
Secretary of State George Shultz, Winston Lord, former Council president and U.S. ambassador to China in the Reagan and Bush administrations, and David Rockefeller, former chairman of the Council. All three have written for *Foreign Affairs*.

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Richard M. Nixon contributed "Superpower Summitry" in 1985 and "American Foreign Policy: The Bush Agenda" in 1989. In 1967, before he was a presidential candidate, he caused a sensation with his article "Asia After Vietnam," anticipating a more conciliatory policy toward China.

1991
James A. Baker, III, the latest in a long line of secretaries of state who have written for *Foreign Affairs*, provided an overview of U.S. policy toward Asia in the Winter 1991/92 issue.

1991
Andrei Kozyrev, the first foreign minister of the post-communist Russian Republic, wrote in the Spring 1992 issue on prospects for Russia's survival.

1992
William G. Hyland, editor from 1984 to 1992, shows Mikhail Gorbachev a copy of the first issue of *Foreign Affairs*, which had been annotated by Lenin's own hand.

Credits

Photo Research:
Joan Menschenfreund

Text: David Kellogg

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The Bettmann Archive (DuBois); Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (Roosevelt); UPI/Bettmann (Lippmann, Trotsky, Eden, Dulles/Adenauer, Khrushchev, Nehru, Kissinger/Vance); AP/Wide World (Thompson, Wells, Kennan, Rusk, Solzhenitsyn, Smith *et al.*, Nixon, Baker); John F. Kennedy Library (the Kennedys); Tracy Litt/Council on Foreign Relations Archive (first issue, Hyland/Gorbachev); Ken Levinson/Council on Foreign Relations Archive (Kozyrev); Robert F. Rodriguez/Council on Foreign Relations Archive (Shultz/Lord/Rockefeller); G.D. Hackett/Council on Foreign Relations Archive (Armstrong); J. Hampl/Council on Foreign Relations Archive (Allen Dulles). All other photographs from the Council on Foreign Relations Archive.

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of a world in which Englishmen have traditionally shown that they do positively like to live, rather than acquiescence in the idea that they must live in a different sort of world 'whether they like it or not,' have won the former and staved off the latter? The possibility is suggestive for Americans who see some such eventual choice before them too.[7]

Hermann Rauschning, a former colleague of Hitler's who had broken loose, summed up the inevitability of war:

Compromise, for National Socialism, is death. The alternatives facing it were and are total success or total capitulation. One or the other. Any retreat abroad would at once create difficulties at home that would lead to the regime's collapse. From it, then, one could and can expect nothing but an unwavering advance along the road on which it set out—the road to hegemony over Europe and to world revolution.[8]

Finally, on the very eve of the Blitzkrieg against France, journalist Dorothy Thompson, confessing her "frustrated love" for Germany, wrote at length of the German character and concluded that:

Germany is greater than Hitler esteems her to be and Russia is greater than Stalin esteems her. One cannot avoid recognizing that the West confronts the greatest danger in her whole history. . . . The West must save itself from destruction. Its awakening may accompany or follow the war. It has not yet come. But we who love the West, and yearn for a Germany integrated with the West, have faith that it will.[9]

Prophetic words indeed, though they took decades to come about. Ms. Thompson's faith was eventually justified. Germany would be integrated into Europe, and Russia would finally surmount Stalinism.

IV

The twentieth anniversary of *Foreign Affairs* found America deep into World War II. Hanson W. Baldwin, military correspondent for *The New York Times*, summed up the situation after Pearl Harbor:

In less than 90 days the strategic picture of the war had been considerably altered. The United Nations had suffered their worst defeats since the fall of France. As spring approached, the short-range prospects were grim.

[7]"Armistice at Munich," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1939, p. 289.
[8]"Hitler Could Not Stop," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1939, p. 12.
[9]"The Problem Child of Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1940, pp. 411–12.

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The Japanese attack . . . enlarged the theater of military operations from a continent to the world. . . . In the fullest sense it is total war.[10]

After the victory it was fear of losing the peace that began to preoccupy Western statesmen. Mr. Armstrong, still the editor of *Foreign Affairs*, had witnessed the Versailles experience at firsthand and warned against a repetition:

The generation which had fought and won [World War I] after comprehending so much in detail, committed the sin of comprehending nothing in the large; and, after performing so many brave and unselfish deeds, committed the sin of failing to insist that they be carried to their logical end. . . . Will the children now go and sin likewise?. . . We from the last generation can tell them, however, how it was done last time, and we can pray that this time they will not miss the chance to use their victory.[11]

Unfortunately the use of victory was stymied by the beginning of the Cold War, though this was not clearly perceived outside the narrow circles of official Washington. And a new dimension of conflict arose to fill the pages of *Foreign Affairs* for decades to come: the control of atomic weapons.

The hope that this terrible new weaponry could somehow be restricted by an international covenant was emphasized, for example, by Caryl P. Haskins, who wrote in 1946 that "international control of atomic energy is the surpassingly important objective of this nation's foreign policy."[12] Allen Dulles, veteran of World War II intelligence, argued in a similar vein, though more skeptically, in January 1947 in his article "Disarmament in the Atomic Age." And Stimson wrote that "the riven atom, uncontrolled, can only be a growing menace to us all."[13] The other side of these pleas was an evolving body of theory on how these awesome weapons might be used in warfare, and more soberly, how they might constitute a deterrent against war itself.

A defining moment of the postwar era came in 1947, with the decision of the Truman administration to launch the Marshall Plan and institute the Truman Doctrine. Washington was shifting to the offensive in an effort to counter the inroads of Soviet power in Europe. The policy reflected the analysis and prescriptions of George F. Kennan, who elucidated what

[10]"America at War: Three Bad Months," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1942, pp. 393–94.
[11]"Last Time," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1945, p. 377.
[12]"Atomic Energy and American Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1946, p. 606.
[13]"The Challenge to Americans," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1947, p. 12.

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came to be known as the policy of containment. This concept surfaced in a *Foreign Affairs* article, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," published in July 1947. Since Mr. Kennan was at that time a member of the State Department's policy planning staff, he preferred to publish under a pseudonym, "X." His identity was quickly revealed by *The New York Times*, but for many years the *Foreign Affairs* editors refused to confirm the name of the author.

The article was a landmark for *Foreign Affairs*: no other article has been as widely read or extensively quoted. Over the years Mr. Kennan came to believe that his concept had been misinterpreted and misapplied as a doctrine of miliary containment of the Soviet Union, whereas he meant to stress a geopolitical concept. In his memoirs published in 1967 he noted that "it was a doctrine that lost much of its rationale with the death of Stalin and with the development of the Soviet-Chinese conflict. I emphatically deny the paternity of any efforts to invoke that doctrine today in the situation to which it has, and can have, no proper relevance."[14]

Kennan was hardly alone in his appreciation of the Soviet threat. In that very same issue of *Foreign Affairs* the British diplomatic historian, Sir Charles K. Webster, surveying the historical process of peacemaking, wrote about the problem of dealing with Russia and the Soviet Union:

> Today peace depends on finding the method by which the Soviet Union, with these bitter memories and with a different scale of values from that of her western Allies, can be induced to accept cooperation rather than conflict. If the experience of 1914–15 is of any value, it goes to show that only a continuation of resistance to undue Russian demands combined with an acceptance of the special claims which history has taught Russia justly to consider fundamental is likely to yield satisfactory results.[15]

Judicious advice gave way to the urgency of the crisis in Europe. The editor of *Foreign Affairs*, having returned from his annual visit to Europe, reminded his readers that while America worried about the atomic bomb and strategic doctrines, Europe's preoccupation was plain and simple:

[14] *Memoirs: 1925–1950*, Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., p. 367.
[15] "Pattern of Peacemaking," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1947, p. 610.

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When you are as worried as Europe is about the bare essentials of existence, you are not much interested in ideas. As for the atom bomb, it is comprehended in Europe even less than in America.[16]

In the period that followed the "X" article the Cold War added a long list of byproducts for *Foreign Affairs* readers, who had to cope with a new alphabet—NATO, SEATO, IMF—and new areas of concern as the Cold War widened beyond eastern Europe. One could still find familiar authors—Hanson W. Baldwin, Barbara Ward Jackson, Raymond Sontag, Henry M. Wriston—but also new ones—Henry Kissinger, John C. Campbell, A. M. Rosenthal—and some world leaders—Paul-Henri Spaak, Lester B. Pearson, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, Habib Bourguiba.

On the occasion of its thirty-fifth anniversary, *Foreign Affairs* was treated to praise in the press. *The New York Times* wrote:

The plain blue-gray covers of that publication are recognized throughout the world as containing authoritative articles on every aspect of international relations, contributed by leading statesmen, politicians, thinkers and writers from the four corners of the globe. . . . Hamilton Fish Armstrong . . . can look on his work with deep satisfaction; and the Council on Foreign Relations, publisher of *Foreign Affairs*, can take well-justified pride in this constantly recurring contribution to American scholarship.

If 1947 was a watershed, then 1957 also qualified as a turning point. It was the year of Sputnik, and it was the start of a long bitter crisis that ended with the most hair-raising confrontation over Cuba, where 42 Soviet missiles were deployed in secret in the fall of 1962.

On the very eve of that confrontation *Foreign Affairs* marked its fortieth anniversary. In a lead article Mr. Armstrong, drawing on his own personal experience, compared the situation in late 1962 with that of 40 years earlier. Among the new factors he noted that the United States had returned to normal relations with its former enemies much earlier; that there was also in existence a much stronger international organization, the United Nations, and, above all, American policy had shifted from the "static to the active, from the conservative to the creative." Considering the crisis that was about to break, Mr. Armstrong offered a pertinent observation:

[16]"Europe Revisited," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1947, p. 537.

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Of course the fundamental change for American diplomacy was that this time the American people as a whole, looking at the world with eyes opened by a second terrible experience, saw that their interests and responsibilities reached to every part of it. This meant that their leaders could enter without hesitation into a policy of active international cooperation; and with the public behind them, they did so. . . . Without steady public backing, a Truman, Eisenhower or Kennedy could not have pursued a strong foreign policy, and if he had tried would have ended like Wilson in frustration.[17]

Armstrong could not know how valid his point would be in the months and years that followed. Strong public support was in some measure crucial to President Kennedy's masterful handling of the Cuban missile crisis. In October 1962 there were no demonstrations, no political hectoring by the opposition party on television, no congressional waffling. But when that same public endorsement faltered in the 1960s, the Vietnam War turned into a political disaster for Kennedy's successors.

Vietnam was also a crisis of sorts for *Foreign Affairs*. By and large ever since Pearl Harbor the editorial content of the journal had seemed in line with the official policy of the United States; to be sure, there were dissenting articles—especially on nuclear affairs—and criticisms—on China policy for example. Vietnam sorely tested the consensus. In a preface to a collection of *Foreign Affairs* articles, written several years later, the editors noted that: "The 'credit' for the movement to discredit the Vietnam War must go largely to those American liberal intellectuals who began fairly early to register their discontent with their country's involvement in Southeast Asia." The problem was aptly summed up in *Foreign Affairs* by Irving Kristol in July 1967:

Our intellectuals are moving toward a significant 'confrontation' with the American 'establishment' and will do nothing to strengthen the position of their antagonist. Which is to say that the American intellectual class actually has an interest in thwarting the evolution of any kind of responsible and coherent imperial policy.

But for any imperial policy to work effectively . . . it needs intellectual and moral guidance. It needs such guidance precisely because, in foreign affairs, one is always forced to compromise one's values. In the United States today, a relative handful of intellectuals proffers such guidance to the policymaker. But the intellectual community en masse, disaffected

[17]"Then and Now," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1962, pp. 7, 12-13.

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from established power . . . feels no such sense of responsibility. It denounces, it mocks, it vilifies.[18]

The domestic crisis worsened. In early 1968 the Tet offensive shocked the nation; it led to Lyndon Johnson's decision to withdraw from the presidential contest in an effort to promote a peaceful resolution in Vietnam. Clark Clifford became secretary of defense in March. In the election campaign of 1968 Nixon suggested that he would find a way to end the war. His soon-to-be-named national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, wrote of the improbability of a military victory and the advisability of a negotiated settlement, with the United States discussing the military issue and the Vietnamese discussing the political problems. But Kissinger also argued for continuing military pressures while negotiating.[19]

After he had left office Clifford wrote for *Foreign Affairs*, outlining a solution. He argued that predictions of progress and of military success had proved "illusory." His prescription boiled down to an initial withdrawal of 100,000 American troops in an effort to convince the Saigon government that South Vietnamese forces would have to bear the brunt of the fighting. Clifford concluded, "Let us start to bring our men home—and let us start *now*."[20]

American forces indeed began to withdraw, but there was no settlement until January 1973. By then Vietnam had become more and more subordinate to the transformation of Great Power relations: between the United States and China, and between Moscow and Washington. Nevertheless, upon his retirement as editor after 44 years, Mr. Armstrong wrote with bitterness in his final article:

The war in Vietnam has been the longest and in some respects the most calamitous war in our history. It has rent the American people apart, spiritually and politically. It is a war which has not been and could not be won, a war which was pushed from small beginnings to an appalling multitude of horrors, many of which we have become conscious of only by degrees. The methods we have used in fighting the war have scandalized and disgusted public opinion in almost all foreign countries.

Not since we withdrew into comfortable isolation in 1920 has the prestige of the United States stood so low.[21]

[18]"American Intellectuals and Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1967, pp. 606–9.
[19]"The Vietnam Negotiations," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1969, pp. 211–234.
[20]"A Vietnam Reappraisal," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1969, p. 622.
[21]"Isolated America," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1972, pp. 1–2.

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Mr. Armstrong's frustration was understandable. His generation had witnessed the disaster of isolation and appeasement in the 1920s and 1930s as well as the heroic efforts of World War II and the severe tests of the Cold War. It must have seemed to him that the lessons of international responsibility that he had always pleaded for were being squandered in southeast Asia.

Yet there was a new trend that he, as editor, had sponsored. In 1967 Richard M. Nixon, not yet a candidate, had written of Asia after Vietnam, and had foreshadowed a more conciliatory policy toward China.[22] Given Nixon's reputation and political alignment this was a small sensation, much discussed after he entered the Oval Office.

V

The new editor of *Foreign Affairs*, William P. Bundy, was well equipped to follow the post-Vietnam trends. He had served in various capacities in the U.S. government, and in the Johnson administration as assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs. Working with him was Mr. Armstrong's last managing editor, James Chace. In his final article for *Foreign Affairs* in 1984 Mr. Bundy detailed some of the important elements that he believed characterized the conduct of U.S. foreign policy during his tenure at the journal from mid-1972 to late 1984.

The Middle East, he wrote, was "the foremost area of concern and danger." During Bundy's editorship Israel and its Arab adversaries fought the 1973 war and the United States worked to negotiate a peace settlement, and later the 1978 Camp David accords with Egypt and Israel. The Iranian Revolution overthrew the pro-American shah, and the anti-Western fundamentalist regime of Ayatollah Khomeini took power, seizing American hostages in a fatal crisis for the Carter administration. In 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon and a multinational peacekeeping force slowly withdrew after terrorist attacks on American and French forces.

Bundy supported the U.S. "moral commitment" to Israel, and saw U.S. policy aimed at "getting Israel accepted, settled down and at peace with the Arab world." This was a bipartisan objective that successive presidential administrations pursued with only "minor and tactical" disagreements. It was not U.S.

[22]"Asia After Vietnam," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1967, pp. 111–125.

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policy, but Arab rejectionism and Israel's resolve to retain the West Bank and Gaza, that obstructed peace: "The tragedy all along has been that at times when one side might have been ready to compromise, the other was not."

Bundy felt that the fall of the shah and the rise of the Islamic republic was "the greatest single setback for U.S. policy and for stability in the Middle East of these dozen years." A related issue was the oil embargo in 1973: the subsequent quadrupling of oil prices made U.S. energy policy a major issue in the pages of *Foreign Affairs*. In 1978 Walter J. Levy wrote that oil-consuming nations needed to develop alternate energy sources, and that the United States needed to discourage often wasteful spending by OPEC members on rapid development and military buildups:

> We cannot much longer afford a situation in which the importing countries waste a substantial part of their energy while the producing countries waste a substantial part of their oil revenues. In the past we have too often been stymied in our efforts to cope with these problems by entrenched national or private interests on all sides. If we should ultimately fail, this period in our history could truly be characterized as 'the years that the locust hath eaten.'[23]

The failure of the United States not only to lead the industrialized nations out of the oil crisis, but even to design an effective national energy policy, was a major factor in the "renewed decline of respect abroad for U.S. policy," Bundy concluded.

Also during Bundy's tenure détente between Moscow and Washington began to die. The coup de grace was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. While he had been skeptical that the Soviets would pass up regional advantages or cancel significant military programs, Bundy argued that congressional opposition had blocked Nixon's and Kissinger's détente strategy. The Jackson and Stevenson amendments to the trade act in 1974, linking trade arrangements to Soviet immigration, were "extraordinarily unwise." Forcing the Soviet Union to make internal changes was likely to meet firm resistance.

While the immediate prospects for arms control seemed poor, Bundy argued for seizing the initiative, to avoid desta-

[23]"The Years that the Locust Hath Eaten: Oil Policy and OPEC Development Prospects," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1978/79, p. 305.

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

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bilizing technological changes and to abandon chimerical searches for strategic advantage, such as the then recently proposed Strategic Defense Initiative. Bundy summed up: "All postwar experience . . . points to the wisdom of a steady intermediate policy that on the one hand recognizes the depth and reality of the rivalry and on the other seeks always to keep the lines of communication open and to negotiate wherever possible."

Another *Foreign Affairs* author, John Lewis Gaddis, deplored the lack of strategic thinking in U.S. policy, and its harmful effect on containment of the Soviet Union.

> We really ought not to go on framing long-term national security policy in response to short-term domestic political expedients, crossing our fingers each time in the hope that the result will relate, in some way, to the external realities we confront, and to our own long-term interests. We ought not to neglect, to the extent that we do, the relationship between national security and the national economy.[24]

The persistence of tension and danger in Third World conflicts prompted considerations of parallels to the Balkans prior to World War I. Miles Kahler's "Rumors of War: The 1914 Analogy" outlined the perils of minor conflicts accidentally escalating into major wars.[25] The two superpowers, wading warily together into the turbulent political waters of the Third World, risked being washed unintentionally into one another with violent consequences.

Bundy saw the Third World conflicts arising from nationalism and the rejection of colonial rule, and the United States, he wrote, also was going against the nationalist trend, intervening in ignorance of the regional source of troubles, in Panama and Nicaragua. He called for a more historically sensitive approach to regional issues, a forward-looking strategic goal of "regions taking responsibility for their own security. . . . In our hearts we know, especially since Vietnam, that the United States cannot be the world's policeman or even that of a given region." And he concluded with remarkable prescience:

> The whole postwar period has been marked by the ending of colonial or quasi-colonial positions no longer compatible with the ethos of the last 40 years or with the felt power and awakened sentiment of the local and

[24]"The Rise, Fall, and Future of Détente," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1983/84, p. 376.
[25]*Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1979/80, pp. 374–396.

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regional nations concerned. In that sense, the Soviet Empire is itself by far the greatest anomaly of all; in the next generation its weakening and possible eventual breakup may become the greatest single source of turbulence the world faces.[26]

One theme that ran through this period was the importance of national economic strength. For Bundy national security and international influence, in the long term, depended as much on relative economic resources and performance, as on comparative military strength. Both the United States and the Soviet Union were ignoring the importance of economic strength, with harmful portent.[27]

Throughout came the perennial tensions between the president and Congress over foreign policy. Bundy wrote:

Over and over again, in this period, Congress has intervened to modify, dictate or obstruct foreign policy actions. . . . One's view of a particular congressional intervention is heavily influenced by personal preference; each of us could pick out many examples (differing to taste) where Congress has acted usefully. But a great many today would surely agree, at a minimum, that the present system is extraordinarily cumbersome and fragmented.[28]

Bundy argued that greater attention should be paid to foreign service and civil service professionals in government. Despite this emphasis on professionalism, Bundy reiterated the theme that had inspired *Foreign Affairs* from the beginning: "In the end it is public opinion that defines, and in our democracy must define, the limits of foreign policy and often its specifics."

Finally, in 1984, Bundy forewarned readers of the difficulties they would face after the end of the Cold War: "We have to resign ourselves to the fact that the wartime and postwar consensus was a condition that could only survive so long as the dominant fact of world politics was a major hostile power threatening clearly vital interests already familiar to us."

Less than a year after this summation Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power in the Soviet Union and began a series of initiatives that sooner, rather than later, would bring an end to the Cold War, an end to Soviet communism and, finally, an end to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

[26]"The Last Dozen Years: What Might We Learn?" *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1984, p. 1225.
[27]"Elements of Power," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1977, pp. 1–26.
[28]"The Last Dozen Years: What Might We Learn," *Op. cit*, pp. 1233–34.

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VI

In 1984 the editorship of *Foreign Affairs* changed for the third time: the new editor was William G. Hyland, veteran of successive administration staffs in the State Department and White House, assisted by executive editor Peter Grose, a former correspondent and editorial writer of *The New York Times*. The years that followed have proved to be a truly revolutionary period in the international politics of the century.

It would be presumptuous to claim that this revolution was foreseen in all its complexities in the pages of *Foreign Affairs*, but there were ample foreshadowings.

The international political climate was tense in late 1984, as the American people approached yet another national election. Leonid Brezhnev was dead, but his successors had continued the confrontational policies that began in Afghanistan. Superpower relations were further aggravated by the Soviet walkout from arms control negotiations, after NATO had decided to deploy American Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe. Prospects for any improvement in the situation were discussed by Professor Robert W. Tucker:

> An improved relationship between the two great nuclear powers is the precondition of virtually any significant measures of arms control. . . . Thus proposals for very deep cuts in nuclear arms—let alone for the abolition of these weapons—are idle unless they assume a relationship that has in all likelihood passed beyond the stage of a mere détente and has become something more intimate and promising. The prospects for this are such that they seem scarcely worth pausing over.[29]

After President Reagan's reelection U.S.-Soviet arms talks resumed, mainly because the Soviet leaders were becoming alarmed at the prospect of a domestic crisis combined with a foreign crisis. However, the direction of U.S. policy during Reagan's second term was the source of continuing debate, centering around the old issue of détente. The division between the conservative right and the moderate center was summarized in *Foreign Affairs* by Norman Podhoretz, on the one hand, and by Leslie H. Gelb and Anthony Lake, on the other.

Podhoretz argued that Reagan risked abandoning the gains

[29]"The Nuclear Debate," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1984, p. 32.

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of his first term by making imprudent concessions to restore détente, in an effort to appease public opinion. Reagan "was more politician than ideologue," Podhoretz wrote:

This at least partly explains why Mr. Reagan in his first term failed to steer the nation away from the course of détente on which it had been moving since 1972 and toward a new strategy of containment aimed, just as the original conception of containment had been, at a prudent encouragement of the forces of disintegration already operating entirely on their own within the Soviet empire.[30]

In contrast Gelb and Lake were encouraged by the perceived turnaround in Reagan's outlook, and supported the resumption of diplomatic efforts, as opposed to what they saw as "an attitude of almost anti-diplomacy" during the first term. They concluded that President Reagan:

is almost uniquely in a position to bring American power to bear and get things accomplished. He has a better chance than any of his post World War II predecessors at quelling opposition from the right. He has succeeded in creating the impression that the United States has turned the tide against the Soviet Union in broad strategic terms.[31]

This impression was reflected in Secretary of State George Shultz's article in the Spring 1985 issue of *Foreign Affairs*.

The United States is restoring its military strength and economic vigor and has regained its self-assurance; we have a president with a fresh mandate from the people for an active role of leadership. The Soviets, in contrast, face profound structural economic difficulties and restless allies; their diplomacy and their clients are on the defensive in many parts of the world.[32]

This sense of confidence in American power enabled the Reagan administration to advance new overtures for improving relations, especially bolder arms control proposals. Shultz called for "a strategy geared to long-term thinking and based on negotiation and strength simultaneously." The secretary saw more than the vindication of administration policy, but a broader triumph for Western values, and in an interesting premonitory remark, stated:

[30]"The Reagan Road to Détente," *Foreign Affairs*, America and the World 1984, p. 461.
[31]"Four More Years: Diplomacy Restored?" *Foreign Affairs*, America and the World 1984, p. 488.
[32]"New Realities and New Ways of Thinking," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1985, p. 707.

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After more than a century of fashionable Marxist mythology about economic determinism and the 'crisis of capitalism' . . . today, in a supreme irony—it is the communist system that looks bankrupt, morally as well as economically. The West is resilient and resurgent.[33]

For Shultz this Western triumph was manifest in the spread of democracy in Latin America and of free enterprise reforms there and in Africa and Asia. But the full affirmation of classical liberalism was to come a few years later. It was ushered in both intentionally and accidentally by a man whose arrival Shultz heralded as "a fresh opportunity" for the United States and the Soviet Union to approach "constructive possibilities."[34]

The accession of Mikhail Gorbachev in March 1985 was the great watershed. Even at this early date it seemed to outside observers to be an opportunity for change in the Soviet Union:

In Moscow, for the first time, the leadership of the Soviet party has passed to a man born after the Bolshevik revolution. Change is in the air. A new generation is taking power.[35]

Gorbachev's plans for the Soviet Union were uncertain, even after he began to outline a policy of "perestroika." In any case the constraints on Soviet policy were apparent.

At some point he will have to grapple with strategic realities. One of those realities is that the Soviet Union finds itself beset with problems: a potential explosion in its decaying East European empire; an endless war in Afghanistan; infectious religious fanaticism along its southern borders; vibrant adversaries in China and Japan. . . . The new leaders in Moscow should also recognize that the 'correlation of forces' that they so carefully assess is no longer favorable to the Soviet Union.[36]

It was in eastern Europe where the world witnessed the decisive turn toward political liberation in that historic autumn of 1989. As Michael Howard put it, "the springtime of nations" blossomed with the abdication of communist rule across eastern Europe.

In 1989, while the nations of Western Europe celebrated the bicentenary of the French Revolution, the nations of Eastern Europe reenacted it. . . .

[33]*Ibid*, p. 720.
[34]*Ibid*, p. 706.
[35]William G. Hyland, "The Gorbachev Succession," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1985, p. 800.
[36]*Ibid*, p. 808.

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Whatever happens, the structure of world politics has been changed, and changed irrevocably. The problems that those changes present to our statesmen are urgent and complex, but never has there been a better opportunity—not in 1945, not even in 1918—to construct a new order that will finally defuse Europe as a focus of world conflict.[37]

The last great bastion of communism broke loose. At first observers were optimistic about the reforms in Chinese politics and economics and more moderate cooperative behavior in China's foreign policy. But, tragically, China would reverse this course with the June 1989 killings at Tiananmen Square and the subsequent nationwide repression. For many Americans, concern over long-term U.S.-China relations was drowned by the flood of outrage at the regime's brutality. Winston Lord, former president of the Council on Foreign Relations and ambassador to China, sought to balance the passion of American convictions for human rights with the reason of American interests in continued diplomacy.

While we must not condone what has happened and is happening in China, we must not totally isolate the Chinese and rip out all the roots that we have so carefully nurtured. We need to find a way to balance our objectives of expressing near-term censure and holding open long-term cooperation with an enlightened leadership.[38]

By 1990 the Cold War was over. The United States was confronted with the need and opportunity to reexamine its foreign policy. A *Foreign Affairs* article stated that:

For the past fifty years American foreign policy has been formed in response to the threat posed by this country's opponents and enemies. In virtually every year since Pearl Harbor, the United States has been engaged either in war or in confrontation. Now, for the first time in half a century, the United States has the opportunity to reconstruct its foreign policy free of most of the constraints and pressures of the Cold War.[39]

It soon became fashionable to argue over the proper "vision," but as America began to reconsider its world role, it was not quite prepared for surprises that defied any carefully crafted foresight.

Saddam Hussein provided one such surprise: the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and the subsequent

[37]"The Springtime of Nations," *Foreign Affairs*, America and the World 1989/90, pp. 17, 32.
[38]"China and America: Beyond the Big Chill," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1989, pp. 12–13.
[39]William G. Hyland, "America's New Course," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1990, p. 12.

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deployment of international forces to defend Saudi Arabia recast the debate over America's global role. Fouad Ajami described the importance of American military power during the crisis.

An old order has passed in the gulf. There is talk of a 'new political order,' but no one knows what this new political order might look like. It is clear that there is a great power standing sentry in the gulf—a power that was on the verge of believing that military force is the thing of the past. . . . The skeptics may say that Operation Desert Shield is something of a rent-a-superpower deal. But the American military presence in the peninsula and the gulf and the cobbling of the American-led coalition were the only viable answers to aggression in an order of states that remains anarchic and vulnerable to the assaults of aggressors like Saddam Hussein.[40]

The dominant role for the United States in Desert Storm led to new ideas about America's place in what President Bush had called "the new world order." Columnist Charles Krauthammer argued that the United States was the unipolar power in the post-Cold War world, and securing international order depended on American leadership.

Compared to the task of defeating fascism and communism, averting chaos is a rather subtle call to greatness. It is not a task we are any more eager to undertake than the great twilight struggle just concluded. But it is just as noble and just as necessary.[41]

In the same issue Michael Mandelbaum wrote that the gulf crisis was an anomaly that distracted attention from the real nature of the new world.

The post-Cold War international agenda is beginning to take shape. It is not likely to be dominated by military confrontations between great nuclear powers, or even by crises like the one in the Persian Gulf. Instead, economic issues will predominate, particularly as formerly communist Europe and countries in other regions move toward market institutions and practices.[42]

This message was echoed by Robert D. Hormats in the Summer 1991 issue.

[40]"The Summer of Arab Discontent," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1990/91, p. 18.
[41]"The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs*, America and the World 1990/91, p. 33.
[42]"The Bush Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, America and the World 1990/91, p. 6.

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If America's economy does falter, so will the underlying source of its international power. Thus this nation's central foreign policy priority in coming years and its central domestic priority must be the same: strengthening the American economy. Unless the United States reinvigorates in this decade the economic roots of its international power, it risks an erosion of self-confidence and of its international leadership at the turn of the century. With a weak economy and a society in conflict over how to allocate slowly growing resources, this nation would find it increasingly difficult to achieve its essential global objectives.[43]

A dangerous coup in Moscow, followed by its collapse in the face of popular opposition, made for another August surprise in 1991. Like the Roman emperor for which that month was named, Gorbachev sought to transform his country. When Gorbachev emerged from the Politburo struggle for leadership in 1985, Seweryn Bialer wrote, he and his closest advisers realized that their country was stagnating:

but they termed it a 'pre-crisis situation.' So although they perceived some crisis of effectiveness in the regime, they did not yet comprehend its depth. They thought the regime only needed reform. Six and a half years later the Soviet Union and Soviet communism were dead.[44]

The official end of the Soviet Union coincided with the fiftieth anniversary of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. It was an odd twist of fate, for it was World War II and the destruction of Japan and Germany that opened the way to the aggressive advances of the U.S.S.R. and its satellites and to the Cold War itself. Now that war also had definitely ended. With that dramatic proclamation on December 8, 1991, in Minsk, America was freed from the threats and fears that had driven its foreign and domestic policies for half a century.[45]

With the end of the major threat to Europe, U.S.-Japan relations and other Asian relationships took on new importance. For years *Foreign Affairs* had warned about America's increasingly fragile relationship with Japan. George R. Packard expressed concern over deteriorating relations and called for the formation of a wisemen's commission of statesmen on each side to develop a plan for improving trade relations, including drafting a "mutual economic security treaty" between the United States and Japan. "If such a treaty could

[43]"The Roots of American Power," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1991, pp. 133–34.
[44]"The Death of Soviet Communism," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1991/92, p. 166.
[45]William G. Hyland, "The Case for Pragmatism," *Foreign Affairs*, America and the World 1991/92, p. 38.

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provide freedom from anxieties and paranoia, the entire relationship could move away from the prevailing acrimony toward closer collaboration."[46]

In the Spring 1986 issue Ezra F. Vogel predicted "a pattern of limited and uneven Pax Nipponica." The danger as seen by Vogel and others was that Japan would pursue "neomercantilist objectives."[47] With the end of the Cold War there was a growing appreciation that U.S.-Japan relations were based on obsolete concepts. Richard Holbrooke wrote:

> Each side will have to change certain attitudes deeply engraved into their national subconscious in the half century since December 7, 1941. The United States will need to accept a Japan that carries out an independent foreign policy and no longer automatically follows the American lead on international issues. Japan will need to recognize the necessity of true equality of market access between the two nations and avoid the temptation to seek complete domination of the East Asian region. Japan will also have to learn how to treat other nations as equals.[48]

This opinion was reflected by Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, in his overview of U.S. policy toward Asia.

> The keystone of our engagement in East Asia and the Pacific is our relationship with Japan. . . . But U.S.-Japan relations have changed profoundly over the past decade. Our dealings have become more equal, and their form and substance must now be adjusted to reflect this reality if we are to address the sources of tension.[49]

VII

As *Foreign Affairs* celebrates its seventieth anniversary we see some parallels between the 1920s, when the journal was founded, and the 1990s. The United States had participated in a great victory in 1918. Then the nation was challenged to redefine itself, both at home and abroad. Two horrendous choices were made: at home, the progressivism of Wilson, Theodore Roosevelt and the elder LaFollette was rejected in the name of a new prosperity promised by Harding and

[46]"The Coming U.S.-Japan Crisis," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1987/88, p. 366.
[47]"Pax Nipponica?" *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1986, p. 767.
[48]"Japan and the United States: Ending the Unequal Partnership," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1991/92, p. 57.
[49]"America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1991/92, p. 9.

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Coolidge; abroad, the internationalism of Wilson was rejected in favor of a new isolationism.

The first mistake led inexorably to the Great Depression and, with it, untold misery. The second mistake led to World War II and the deaths of millions.

With the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War, America is in the process of once again redefining itself. We are fortunate that in 1992 there are no Hardings, and that the outcome in this year's presidential primaries routed any revival of isolationism. Yet, as in the 1920s, the desire to shift priorities from foreign to domestic affairs is also manifest. Finding a workable balance is one of the underlying issues of this presidential campaign.

Important differences distinguish these two periods: in the 1920s there was a superficial optimism; in 1992 there is a pessimism that seems to be more than a passing phase. In the 1920s the country was becoming more urban, more sophisticated, better fed, better educated and seemingly more prosperous. Now for the first time in American history it is an open question whether the next generation of Americans will in fact be better off than their parents.

Seventy years ago it seemed that the good times would never end. The editor of *Foreign Affairs* wrote in 1923: "The position of America among the nations was imposing. In power and wealth she stood first." Today we debate whether America is in "decline."

In 1924, when Calvin Coolidge carried 35 states to win the presidential election, it seemed that peace and prosperity were permanent conditions. Foreign policy was not even an issue. Just four years later the United States, along with other nations, agreed simply to outlaw war—the Kellogg-Briand pact, which Senator Carter Glass, Democrat of Virginia, called "worthless, but perfectly harmless."

In its determination to turn inward and exorcise the ghosts of the Great War, the United States virtually abandoned any pretense of a serious foreign policy. It cannot afford to do so again.

To be sure, the dangers of the 1990s do not even approximate the threats of the 1930s, or for that matter the more recent risks of the early 1980s. The challenges for American foreign policy may seem rather prosaic, albeit elusive and subtle. They range from places as familiar as Sarajevo, to subjects as novel as global warming. As the pages of this

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journal have indicated for the past several issues, defining what constitutes a "new world order" will not be as easy as it seemed after the victory in Desert Storm. Surely a crucial step continues to be a critical examination of the issues as the basis for genuine debate. That is where a journal such as this one can still play the role for which it was created.

As the eighth decade of *Foreign Affairs* begins, there will be another presidential election. It will be the first election since the end of the Cold War. It should be a moment for sober reflection about the nation's new course, but also a time for some self-congratulation, by the candidates, by the parties, but above all by the American people. The dark age of the world that began on a Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, is finally over.

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THE CHAIRMAN: JOHN McCLOY AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN ESTABLISHMENT. By Kai Bird. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992, 800 pp. $30.00.

SPANNING THE CENTURY: THE LIFE OF W. AVERELL HARRIMAN, 1891–1986. By Rudy Abramson. New York: William Morrow, 1992, 699 pp. $25.00.

These are three important biographies. Although the Cold War is over, there is still much to learn, understand and interpret. Pending the opening of the Kremlin archives, the most fertile field for investigation is "the life and times," that is, biographies of the major figures, and not only the presidents. While no new startling facts are likely to be revealed about the American side, recreating the ambience of the early years of the Cold War may open some new historical understanding, especially in light of the inevitable next wave of revisionism.

It is therefore a happy coincidence that we have before us three large biographies of men who helped shape the wartime as well as the postwar national security policies of the United States. This period, which began with Pearl Harbor and lasted until the inauguration of Richard Nixon, was dominated by the so-called establishment. If there was in fact such an establishment, then three of its key figures in the early years were John J. McCloy, James Forrestal and Averell Harriman.

Born in the 1890s, their backgrounds were quite different. McCloy and Forrestal came from modest circumstances, but both rose to prominence before World War II: McCloy as a partner in a prestigious New York law firm and Forrestal in the upper reaches of a large New York financial institution. Harriman of course was born to great wealth and was the bearer of a famous name. Ostensibly Republicans, they were drawn to Washington to work for Franklin Roosevelt. McCloy was recruited as an assistant secretary of war by Henry Stimson in 1940; Forrestal became undersecretary of the navy, brought in by Frank Knox and Roosevelt; Harriman, after dabbling in the New Deal, was appointed special emissary to the British government by Roosevelt.

Forrestal forged slightly ahead when he became secretary of the navy, and later the first secretary of defense. Oddly enough, after the war Forrestal started as a strong opponent of the creation of the new consolidated defense department. He succeeded in watering down the final legislation, to protect his beloved navy, but came to regret it when Truman appointed him to the office. He found that his handiwork made it difficult

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for him to stop the service rivalries and to shape a cohesive instrument. He was more successful in propagating the view of the young George F. Kennan and his doctrine of containment; in this sense Forrestal was, as his biographers put it, the Godfather of Containment. In the end, out of frustration with the quarreling in the defense department, under pressure to fashion a much-reduced military budget and worried about the failure of Washington to appreciate the Russian threat, he broke down and killed himself. Unfortunately he was succeeded by Louis Johnson, who nearly wrecked Forrestal's creation.

Harriman's career spanned a much longer period, ending only in 1969. He is best remembered, however, as wartime ambassador to Moscow; he later served as leader of the Marshall Plan in Europe and then as secretary of commerce under Truman. An active contender for the presidential nomination that eventually went to Adlai Stevenson, Harriman was elected governor of New York in 1954. In limbo during the Eisenhower period, he returned to serve both Kennedy and Johnson; his final mission, to work for a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam War, ended in failure. He never returned to active political service, though he remained a force in Washington circles.

McCloy's career was less flamboyant; indeed he made a virtue of humility but, as his biographer reiterates, he became the effective "chairman" of the establishment, advising every president through Reagan. His principal achievement was as high commissioner for Germany in the years that ended the allied military occupation and transformed West Germany into a legitimate member of the Western community.

All three men were driven by a strong sense of patriotism, galvanized by the war. After the war, however, they had become so mesmerized by public service that they could not return to their private professions. Forrestal was so obsessed with his office that he finally had to be relieved by Truman. Harriman always seemed to be between assignments. McCloy returned to his law practice, but only temporarily, and he was soon back in Washington as chairman of the World Bank.

Though reasonably ambitious, they had an unusual ability to organize themselves and their associates and to accomplish their missions. The key was their self-assurance, but they also possessed a high sense of duty. Even when overruled they proceeded; and they were often overruled. They did not actively seek power so much as power flowed their way as they made themselves indispensable to the men they served. Kennedy, for example, was reluctant to use Harriman, but within two years Harriman was in Moscow negotiating the first limited ban on nuclear tests with Khrushchev. That agreement still stands.

Nevertheless it would be wrong to see them simply as prominent members of the establishment. Harriman was of the moderate left, despite his capitalist roots; throughout his life he could never quite shake the conviction that a negotiated settlement with Moscow was possible. Forrestal, on the other hand, had "socialist" leanings as a young man but moved to the right and became one of the most strident anticommunists. He did not have the intellectual capacity to work his way to a comprehensive strategy of his own; hence his attraction to the already crafted Kennan thesis.

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McCloy was closer to the center; the main criticism of him was that he was too willing to serve the rich and famous and to tell his mentors what they wanted to hear. But McCloy argued near the end of the war for warning the Japanese before dropping the first atomic bomb. Forrestal had no qualms on that score but feared that Japan might be driven into the arms of the Soviet Union. He was highly skeptical of the Baruch plan for controlling atomic weapons, which McCloy had helped prepare.

Their influence began to wane under Truman. Indeed at Potsdam, Harriman, McCloy and Forrestal were uninvited attenders who spent their time chatting among themselves and sightseeing outside the conference while Jimmy Byrnes advised Truman—not exactly testimony to the power of the establishment.

The biographies of Forrestal and Harriman are quite sympathetic, well written, thoroughly researched and documented. Rudy Abramson, a *Los Angeles Times* journalist, benefited from access to various Harriman papers and archives; Douglas Brinkley and Townsend Hoopes benefited from interviews, including with Forrestal's late son, Michael; Hoopes had also worked for Forrestal in the Defense Department. Both books are informative and comprehensive, but the reader never really comes to understand Forrestal's increasingly vehement anticommunism or Harriman's conversion from a Republican businessman to a loyal New Dealer. There is a hint that Harriman's career was somehow driven by the ghost of his powerful father, E.H. Harriman; Brinkley and Hoopes speculate that Forrestal spent his life running away from his humble origins, including Catholicism, a lifelong flight that ended in suicide.

But the inner character of both men remains something of a mystery even after these heavy 500-page biographies. This may be a blessing, since such an understanding would undoubtedly have led the writers into psychobabble, which mercifully they avoid.

Bird does attempt to come to grips with the public McCloy and offers judgments on many issues based on his view of McCloy's capitulation to peer pressures. Yet it is a curious biography. For example Bird dwells on the internment of Japanese-Americans after Pearl Harbor; his discussion seems fair and balanced but suddenly he blames McCloy for the decisions, though his own text suggests it was a more complicated decision approved on two occasions by Roosevelt and Stimson. The same pattern marks Bird's narrative of the decision not to bomb the camps and rail lines around Auschwitz, a failure he blames on McCloy. Bird's interpretation of McCloy's role in Germany is to blame him for American agencies collaborating with former Nazis, including indirectly Klaus Barbie. It is a very, very long stretch to link McCloy's tenure as high commissioner for Germany with Barbie's secret work for American army intelligence. Moreover in some of his conclusions Bird relies on questionable sources, such as D.F. Fleming, who are scarcely up to date or reliable.

The Forrestal biography is somewhat too episodic, and the chronology occasionally leaves the reader confused. The Harriman biography is perhaps a bit too relentless, without any pauses for summing up Harriman's views; thus the real Averell Harriman may have eluded the writer's net.

All three books are too long. They reflect the new biographic technique

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of overwriting: every time a name or event is mentioned the authors feel compelled to explain at some length, while the principal subject waits on the sidelines.

Nevertheless these are three significant contributions, well worth reading, especially if one prefers to imbibe history through personal stories rather than the more standard diplomatic and political histories. One hopes that somewhere there are biographers at work on Dean Acheson, on the Dulles brothers, John Foster and Allen, and Robert Lovett.

THE END OF THE COLD WAR: ITS MEANING AND IMPLICATIONS. Edited by Michael J. Hogan. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 275 pp. $44.95 (paper, $13.95).

This is a stimulating collection of essays mainly by diplomatic historians. Most of them appeared in *Diplomatic History*, the admirable journal of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations, which Michael Hogan also edits. They tend toward the revisionist side, but are sufficiently diverse to arouse the reader's interest. As Raymond Garthoff notes in his own essay: "It was the Soviet threat, real or imagined, that generated the American dedication to waging the Cold War. . . . The revisionist interpretation errs in attributing initiative and design to American diplomacy, but it is not entirely wrong."

GEORGE F. KENNAN AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1947–1950. By Wilson D. Miscamble. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press, 1992, 419 pp. $35.00.

Another book about George Kennan would seem redundant, but this volume is a good analytical examination of American foreign policy as seen through the lens of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, which Kennan led from 1947 until 1950. As such it embraces much more than the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The author insists that there was no grand design to American policy in these years, but one is impressed by the pervasive and lucid intellect of Ambassador Kennan.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE COLD WAR. By John Lewis Gaddis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992, 285 pp. $24.95.

A collection of the author's essays, most of which have already appeared elsewhere, but have been revised. Well worth perusing nevertheless. The last essay, "Toward the post-Cold War World," is a stimulating examination of the conflict between the traditional desire for international integration and new forces of fragmentation, so obviously now at work in Europe.

KISSINGER: A BIOGRAPHY. By Walter Isaacson. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992, 711 pp. $30.00.

The first full-scale biography of the former secretary of state that examines not only his public life and policy but his origins and his activities since leaving office. While not an "authorized" biography, the author enjoyed some access to many of Kissinger's friends and colleagues (including this reviewer), as well as to Kissinger's family. This does not mean that the book is uncritical; on the whole the author strives for and achieves a balanced objectivity, though this reviewer would disagree with some of his judgments about policy. Written with an engaging flair, it suffers slightly from the journalist's tendency to write episodes. For a new generation of

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readers, for whom these years are fading into genuine history, it is "must" reading. It is likely to stand as the definitive biography, at least until more of the Kissinger, Nixon and Ford papers become available to scholars.

General: Political and Legal

Andrew J. Pierre

TRADITIONS AND VALUES IN POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY. By Kenneth W. Thompson. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992, 341 pp. $37.50 (paper, $12.95).

Thompson is one of the best teachers still active from the postwar generation of scholars that developed the discipline of international relations. In this finely crafted work he touches upon many aspects of world politics—the role of moral standards in diplomacy, the relationship between power and ethics, human rights, peace studies as a field and the debate between realism and idealism in international relations theory, to name only a few. The actions and policies of five presidents (Lincoln, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon) are viewed through the fine prism of the values they held and the choices they made. Thompson provides a wealth of thought and a good deal of wisdom. What makes this book such pleasurable and profitable reading is not the novelty of the issues addressed but the cultivated, intelligent mind that leads the discussion.

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE US-USSR AND MIDDLE EAST CASES. By Louis Kriesberg. New Haven (CT): Yale University Press, 1992, 275 pp. $35.00.

A sociologist at Syracuse University, the author has long been a student of conflict resolution. In this enterprising and successful study he takes the Soviet-American rivalry of the postwar decades and the Arab-Israeli conflict as laboratories to examine how international conflicts can be reduced. This leads to the identification of steps toward deescalation—ways to initiate negotiations, choose issues and reach implicit as well as explicit agreements. The role of inducements is discussed, as is the creation of "ripeness" for settlement. Conflict termination is correctly seen as an elaborate and subtle process in which the wider environment of international politics often has a determining influence. This is a significant contribution to scholarship.

EXPANDING THE FRONTIERS: SUPERPOWER INTERVENTION IN THE COLD WAR. By Karen A. Feste. New York: Praeger, 1992, 232 pp. $45.00.

In converse to the book above, this work looks at how nations get drawn into intervening abroad, thereby creating conflict. Soviet and American intervention, mainly in the Third World, is examined. Such interventions are seen as having expanded the frontiers of the Cold War. What a reading of Feste makes clear is that Moscow and Washington were pursuing their own agendas in these Third World escapades, looking through their own ideological prisms, and often with inadequate understanding of local conditions where the interventions took place. Although an interesting and well-conceived study, the momentous transformations of the past three years already give it an antiquated feel.

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THE END OF SOVEREIGNTY? THE POLITICS OF A SHRINKING AND FRAGMENTING WORLD. By Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk. Aldershot (Hants, UK): Edward Elgar, 1992, 312 pp. (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, distributor, $62.95).

In questioning the relevance of past notions of state sovereignty for the more complex world of the future, these two Australian authors have hit on the head one of the more intriguing aspects of the fast-changing international landscape. Be it globalization of economies, diffusion of technology or multipolarity of security concerns, territorial boundaries are coming to matter a good deal less. Accordingly national sovereignty will have to be redefined. This book sets out more to state the problems than to suggest answers, but it is probably the best we can do in our current thinking, and is therefore a welcome contribution.

BRAVE MODERN WORLD: THE PROSPECTS FOR SURVIVAL. By Jean Chesneaux. New York: Thames & Hudson (Norton), 1992, 191 pp. $22.50.

The title is caustic, for this long essay could more correctly be characterized as being about the failure of modernity. The author is a distinguished French intellectual. Though retired he retains a trenchant eye for the idiosyncracies and, he would say, idiocies of the new technologically driven world culture. Chesneaux takes the reader with him on his travels to the corners of the world, where he finds much to deplore. His pessimism may well be fashionable in some Parisian salons, and often he has a good point, but the stream of criticism, often highly personal, may lead the reader to ask, who cares?

General: Military, Scientific and Technological

Gregory F. Treverton

FROM OCCUPATION TO COOPERATION: THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED GERMANY IN A CHANGING WORLD ORDER. Edited by Steven Muller and Gebhard Schweigler. New York: Norton, 1992, 288 pp. $24.95 (paper, $10.95).

The contributors to this American Assembly-Atlantik Brücke volume could hardly be more distinguished, ranging from Paul Nitze, a founder of the German-American connection, to Robert Blackwill, who recently managed it. By its nature this nicely edited volume contains more good sense than striking innovation, but there is plenty of insight: Karl Kaiser on "domesticism"—the temptations of both America and Germany to turn inward; Christoph Bertram on the spill-back of troubles in Europe's east to its west, Germany in particular; and Robert Blackwill on the near inevitability that America's influence over Europe's security will wane despite its continuing value.

IN SEARCH OF A NEW WORLD ORDER: THE FUTURE OF U.S.-EUROPEAN RELATIONS. Edited by Henry Brandon. Washington: Brookings, 1992, 171 pp. $19.95.

Brandon's authors are just as distinguished as in the volume above; they are all Europeans save James Schlesinger (and Brandon himself, an Englishman long on this side of the Atlantic as Washington correspondent

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for the London *Sunday Times*). They paint their picture of Europe post-Maastricht in broad strokes. Their tone is optimistic, but Brandon cautions, presciently in light of subsequent events, that progress will be slower than Maastricht indicated and Michel Rocard predicts (and David Owen fears). Michel Stürmer reiterates the value of Europe's American connection, but Schlesinger, like Blackwill, foresees that connection becoming less intimate. He criticizes the Bush administration for resisting efforts by Europeans themselves to get together in foreign policy or defense.

ON INTERNAL WAR: AMERICAN AND SOVIET APPROACHES TO THIRD WORLD CLIENTS AND INSURGENTS. By William E. Odom. Durham (NC): Duke University Press, 1992, 271 pp. $29.95.

The end of the Cold War has, after some delay, diminished the stream of works on strategy. It makes Odom's intriguing analysis of primarily historical interest. He aims to examine U.S.-Soviet competition in what used to be called broadly the Third World, to integrate the military dimension with external influences and internal sources of conflict. Reviewing cases in Latin America and Asia, his critique of American policy is biting: it has amounted to "colonialism by ventriloquy." Actual colonialism would have been better, and doing less—"cutting almost all direct aid to the client state and giving its military very little advice"—would not have been worse.

ANALOGIES AT WAR: KOREA, MUNICH, DIEN BIEN PHU, AND THE VIETNAM DECISIONS OF 1965. By Yuen Foong Khong. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press, 1992, 286 pp. $39.95 (paper, $16.95).

Khong's interviews and newly declassified documents make a compelling case that American decision-makers in 1965 used historical analogies not only to justify decisions but to make them, most notably in the process of rejecting options. He commends the techniques for probing analogies suggested by Ernest May and Richard Neustadt in their path-breaking *Thinking in Time* (reviewed in *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1986) but argues that the "focus on techniques diverts attention from the more fundamental psychological processes at work."

FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION: THE DYNAMICS OF PROTRACTED CONFLICT. Edited by Ariel E. Levite, Bruce W. Jentleson and Larry Berman. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992, 334 pp. $32.50.

What began as a luncheon conversation on intriguing similarities between the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan, Israel's in Lebanon and America's in Vietnam turned into a book, based on those cases and three others—Syria in Lebanon, India in Sri Lanka, and Cuba and South Africa in Angola. The cases themselves, written by distinguished scholars, are rich, and their focused comparison in the method of Alexander George not only confirms some conventional conclusions—it's easier to go in than to get out—but also elucidates the complicated politics between intervener and client. It may thus help remedy a defect it identifies: policymakers considering intervention often draw analogy to their own experience or to the country in question but seldom learn from other interveners.

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EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE AFTER THE WARSAW PACT: SECURITY DILEMMAS IN THE 1990s. By Andrew A. Michta. Westport (CT): Greenwood, 1992, 216 pp. $49.95.

This wise discussion of post-revolutionary Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia—east-central Europe's "triangle"—calls it a "grey zone," distinguished by its relatively brighter reform prospects but confronting instability to its south and the ripple effect of breakup in the former Soviet Union to its east. No neat resolution to its security dilemma will come soon; western Europe must first reach agreement on an institutional framework for its security and that, in turn, must await an outcome to the crisis in the former Soviet Union.

STRATEGY. By Aleksandr A. Svechin. Minneapolis: East View, 1991, 374 pp. $44.95.

Svechin's works and life were lost in the purges of the 1930s, but he has been rediscovered, not least by Andrei Kokoshin, the chief civilian in Russia's new defense ministry. This book, originally written in 1927, is remarkably free of Soviet dogma and prophetic in its foreshadowing of civil-military relations.

THE NEED TO KNOW: COVERT ACTION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY. Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force. New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1992, 148 pp. $9.95 (paper).

Spawned by the Cold War, covert action as a routine instrument of foreign policy may be suspect when the United States no longer faces an ideological adversary across the globe. A 15-member task force chaired by Richard E. Neustadt of Harvard recommends tight new restrictions, mainly that overt means to achieve the same purpose be thoroughly canvassed first, that private action groups come under the same accountability requirements as government agencies and, most important, that covert action be undertaken only in support of policies that have been fully and publicly articulated. Notable is the eloquent dissent of task force member Hodding Carter III, who calls the practice an "addiction" of the Cold War: "To continue covert action now is to admit that we have become what we have fought."

Peter Grose

General: Economic and Social

William Diebold, Jr.

CHANGING FORTUNES: THE WORLD'S MONEY AND THE THREAT TO AMERICAN LEADERSHIP. By Paul Volcker and Toyoo Gyohten. New York: Times Books, 1992, 394 pp. $25.00.

Partly narrative and memoir but always analytical, this major book (edited from a seminar at Princeton) provides a stimulating and authoritative account of the international monetary history of the last 40 years, especially as seen by Paul Volcker from his many inside seats. Toyoo Gyohten, whose career was spent in the Japanese ministry of finance, provides a most enlightening discussion of how these matters were seen in Tokyo and what his government learned as time passed. All the great crises are here—the Nixon shocks of 1971, the Bonn Summit of 1978, the debt problems of the developing countries—but just as noteworthy is the

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examination of the fabric of continuing relations. Volcker suggests that the American economy would be in better shape if it's domestic policies had taken more account of the international situation, and at key points he poses unanswered questions about the past and the future. The authors are discreet and generally kind to individuals, but there are some nice personal touches.

CONFLICT AMONG NATIONS: TRADE POLICIES IN THE 1990s. Edited by Thomas R. Howell and others. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1992, 633 pp. $59.00 (paper).

"Trade policy conflict among nations in the 1990s is not a relic of a waning era of economic nationalism, but a development which will actually grow in intensity." A group of Washington trade lawyers make their case for this proposition in detailed examinations of the trade policies of Japan, Germany, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, the EC and the United States. They argue that in several of these countries, including Japan, protectionism and discriminatory practices are lodged more in private than in government hands. In the last 150 pages Alan Wolff cogently indicts the "failure" of American trade policy and suggests a series of "improvements." Although the authors do little to defend their views against objections, it would be a mistake for believers in the conventional wisdom of trade policy to ignore this first-rate provocative book or to think they had all the answers.

ONLY ONE WORLD: OUR OWN TO MAKE AND TO KEEP. By Gerard Piel. New York: Freeman, 1992, 367 pp. $21.95.

"Human activities have assumed the biosphere's own orders of magnitude." To show us how to cope with this unprecedented situation, the former editor and publisher of *Scientific American* begins with an authoritative and enlightening synthesis of the earth and life sciences. There follows an extended discussion of economic (and to a considerable extent political) development. Piel argues that the environment can only be saved by bringing the industrial revolution to the four-fifths of the world that has missed much of it, and by acting on the principle that "the hazards to the environment laid by industrial technology . . . are subject to cure by technology." Then the world will be able to stabilize its population at twice its present size by the end of the 21st century. All this may require a "moral revolution" in the rich part of the world with a new emphasis on equity rather than growth. Needless to say there is a great deal to argue about with regard to both the past and the future in this remarkably wide-ranging book.

CHANGING COURSE: A GLOBAL BUSINESS PERSPECTIVE ON DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT. By Stephen Schmidheiny, with the Business Council for Sustainable Development. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 1992, 374 pp. $16.95 (paper).

To provide advice for the 1992 Rio de Janeiro conference on the environment, a Swiss industrialist mobilized businessmen from a variety of countries to try to find practical ways of achieving "sustainable development"—meeting current needs while leaving adequate resources for future generations. Their ambitious book ranges from general principles to 150 pages of examples in which individual companies explain what they have

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done. The recommendation to rely heavily on markets is not surprising, but the study makes plain that markets will only work well if prices reflect environmental costs, a difficult condition to achieve. Not everyone will believe that business can be expected to do as much as these people hope, but the illustration of what can be achieved by attention and improved efficiency within existing frameworks is impressive.

GLOBAL WARMING: THE ECONOMIC STAKES. By William R. Cline. Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1992, 103 pp.

Careful and ingenious analysis of the many kinds of damage that would be brought on by global warming leads to a recommendation for "an aggressive program of international abatement." Though other things come into the picture, the main target must be the use of carbon fuels, and Cline estimates that there are some attractive cost-benefit possibilities. Since damage increases as time passes it is sensible to look ahead to, say, the year 2300, but the recommendations call for a staged program to allow for adaptation as scientific knowledge increases.

A COLD PEACE: AMERICA, JAPAN, GERMANY, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY. By Jeffrey E. Garten. New York: Times Books, 1992, 277 pp. $22.00.

When a quick and well-informed mind challenges conventional assumptions, some troubling questions are bound to arise about the present and future state of the world. Drawing on his experience in government and business, Jeffrey Garten shows quite eloquently how easily serious frictions can arise among Germany, Japan and the United States, and how difficult it is likely to be for them to cooperate with their different kinds of capitalism and their diverse histories. Like other observers he sees little chance of Japanese or German leadership and hopes the United States can find ways of taking major responsibility for international affairs with the help of the others. But for that, he says, this country must overcome its current economic weaknesses and social problems, which can no longer be thought of as separate from foreign policy. This is a challenging, helpful book.

THE NEW EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF INTEGRATION. By Loukas Tsoukalis. New York: Oxford, 1992, 333 pp. $52.00.

Tsoukalis succeeds very well in his aim "to capture the shape of the emerging regional economic system in Europe." Based on years of close observation, his thoughtful book explains the revival of integration but gives full weight to the factors that impede the process. In addition to covering all the familiar topics, he has a good chapter on the labor market and social policy where very difficult issues remain unresolved.

GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION: THE END OF GEOGRAPHY. By Richard O'Brien. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1992, 120 pp. $14.95.

Some vivid passages in this compact book depict a world in which "location no longer matters in finance," thanks to new technology and deregulation. But in his closer and well-informed analysis, the chief economist of the American Express Bank describes a more complex

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process in which some differences among countries and markets continue to shape the dynamics of banking and finance. Often O'Brien provides a broader and subtler view than most people who write about globalization by noting such points as the way integration changes identities, how alterations of financial markets change the function of money and why competition policy will become increasingly important (and difficult).

RIVALS BEYOND TRADE: AMERICA VERSUS JAPAN IN GLOBAL COMPETITION. By Dennis J. Encarnation. Ithaca (NY): Cornell University Press, 1992, 222 pp. $24.95.

Arguing that ownership and control of enterprises abroad increasingly shape patterns of international trade, Encarnation of the Harvard Business School finds the big imbalance in U.S.–Japanese trade to lie in the strategic investment policies and practices of the two countries. His book, which is interesting, often controversial and sometimes built on fairly familiar points, will give analysts some new themes to pursue.

MONETARY SOVEREIGNTY: THE POLITICS OF CENTRAL BANKING IN WESTERN EUROPE. By John B. Goodman. Ithaca (NY): Cornell University Press, 1992, 235 pp. $29.95 (paper, $12.95).

This is a first-rate comparative study of the very different relations between governments and central banks in Germany, France and Italy. The general conclusions about the results of the mix of dependence and independence each bank has had are not very surprising, but the great value of the book lies in the quite detailed analysis of the interplay of governments, banks and publics since the early 1970s. External as well as internal pressures are taken into account and there is special attention to the slow process that this author from the Harvard Business School sees as moving "toward a European Central Bank."

BEYOND SPINOFF: MILITARY AND COMMERCIAL TECHNOLOGIES IN A CHANGING WORLD. By John A. Alic and others. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1992, 428 pp.

Exaggerated in the past, reliance on the civilian application of scientific and technological work done for military purposes will be inadequate in the future. After a thorough examination of the characteristics of dual-use technology, the experienced authors of this thoughtful book—John Alic, Lewis Branscomb, Harvey Brooks, Ashton Carter and Gerald Epstein—recommend changes that move in two directions. They suggest in considerable detail how dual-use technology can be made to contribute more effectively than in the past to the competitiveness of the civilian economy. And they outline new tasks for the government, including certain types of investment, that will serve the same purposes. This is an original and stimulating book.

DISMANTLING THE COLD WAR ECONOMY. By Ann Markusen and Joel Yudken. New York: Basic Books, 1992, 314 pp. $25.00.

Blaming defense spending for much of the deterioration of the American economy, seeing the military-industrial complex "paralyzed by inertia" and stonewalling against conversion, two Rutgers specialists call for "a national economic development strategy" that would focus on environ-

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ment, health and community stability. They sketch the means of moving toward these targets in rather general terms.

THE IMF AND THE SOUTH: THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF CRISIS AND ADJUSTMENT. Edited by Dharam Ghai. Atlantic Highlands (NJ): Zed Books/Humanities Press, 1992, 273 pp. $55.99 (paper, $19.95).

The economic setbacks of the 1970s and 1980s and the shift in many Third World countries away from state-run and protectionist policies affected the income, interests and strength of different social groups in a variety of ways. These studies prepared for a conference at the University of the West Indies try to work out the consequences of such changes for a number of countries in Latin America, the Caribbean and sub-Sahara Africa, and break a good bit of new ground.

STATES OR MARKETS? NEO-LIBERALISM AND THE DEVELOPMENT POLICY DEBATE. Edited by Christopher Colclough and James Manor. New York: Clarendon Press Oxford, 1992, 359 pp.

These 15 papers based on a series of discussions at the Institute for Development Studies of the University of Sussex (U.K.) critically examine both the broad claims of the neoliberal approach to development and some specific examples of its application. Recognizing some useful contributions by what is almost a new orthodoxy, the authors, who call themselves "structuralists," argue that circumstances and countries vary too greatly to make it wise always to reduce the role of government as much as most neoliberals would like. This is a very useful piece of work.

PROTECTING MARKETS: U.S. POLICY AND THE WORLD GRAIN TRADE. By Ronald T. Libby. Ithaca (NY): Cornell University Press, 1992, 152 pp. $26.50.

Argumentation, plus detailed evidence on some points, help to illustrate but do not really suffice to prove the author's thesis that subsidizing grain exports "is an effective instrument of foreign policy" that has given the United States "political leverage" over the European Community.

The Western Hemisphere

Abraham F. Lowenthal

THE WORKERS' PARTY AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN BRAZIL. By Margaret E. Keck. New Haven (CT): Yale University Press, 1992, 315 pp. $35.00.

A fine first volume by a young scholar. This well researched and stimulating study analyzes the origins and evolution of a moving target: the Brazilian Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, known as PT), which grew from a small labor-union-based political organization in 1979 to winner of some 47 percent of the vote in the 1989 presidential election, the first direct presidential election in Brazil in three decades. At first an anomaly in Brazilian politics, and still so to some extent, the PT had a solid base in labor and social movements, took seriously the question of democratic representation (both in internal organization and with regard to electoral constituencies), and based its appeal primarily on programmatic items. It is not yet clear whether the PT can build from its unquestioned

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legitimacy as a vehicle for mass protest in the mid-1980s to become a fully institutionalized party in the 1990s. Despite the worldwide crisis of the left, it has already made an important mark on Brazil's politics.

COLOMBIA AND THE UNITED STATES. By Stephen J. Randall. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1992, 325 pp. $40.00 (paper, $17.50).

The latest volume in a useful series edited by Lester Langley, this study surveys two centuries of relations between the United States and Colombia, a medium-sized, strategically located nation at the gateway to South America. The U.S. role at the turn of the century in breaking Panama, Colombia's northern province, into an independent nation subservient to U.S. interests colored the relationship for many decades. After World War II Colombians split between those advocating an independent and even antagonistic stand toward the United States and those favoring acceptance by Colombia of its place as a mid-range regional power within the U.S. sphere of influence. The largest factor shaping relations has been the asymmetry of power, as the United States is an all-pervasive factor in Colombia's foreign policy while Colombia is low on the U.S. priority list. Although the countries share many fundamental concerns, insensitivity in Washington to Colombia's self-image and interests have recurrently exacerbated bilateral tensions.

THE DEPENDENCY MOVEMENT: SCHOLARSHIP AND POLITICS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES. By Robert A. Packenham. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1992, 362 pp. $42.50.

Some 15 years in preparation, this volume assesses the origins, methods, meaning and influence of the *dependencia* perspective that dominated Latin American social science and its counterpart literature in the United States at the time the project was begun. In a post-Cold War world—and a post-authoritarian and postcommunist Latin America, where neoconservative ideas are fashionable—it is hard to recall the powerful appeal of the *dependencia* approach, but Packenham argues persuasively that its hold was very strong and that it was reinforced by political techniques inappropriate to professional scholarship. Although somewhat overwrought, this book deserves serious consideration as a passionate and well-executed critique of an important chapter in inter-American cultural relations.

THE RIGHT AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA. Edited by Douglas A. Chalmers, Maria do Carmo Campello de Souza and Atilio A. Boron. New York: Praeger, 1992, 336 pp. $45.00.

Fifteen chapters, ten of them by Latin American scholars, explore the changing identity and character, strategies and behavior, political role and impact of the Latin American right and examine the impact of the right on Latin America's transitions from authoritarian rule and on the prospects for consolidating democratic governance. It is too early to be sure whether the Latin American right's current devotion to democratic procedures is tactical and temporary or represents a fundamental and permanent shift, but an underlying premise of this book, as one author makes explicit, is that "one way we might help to make that shift more permanent is to study it objectively and help people understand it." An important introduction to an understudied topic.

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LONG-TERM TRENDS IN LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. Edited by Miguel Urrutia. Washington: Inter-American Development Bank, 1992, 170 pp. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, distributor, $18.00, paper).

Five qualified international economists review Latin America's economies from World War I to the present, thus putting the difficult "lost decade" of the 1980s into the long-term context of several decades of rapid modernization, expansion and growth. Despite considerable variation among countries, most of Latin America has experienced sustained development throughout the century. The crisis years of the 1980s may thus have been an aberration, caused by Latin American policy errors, adverse industrial country policies, and bad luck. Over the decades national markets have been created and fortified, production has been decentralized and many Latin American economies have become well integrated with the global economy. A host of recent political, economic and institutional transformations should facilitate a renewal of Latin American modernization at an accelerated pace. This overall argument is supported by considerable data and many helpful tables.

PERU UNDER FIRE: HUMAN RIGHTS SINCE THE RETURN TO DEMOCRACY. Americas Watch. New Haven (CT): Yale University Press, 1992, 169 pp. $23.50.

While Mexicans talk of economic integration with the United States, Peruvians worry about their country's social, political and economic *dis*integration and about the deadly cross-fire between the brutal Shining Path insurgency and government forces trying to reimpose state authority. This study, by a leading human rights organization, documents Peru's agony—the death or disappearance of more than 20,000 persons in the last decade, the displacement of some 200,000 more, the vicious cycle of insurgent and repressive violence that grips Peru, and the ambiguous and perhaps counterproductive impact of U.S. policy. Although this volume is understandably stronger at description and denunciation than at analysis or implementable prescription, it contributes importantly to highlighting the very painful dilemmas facing Peru and the inter-American community.

SHINING PATH OF PERU. Edited by David Scott Palmer. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, 247 pp.

A professor of political science at Boston University has assembled 14 American, Peruvian and Dutch experts from the fields of development, academia and journalism to provide what may be the most comprehensive analysis available of Peru's violent insurgency, the Shining Path, or Sendero Luminoso. Complementary and sometimes overlapping chapters assess the genesis of the movement among middle-class mestizos at the University of Huamanga, the reasons for Sendero's acceptance and setbacks, its spread to the coca-producing Upper Huallaga valley and the beginnings of its campaign of urban terror. Other contributions provide theoretical context on the motivations of revolution and a profile of the "philosopher king," Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, who is Sendero's prime force. Collectively the chapters emphasize that Sendero is not a broad-based popular front; it is a highly organized and cellular Maoist vanguard—an "armed party"—using selective terror often to impose itself on the very people it espouses to

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serve: Peru's Indian and campesino population. What support it does gain comes from exploiting local needs and animosities, fissures in a nation characterized as a "political archipelago." Although compiled before Peru's April *autogolpe*, this collection makes clear that if Sendero's aim is to supplant Lima's already-weak governmental structures, President Fujimori himself may have gone a long way toward aiding that end.

Kirk Kraeutler

THE COLLAPSE OF CANADA? Edited by R. Kent Weaver. Washington: Brookings, 1992, 186 pp. $28.95 (paper, $11.95).

The institutions that help or hinder the management of conflict in Canada; how both fear and confidence and a sense of rejection stimulate Quebec nationalism and could lead to separation; the sources of English-Canadian opposition to Quebec nationalism: these and related basic issues are nicely analyzed in clear essays that go well beneath the surface in a book that is especially useful to non-Canadians. The authors are very reasonable and would be satisfied with compromises but do not commit themselves as to whether the citizenry would feel the same. William Diebold, Jr.

Western Europe

Fritz Stern

THE SHAPE OF THE NEW EUROPE. Edited by Gregory F. Treverton. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 232 pp. $16.95 (paper).

In the flood of "whither Europe" books—what will the newly united, newly challenged Europe be like—this collection of essays stands out, not least by the stature of its well-known contributors. Helen Wallace begins the volume with questions concerning the likely structures that might accommodate a Europe that was preparing for the leap to a single market and beyond—and that since 1989–90 faces an impoverished, liberated eastern Europe and the successor states to the U.S.S.R. Will the EC go forward, and if so, how and for whom and with what associated organizations? François Heisbourg deals with the prospects of a new European security system. And Stanley Hoffmann discusses the possible political arrangements for the new Europe. Along with the other authors Hoffmann probes the implications of all this for the United States, and the implications of a domestically weakened and preoccupied America for Europe. In a characteristic, if slightly mischievous, formulation, he writes: "Washington would like its partners to speak in a single voice, as long as they repeat what the United States tells them."

THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC: THE CRISIS OF CLASSICAL MODERNITY. By Detlev J.K. Peukert. New York: Hill & Wang, 1992, 334 pp. $28.00.

A young German historian who died before he reached 40 sets the familiar story of Weimar's successes and ultimate failure in the context of modernization, that is, all the socioeconomic changes that swept across Germany, including the great cultural innovations. The book's virtue lies in the emphasis on these nonpolitical elements that clearly contributed to the debility of Weimar, though Peukert makes clear that there was no inevita-

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bility to Hitler's triumph. An intelligent, scholarly work with an eye for the oft-neglected connections among the ways people think, feel, live and vote.

ORDINARY MEN: RESERVE POLICE BATTALION 101 AND THE FINAL SOLUTION. By Christopher R. Browning. New York: HarperCollins, 1992, 231 pp. $22.00.

A practiced historian examined the German trial records of one police unit made up of largely middle-aged, nonfanatical Germans responsible for the murder of thousands of Jews in small Polish towns in the summer of 1942. A few of these men (about 10–20 percent) refused to participate in the killing of women and infants—and did so without suffering reprisals. A meticulous study of a microcosm of murder, all the more powerful because it is written with some effort at empathy and understanding. Browning analyzes the accounts of these men as they were tried 20 years after the events, and he carefully speculates about motives, including simple careerism, and also points to the savagery elsewhere, in the Pacific war, for example. A tale of horror with gripping specificity, so as to make the link between "ordinary men" and the Holocaust clearer and still more unsettling.

NATIONAL SOCIALIST LEADERSHIP AND TOTAL WAR, 1941–45. By Eleanor Hancock. New York: St. Martin's, 1992, 332 pp. $49.95.

A study based on archival research of German mobilization during World War II, focusing on the views and policies of four leaders: Himmler, Goebbels, Speer and Bormann. The author, an Australian scholar, argues that these leaders were far more successful in organizing total mobilization than had been assumed, but she also insists that Himmler, Goebbels and Speer tried to persuade Hitler to seek an early peace beginning in 1942. A minor contribution.

TAKING EUROPE SERIOUSLY. By Simon Serfaty. New York: St. Martin's, 1992, 188 pp. $35.00.

An essay on "Europe"—on the slow but inevitable growth of common institutions, on past difficulties partially overcome, on the prospects, at once promising, inherently logical and yet likely to be realized in the same uncertain, uneven pace that has marked Europe's development so far. A good account of a largely familiar story, told in commendable compression, with some interesting aperçus.

FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES: THE COLD ALLIANCE SINCE WORLD WAR II. By Frank Costigliola. New York: Twayne, 1992, 316 pp. $27.95 (paper, $13.95).

A breezy summary of the difficult relations between the two countries, beginning with America's illusions about Pétain and the Vichy government and ending with differences over the Gulf War and beyond. Evenhanded and persuasive in his critical appraisal of both powers, Costigliola, an American scholar, takes account of the cultural presuppositions in the public mind; Sartre and Derrida, for example, receive passing note as examples of intellectual influences on politics. A competent work with few surprises.

RICHARD VON WEIZSÄCKER: IM GESPRÄCH MIT GUNTER HOFFMANN UND WERNER A. PERGER. Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn, 1992, 184 pp.

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In June 1992 Richard von Weizsäcker published an interview in book form, and the book commanded instant, controversial attention. More than any of his predecessors in the presidential office, he has used that supraparty position to address fundamental issues, such as the ever-present unease about the German past, and he does so with clarity and admirable forthrightness. He has what few statesmen nowadays have: moral authority, and in his book—with its intelligent interlocutors—he turns from the past to the present and the future. His greatest worry concerns the vitality of liberal democracy in the enlarged Federal Republic, particularly in light of the power of German political parties in politics and public life generally—their power and the paucity of their imagination, the failure of their leadership. He is remarkably candid in his criticism of parties that only seek electoral gain and calls for a more active citizenry and regrets the immobility of Germany's political life, "the utopia of the status quo." German commentators have seized on formulations that clearly hit the inadequacies of the present government, but these are incidental and inevitable. Weizsäcker's criticisms go far deeper. It took courage and, I suppose, the deepest concern to disturb the political complacency of his country and to do so with thoughts that in the German context and in some parts recall conservative criticisms of the Weimar period. But Weizsäcker's aim to strengthen, to vitalize liberal democracy is beyond question.

He also gives a critical assessment of the actual process of German unification, a process whose material costs the Bonn government has never fully acknowledged. He is attuned to the psychological difficulties of unification; his comments on past Ostpolitik are important. He defines German foreign interests, preserving its Western orientation, promoting European integration, while insisting on Germany's historic role in eastern Europe. Defending the substance of German foreign policy after unification, he emphasizes that style and tone have their own importance.

A major book or admonition addressed to Germans and hence to be read by all those concerned with Germany. Some of Weizsäcker's thoughts about liberal democracy have a disturbing relevance for the other, older democracies as well, ours included.

Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Republics

Robert Legvold

BORIS YELTSIN: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY. By Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova. New York: Putnam, 1992, 320 pp. $24.95.

Two passionate admirers of Boris Yeltsin have written a detailed study of the man during his critical Moscow years, from a 1985–87 stint as Moscow party chief to the heroic days of August 1991. Through firsthand encounters with Yeltsin, his family and many of his collaborators as well as a careful reading of his numerous speeches, they weave an intriguing and useful political biography. The book's principal weakness is the authors' equally passionate antipathy to Mikhail Gorbachev, which creeps into nearly every page.

DILEMMAS OF TRANSITION IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE. Edited by George Breslauer. Berkeley (CA): Berkeley-Stanford Program in Soviet Studies, 1991, 166 pp. $12.95 (paper).

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The essays devoted to eastern Europe provide an excellent, lucid understanding of the problems facing those reforming former socialist countries. Since a good deal of the same trouble awaits the new states of the former Soviet Union, they are every bit as useful in this context. Although somewhat off the central theme of the book, there is also a stimulating essay written by Gregory Freidin probing Gorbachev's complex and tortured struggle with his socialist faith.

BURYING LENIN. By Steven Kull. Boulder (CO): Westview, 1992, 219 pp. $37.95 (paper, $15.95).

There is still some explaining to do before we fully comprehend the revolution in Soviet foreign policy carried out by Gorbachev and his colleagues. Kull's book is a good place to start. He provides a thorough account of the vast reworking of ideas among the Soviet foreign policy elite during this period. For the most part he lets members of this elite, including the leadership, speak for themselves, quoting at length from their writings and, as a particularly helpful feature of the book, drawing on extensive interviews with them. One does not get from the book a profound and comprehensive explanation for this historic turn, but will certainly come away with a much richer sense of its intellectual side.

RED ODYSSEY: A JOURNEY THROUGH THE SOVIET REPUBLICS. By Marat Akchurin. New York: HarperCollins, 1992, 406 pp. $25.00.

Akchurin is a Tatar, born in Tashkent, but was for many years a Muscovite who in mid-1990 journeyed by car from Moscow to central Russia, then down to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and over to Azerbaijan. Akchurin, worldly wise and with a strong sense of the history of the areas he visits, experiences what no outsider can and reports his adventures with insights that no outsider has. For the Westerner who has traveled in the former Soviet Union as a guest of Intourist, his tale contains a rawness and violence that will shock.

LIVING IN FREEDOM: THE EXHILARATION AND ANGUISH OF PRAGUE'S SECOND SPRING. By Mark Sommer. San Francisco: Mercury House, 1992, 261 pp. $21.95.

Based on three snapshots, one taken in 1983, one in spring 1990 and the last in spring 1991, each longer and more detailed than the previous one, Sommer gauges the spirit of the Czech and Slovak peoples before, during and after the 1989 revolution. He builds his account almost entirely from personal observations and conversations with a range of contacts, some of them reasonably high-level officials, some simply extraordinary personalities. (In early 1990 he and his wife also made a trip to Moscow and Leningrad, which provides a revealing counterpoint.) Were Sommer not such a fine and elegant writer, however, this would be merely another example of a genre that seems to have become the most common way of writing about this region. But because the writing is so graceful and fluid and the conversations so well reconstructed, the reader will find the book an effortless way to participate in the "exhilaration and anguish" of the period.

ENERGY AND THE SOVIET BLOC: ALLIANCE POLITICS AFTER STALIN. By William M. Reisinger. Ithaca (NY): Cornell University Press, 1992, 184 pp. $34.50.

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An academic study of an important dimension of the Soviet Union's relationship with its east European COMECON allies. Reisinger offers facts and figures to prove that Moscow integrated its external energy trade with eastern Europe into its foreign policy in pursuit of political objectives. The argument has an important premise: that Soviet relations with eastern Europe are better understood as a species of alliance relations among unequal parties than as a matter of imperial diktat. He then uses existing theory to show how each side went about getting from the alliance what it wanted. On the Soviet side he finds the strongest link to be between the flow of Soviet energy sources to an east European ally and the flow of that ally's resources into defense spending.

SOVIET INTERVENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1968: ANATOMY OF A DECISION. By Jiri Valenta. Revised edition, Baltimore (MD): Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991, 264 pp. $13.95 (paper).

Making use of archival material now available in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia as well as interviews with Alexander Dubček and other principals, Valenta has added two chapters to his well-received original study of the Soviet decision to crush the Czech reform of 1968. He finds in these materials—the most important of which are summaries of the Dresden, Moscow, Čierna and Yalta meetings—vindication of his initial assessment: that the Soviet leadership hesitated to unleash military intervention until the last minute, that János Kádár, alone among Warsaw Pact leaders, refused to see the Prague Spring as a "counterrevolution" deserving of suppression, and that an unseemly group of hard-liners in Berlin, Prague and Moscow finally drove the decision. Still, as Valenta acknowledges, many key questions will remain unanswered until the Soviet archives tell the story (one hopes) they contain.

MOSCOW AND THE GLOBAL LEFT IN THE GORBACHEV ERA. Edited by Joan Barth Urban. Ithaca (NY): Cornell University Press, 1992, 204 pp. $29.95 (paper, $12.95).

Urban, a long-time student of Soviet relations with the Italian Communist Party, and her coauthors ask a significant question: What happened to the left in other parts of the world during the years Gorbachev was pulling the foundation stones from the edifice of socialism? One of his more interesting intellectual and political relationships was with the Italian Communist Party, and Urban explores that deftly. In addition Heinz Timmermann describes the final reconciliation with social democracy, Harry Gelman, the functional reconciliation with the Chinese communists, and Neil MacFarlane, the alienation from the radical left in the Third World. Federigo Argentieri's arresting concluding essay ponders the long-term future of the left in east-central Europe now that state socialism is dead.

THE UNPLANNED SOCIETY. Edited by Janine R. Wedel. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992, 271 pp. $35.00.

Polish voices, mostly those of journalists and academics, assembled by an American anthropologist illustrate the ways Poles worked around the communist system to get what the system failed to deliver materially and spiritually and to protect themselves from its abuses and intrusions. The material is interesting because it is concrete and drawn from daily life. But

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contrary to the editor's implied promise, the book does not deliver a framework for understanding the transition through which Poland is now passing, let alone one superior to those she seems to criticize.

NEW WORLD DISORDER: THE LENINIST EXTINCTION. By Ken Jowitt. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992, 342 pp. $30.00.

As the author, one of academia's most original and at times sulfurous minds, announces in the introduction, this book is about "the character, development, extinction and legacy of the Leninist phenomenon." It is, in fact, a collection of his essays written from 1974 to 1992, essays that are sometimes startling in their associations (for example, Christianity, Nazism and Leninism or the Bolshevik party and the U.S. marines), sometimes guaranteed to provoke dissent, but never dull or unproductive. If social scientists were artists—and Jowitt by style and temperament often seems more the artist—he would be a Cubist, taking apart familiar political realities and reassembling them in different forms and on different planes in order to show in them features the conventional eye has missed.

His newest essays on the legacy of Leninism and what its disappearance will mean predict that the survivor—"liberal capitalist democracy"—will probably not have long to glory in its triumph; soon, he argues, other inspired movements against "individualism, materialism, achievement and rationality" are likely to rise up.

RETREAT FROM THE FINLAND STATION: MORAL ODYSSEYS IN THE BREAKDOWN OF COMMUNISM. By Kenneth Murphy. New York: Free Press, 1992, 403 pp. $24.95.

Sagas of the disillusioned, from Bukharin to Gorbachev, and including such familiar apostates as Koestler, Gide, Djilas, Nagy, Dubček and Solzhenitsyn. This is retreading, but the author has his own particular slant, and at least one essay, on the Italian writer Ignazio Silone, is brilliant.

Lucy Despard

The Middle East

William B. Quandt

STALEMATE: THE WAR OF ATTRITION AND GREAT POWER DIPLOMACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 1967–1970. By David A. Korn. Boulder (CO): Westview, 1992, 326 pp. $36.00.

An excellent case study by a former State Department insider who knows the issues, writes with authority and a sense for nuance, and strives for objectivity. The case itself is important, but overlooked—the years immediately following the June 1967 war. Why in that crucial period was so little progress made toward peace? Korn knows the American side of the story in detail. His command of Hebrew and his knowledge of Israeli politics also serve him well. The Egyptian and Soviet angles are inevitably treated more superficially. This fine work of scholarship would have been enhanced if the author had pressed more of his sources to go on the record. Too many histories of this sort are cluttered with unhelpful footnotes to anonymous sources. What, after all these years, are they hiding? This is a small quibble with an otherwise well-executed study.

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IRAN AFTER KHOMEINI. By Shireen T. Hunter. New York: Praeger, 1992, 163 pp. $32.95 (paper, $14.95).

Hunter has written a clear, timely and largely convincing analysis of post-Khomeini Iran. She sees the emergence of a synthesis of Iranian nationalism and Islam under relatively moderate leadership as the most promising path opening up for Iran. The need for political reform and economic revival is particularly acute after the costly war with Iraq and the ineffective economic policies to date. Some will see this account as too optimistic; others will wish for more information. For example, there is little to be found on the Iranian oil sector, which remains vital to the future of the country. There is no discussion of the possibility of Iran moving toward nuclear capabilities later in the decade. The temptation for Iran to try to export the revolution to the new Central Asian republics, if only to forestall their Turkification, is not discussed in depth. Still, for a clear picture of Iran as it confronts the challenges of the post-Khomeini era, this is a book to read and take seriously.

ENTANGLED ALLIES: U.S. POLICY TOWARD GREECE, TURKEY, AND CYPRUS. By Monteagle Stearns. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992, 185 pp. $16.95 (paper).

The author, formerly ambassador to Greece in the early 1980s, has written a lucid and wise analysis of one of the continuing dilemmas for U.S. policy: How to promote a Cyprus settlement that both of our allies, Greece and Turkey, can live with? Analyzing past policy, Stearns draws useful lessons on what might work. He is a believer in statecraft, in attention to nuance, and in an active American role in seeking ways to break the impasse. He has little patience for those who say that the Cyprus conflict is not "ripe" for settlement. This is a compelling call for preventive diplomacy. But his own account of past policy provides ample evidence that his views will not readily be heeded by bureaucrats who only tackle complex problems when crises force them to do so.

THE POLITICS AND STRATEGY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: OPACITY, THEORY, AND REALITY, 1960–1991: AN ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE. By Shlomo Aronson, with Oded Brosh. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992, 398 pp. $19.95 (paper).

Nuclear weapons, the author maintains, must be understood as a central issue in today's Middle East, despite the fact that they are rarely mentioned in public. Since the 1960s, Aronson maintains, nuclear issues have been part of the region's political reality. The "opaqueness" of the Israeli capability has meant that most everyone has preferred to look the other way, but in reality officials on all sides have geared their policies to deal with Israel's nuclear capability. The problem with this view is not that it is wrong. On the contrary the central thesis of the book is surely correct. But the evidence is often hard to come by, which does not prevent the author from engaging in speculation, some convincing, some not so. For example he assumes that Egypt's Abdel al-Nasser was drawn into the 1967 crisis out of a desire to strike at Israel's Dimona reactor before it was too late. Perhaps. The author and coauthor have read widely and turn up some gems of information, but they are prone to detect a nuclear subtheme even when it may not exist. The book is filled with questions, sometimes going on

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for pages at a time. The authors cannot begin to answer them all, and a tough editor would have done well to insist on a more coherent analytical structure to the book and a more readable text. But with all these shortcomings, the book is valuable in lifting the veil of secrecy, or opaqueness, concerning nuclear weapons in the Middle East.

DEMOCRACY AND ARAB POLITICAL CULTURE. By Elie Kedourie. Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1992, 105 pp. $12.95 (paper).

The late Elie Kedourie pulls no punches: Arabs, and Muslims more generally, have nothing in their own political traditions that is compatible with Western notions of democracy or, more accurately, constitutional representative government. Western implants, he shows in a series of case studies from the twentieth-century Arab experience, have not worked. Having destroyed the authoritarian but accepted, traditional order in the Middle East, the West cannot now hope to see democracy emerge. Instead Arabs have borrowed from the West only those techniques of bureaucratic centralization that make autocracy more oppressive. Kedourie has a stark, black-and-white view of contemporary politics, colored by nostalgia for an earlier era. No credit is given to the current hesitant efforts in Jordan, Egypt and Yemen (to mention a few) to expand the scope of civil society, to permit more political freedom, to establish an independent judiciary and to hold relatively free elections. Nor do we get a hint of how other Muslim societies, such as Turkey, have managed to pursue a relatively democratic path. Is there something special about Arabs that makes them different from other Muslims? Kedourie's analysis suggests that only the inhabitants of Europe and their direct descendants are able to make constitutional government work. This short book strongly presents one side of a debate that will go on for years. Only time will tell whether its pessimistic conclusions are warranted.

GUARDIANS OF THE GULF: THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1833–1991. By Michael A. Palmer. New York: The Free Press, 1992, 320 pp. $24.95.

A useful attempt to put recent gulf crises in historical perspective. The author wastes little time on the first 100 years under review, but does provide a detailed account of how America's involvement in the gulf region grew from the 1930s onward. Much of the book is instant history, relying heavily on press accounts, but the basic narrative is well done and the author's conclusions are reasonable. In short he sees both continuity and success in American dealings with the gulf, resulting in a moment of American preeminence, with limited military commitments in the region, which will probably last for some time without undue cost to the American public.

INDIA'S PRO-ARAB POLICY: A STUDY IN CONTINUITY. By Richard Edmund Ward. New York: Praeger, 1992, 172 pp. $39.95.

A straightforward account of why New Delhi has tended to support the Arab side of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The reasons include early views of Israel as a colonial outpost, the fact of India's own large Muslim community, competition with Pakistan for Arab support in the United Nations on the Kashmir issue, and access to oil. This latter point about oil is the least

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credible. The author errs in claiming that Iran produces 23.3 million barrels of oil a day (an order of magnitude too large) and misses the point that a directed Arab embargo of oil shipments to India would simply force India to look elsewhere in the petroleum market for supplies. Perhaps the Indians really do believe that they must appease Arab oil producers or risk their supplies of oil, but if so, they are ignorant of how the oil market works. The other reasons for India's pro-Arab tilt are more compelling.

ARMS CONTROL AND WEAPONS PROLIFERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA. Edited by Shelley A. Stahl and Geoffrey Kemp. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, 248 pp.

A collection of essays initially written in 1989 but updated after the 1991 Gulf War. The authors present views of supplier countries interested in stability and regional powers concerned with deterrence and equity. The tone is serious, nonpolemical and often dubious that arms control can be promoted without progress toward resolving regional conflicts. While devoid of surprises, this is a useful, if not inspiring, collection.

THE ARAB WORLD: NATION, STATE, AND DEMOCRACY. By Fawzy Mansour. London: Zed Books, 1992, 135 pp. $49.95 (paper, $17.50).

The author is an Egyptian economist with Arab nationalist, leftist credentials. In today's Middle East his secular style of analysis—filled with references to imperialism, the bourgeoisie, aggressive Zionism—is losing ground but still has the capacity to expose some of the contradictions and dilemmas of Arab development. But the author's belief that Arab unity, based on new social forces, can lead the Arab world toward a self-reliant economic future free of the world capitalist system seems very romantic. Even he seems to think it is impossible. Along the way a lot of rewriting of history takes place.

Asia and the Pacific

Donald S. Zagoria

CHINA IN OUR TIME. By Ross Terrill. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992, 366 pp. $25.00.

This prominent China specialist, who was not always so critical of the mainland government, has written a strong indictment and a bleak assessment of China's future. It is not, he says, just that human rights abuses exist in China—the entire system is a fundamental denial of human rights. Communism will end in China, he predicts, though not in the short run, because of the nonchalance of the rural population. And democracy is not likely to replace it. Rather its demise could lead to chaos. There could be a long period of struggle and even civil war. And China's essentially colonial hold over Tibet, Xinjiang and other non-Han areas will be put into question. As China descends into chaos and nationalistic resentment, either Japan or Russia might be enticed to intervene.

Although this dire assessment of China's future could be right, it is not the only possibility. (And the author does not even consider alternative scenarios.) Communism could gradually wither away and be replaced by a looser, more pragmatic but still authoritarian system devoted to economic modernization. This is what is already happening in southern China.

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STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM. Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbau. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1992, 240 pp. $43.00 (paper, $15.95).

In this collection of essays by prominent China specialists, Hong Yung Lee's detailed study of the Chinese bureaucracy finds that professionalization of the Chinese cadre corps in the 1980s transformed it from a body of political activists into a group of educated technocrats. An absolute majority of mayors, governors and party secretaries now have academic training in technical fields or economics. Sociologist Martin Whyte argues that numerous nonpolitical and autonomous social groupings—what political scientists call "civil society"—emerged during the Deng reform era and have fundamentally changed the nature of the relationship between state and society. During the Beijing Spring, prior to Tiananmen, new organizations emerged, large parts of the urban population detached themselves from official organizations to give support to the demonstrators, a vibrant and highly critical public opinion found its voice and the populace resisted all the traditional state control efforts for weeks, until their independence was crushed. Although many of these groups and publications have been suppressed, Whyte argues that the effort to destroy China's civil society has been only partially successful.

THE LAST LENINISTS: THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF ASIA'S COMMUNIST STATES. By Robert A. Scalapino. Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1992, 104 pp.

The dean of America's Asianists looks at the communist states of East Asia and asks whether the status quo can survive in any of them. His answer is strongly negative. He holds out four possible scenarios for the future. First, these states can try to "muddle through," but the dynamics of economic development and the interdependence of societies will make this scenario very difficult to sustain over a protracted period. Second, the Leninist states could undergo explosive upheavals and collapse like the Soviet Union, but this would require at least two prior conditions: continuing economic failures of significant magnitude and extensive breakdown of elite unity. A third possibility could be a rapid transition to political pluralism and an open society, an unlikely scenario at present. The fourth scenario is a move toward "authoritarian pluralism" on the model followed by South Korea and Taiwan. This, he says, is the most likely future for Asian communism, at least in the short term.

TRIAL AFTER TRIUMPH: EAST ASIA AFTER THE COLD WAR. By William E. Odom. Indianapolis (IN): Hudson Institute, 1992, 151 pp. $12.95 (paper).

A former director of the National Security Agency, Odom has written a fresh and sweeping study of the geostrategic challenge that East Asia poses for U.S. policy after the end of the Cold War. Odom says there are three primary requirements for a successful U.S. policy in the region. First, there must be a healthy global economy with the United States as its leader. Next, there should be an indefinite U.S. military presence in the region, albeit at reduced levels. Third, there needs to be a new and broadly accepted threat rationale for the U.S. military in the region. This is a valuable and

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compelling beginning for constructing a new U.S. policy in one of the world's most important regions.

PERFIDIOUS ALBION: THE ABANDONMENT OF HONG KONG 1997. By William McGurn. Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1992, 165 pp. $16.95.

In this provocative study an American journalist argues that Britain has by default allowed China to determine the shape of the institutions that will govern Hong Kong after its reversion to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. The United States, he says, as the largest foreign investor in the colony, ought to play a more active role in shaping future developments in Hong Kong by adopting a more generous immigration policy and by passing the U.S.–Hong Kong Policy Act now before Congress. There is merit in McGurn's analysis but his picture of the situation seems too bleak. With the rapid economic development of Hong Kong and neighboring Kwangdung province, any future Chinese leadership will have a strong interest in maintaining Hong Kong as a financial and trade center.

JAPAN THRICE-OPENED: AN ANALYSIS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES. By Hideo Ibe. New York: Praeger, 1992, 296 pp. $49.95.

This is the history of U.S.–Japanese relations from the point of view of a pro-American Japanese scholar. Japan and the United States, says the author, share many interests and goals, but they suffer from a tremendous gap in mutual perceptions. He believes Japan is neither an inexplicable riddle nor a monolith. Since time immemorial, forging unity among the many warring groups in Japan has been difficult. The author's important contribution is to examine in historical depth the difficulties the Japanese have encountered in their efforts to unify.

MOTHER INDIA: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF INDIRA GANDHI. By Pranay Gupte. New York: Scribner's, 1992, 593 pp. $30.00.

Gupte, a columnist for *Newsweek* International and a former *New York Times* correspondent, has set himself a formidable task: to assess the legacy of Indira Gandhi (sometimes called Bharat Mata, or Mother India) as the central character in India's modern history, if not the most influential woman of the twentieth century. To some extent he succeeds—his section on Ms. Gandhi's climb to power from the dutiful daughter of Jawaharlal Nehru to prime minister is fast paced and highly readable. Unfortunately his account of her youth relies too much on secondary sources, and his analysis of Prime Minister Gandhi's economic policies in the 1960s and 1970s are one-sided and noncritical. In general, though, the book is a decent introduction to an extraordinary woman and the country she ruled.

Patricia Lee Dorff

Africa

Gail M. Gerhart

COMRADES AGAINST APARTHEID: THE ANC AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN EXILE. By Stephen Ellis and Tsepo Sechaba. Bloomington (IN): Indiana University Press, 1992, 214 pp. $37.50.

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The African National Congress and the South African Communist Party have been allied for 40 years and, since their unbanning in 1990, all efforts by South Africa's nervous whites to sever the alliance have failed. In this extraordinary book Ellis, a former editor of the London-based *Africa Confidential*, and the pseudonymous "Sechaba," a member of both organizations, have lifted the alliance's self-imposed veil of secrecy, uncovering many intricacies of the historical partnership. As readers of *Africa Confidential* will appreciate, not every last detail need be flawlessly accurate for the overall picture to be extremely illuminating. Possibly the most original contribution in a decade to the literature on South African politics.

BOUNDS OF POSSIBILITY: THE LEGACY OF STEVE BIKO AND BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS. Edited by N. Barney Pityana, M. Ramphele, M. Mpumiwana, and L. Wilson. New York: Zed Press, 1992, 256 pp.
LEARNING FROM ROBBEN ISLAND: THE PRISON WRITINGS OF GOVAN MBEKI. By Govan Mbeki. Athens (OH): Ohio University Press, 1991, 199 pp.

These two remarkable books open a rare window on the experiences and thought of black South African intellectuals prominent in the resistance to apartheid. The first, a collection of essays on the black consciousness movement, contains the only published account of the life of Biko, the most important black political leader of the 1970s, who was also his era's most influential intellectual. Mbeki's book contains essays and memoranda written during his 23 years on Robben Island, South Africa's Alcatraz. Together the works reveal the wide ideological spectrum ranging from Biko's black nationalism to Mbeki's blend of orthodox Marxism with loyalty to the nominally non-Marxist African National Congress. Equally interesting is the light that both books shed on the practical problems of organizing mass resistance—whether underground or "legal"—under conditions of harsh repression.

THE EMERGENCE OF AUTOCRACY IN LIBERIA: TRAGEDY AND CHALLENGE. By Amos Sawyer. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1992, 418 pp. $29.95 (paper, $15.95).

This is a richly detailed political history of Liberia authored by its present de jure president, a former dean at the national university. It recounts the passage of Liberia from nineteenth-century settler oligarchy to twentieth-century patrimonial autocracy, connecting the country's patterns of political culture and conflict to the evolution of an economy based solely on the extraction and sale of primary products, proceeds from which have always been closely controlled by a privileged elite. Though rather ponderously written, it is an enlightening look at one of Africa's most atypical countries. The American role in shaping Liberia's history receives attention up to the arrival of Firestone Rubber and the Garveyists in the 1920s, but gets little mention thereafter.

THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE. By Roland Oliver. New York: HarperCollins, 1992, 284 pp. $23.00.

Packing several million years of Africa's evolution into a vivid and readable summary of major historical themes cannot have been easy, but one of Britain's most distinguished Africanists has done it. Evidence on the development of languages and states, climate changes and food produc-

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tion, religion and education, colonization and decolonization within the space of less than a century, and much more—all of it is deftly organized and elegantly presented for the general reader.

STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND AFRICAN WOMEN FARMERS. Edited by Christina H. Gladwin. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1991, 413 pp. $34.95.

This very valuable collection examines the feminization of poverty in Africa in the current era of structural adjustment reforms prescribed by international lending institutions. Half the book's 16 essays are case studies (Nigeria, Ghana, Cameroon, Zaire, Kenya, Tanzania and Malawi), and the rest focus on gender issues in the policymaking process and on possible approaches to mitigating the worst effects of structural adjustment policies on women.

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

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

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